Legal and policy aspects to consider when providing information security in the corporate environment by Dagada, Rabelani
 i 
 
 
LEGAL AND POLICY ASPECTS TO CONSIDER 
WHEN PROVIDING INFORMATION SECURITY IN 
THE CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
by 
 
RABELANI DAGADA 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in the subject of 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROF. M.M. ELOFF 
NOVEMBER 2014 
 ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
E-commerce is growing rapidly due to the massive usage of the Internet to conduct commercial 
transactions.  This growth has presented both customers and merchants with many advantages.  
However, one of the challenges in E-commerce is information security.  In order to mitigate e-crime, 
the South African government promulgated laws that contain information security legal aspects that 
should be integrated into the establishment of information security. Although several authors have 
written about legal and policy aspects regarding information security in the South African context, it 
has not yet been explained how these aspects are used in the provision of information security in the 
South African corporate environment. 
 
This is the premise upon which the study was undertaken.  Forty-five South African organisations 
participated in this research.  Data gathering methods included individual interviews, website analysis, 
and document analysis. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that most organisations in South Africa are not integrating legal 
aspects into their information security policies.  One of the most important outcomes of this study is 
the proposed Concept Model of Legal Compliance in the Corporate Environment.  This Concept 
Model embodies the contribution of this study and demonstrates how legal requirements can be 
incorporated into information security endeavours.  The fact that the proposed Concept Model is 
technology-independent and that it can be implemented in a real corporate environment, regardless of 
the organisation’s governance and management structure, holds great promise for the future of 
information security in South Africa and abroad.   
 
Furthermore, this thesis has generated a topology for linking legislation to the provision of information 
security which can be used by any academic or practitioner who intends to implement information 
security measures in line with the provisions of the law.  It is on the basis of this premise that 
practitioners can, to some extent, construe that the integration of legislation into information security 
policies can be done in other South African organisations that did not participate in this study.  
Although this study has yielded theoretical, methodological and practical contributions, there is, in 
reality, more research work to be done in this area.   
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NELSON MANDELA BRIDGE: A BEACON OF HOPE FOR SCHOLARS 
 
 
As we embark on our odyssey 
The journey en route to a wealthy place 
This trek of scholarship, destiny, and choice 
You and I need a torch, a guiding light 
Yes, the bonfire – the warning light 
 
As the walking gathers pace 
The legs getting shaky and tired 
The destination miles away 
The prize of the journey invisible 
We cry for some inspiration 
 
When the thirst and hunger set in 
The walking path becoming steep 
The purpose of the journey elusive 
Fatigue and doubt punishing the mind 
Hopelessness haunting the heart 
You and I will need some encouragement 
 
When throwing in the towel becomes tempting 
The hundreds-of-metres-long-structure becomes distantly noticeable 
Astoundingly appealing and well-dressed during the night 
The Nelson Mandela Bridge turns out to be our beacon of hope 
That one day we shall finish our trek 
We shall reach the destiny, a wealthy place 
 
This visually charming Bridge is our inspiration 
The gigantic beacon that lights away fatigue and doubt 
The Nelson Mandela Bridge gives me hope about my inspiration 
Hope about my dreams 
Hope about you and I 
My fellow scholars 
 
This Bridge is as big as our love for scholarship 
It is a symbol of passion and dedication 
We are ordinary people, but our love for scholarship is no ordinary commitment 
Am I dreaming? I don’t know… 
Nonetheless, I pray my dream comes true 
The Bridge gives me the hope 
We shall complete our odyssey 
The Bridge, you and I together 
 
 
By Rabelani Dagada 
November 2014 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Most organisations around the world, and also in South Africa, have developed websites for 
information and business related purposes (Singh, 2010; Siponen, Mahmood & Phahnila, 
2014).  Some of these websites merely display information about the organisation, whilst 
others offer some interactivity with customers.  The Internet revolution is expanding rapidly 
due to electronic commerce (e-commerce) (Chambers-Jones, 2013).  It is on this premise that 
most organisations are striving to catch up.  De Kare-Silver (2001) noted more than a decade 
ago, that it was a daunting task for organisations to master the new environment, explaining 
that: “There is a new game in town and it is now about learning and embracing the new 
factors for success.” These words are now even more applicable in e-commerce (Abawajy, 
2014). 
 
According to Ginn (2013) and Siponen et al. (2014), the challenges brought by the Internet to 
the corporate environment are exacerbated by information security risks, threats and crime. 
 
Hanser (2011) and Ginn (2013) observes that although information security is essential to be 
able to use the information resources, it is not just information security that organisations 
need to achieve.  Users should be able to trust the infrastructure on which they rely to 
facilitate their private and business transactions (Mukundan & Sai, 2014).  Be that as it may, 
trust in e-commerce is a product of dependable information security.  Chambers-Jones (2013) 
claims that information security is e-commerce’s Achilles heel.  Maskerville, Spagnoletti & 
Kim, 2014) reports that the business-to-consumer component of e-commerce may be affected 
by reservations regarding information security breaches.  On the other hand, the credit card is 
the most common online payment option and thus both e-commerce customers and merchants 
are vulnerable to potentially high levels of fraud due to stolen cards and illegally acquired 
card numbers (Rahman & Ramos 2013; Maskerville et al. 2014).  Although new technical 
techniques are constantly being developed to deal with online fraud, these techniques are not 
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necessarily fool proof and a perfect method of encrypting has not yet been developed.  It is on 
the basis of this premise that information security measures cannot be left to technical 
techniques only (Panton, Colombi, Grimaila & Mills, 2014). 
 
Similarly, dealing with electronic crime also cannot be left only to organisations in the 
corporate environment.  According to Campbell (2005), several governments have developed 
legal requirements regarding e-commerce.  The challenge is how to regulate the e-commerce 
activities through national regulation since the Internet transcends geographical boundaries 
(Junio, 2013; Maskerville et al., 2014).  Westby (2013) argues that some governments are 
stricter than others, but they do not have the right to impose their laws and standards on other 
countries. 
 
South African e-commerce merchants and consumers are not immune to cyber-crime (Masete, 
2012; Panton et al., 2014).  The South African government promulgated the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act No. 25 of 2002.  Both the King II (2002) and King III 
(2009) reports contained good governance recommendations which deal with information 
security issues.  Prior to the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 25 of 2002 
and the King II Report of 2002, South African e-commerce merchants and customers relied 
on common law (Dunlop, 2005).  The legislation that was introduced through the ECT Act 
has given e-commerce participants confidence in transacting over the Internet (Luyinda, 
Herselman & Botha, 2008; Haar, Norlyk & Hall, 2014). 
 
The contribution of legislation and organisational policies in providing information security in 
e-commerce transactions needed to be investigated in the South African corporate 
environment.  To date, little research has been conducted in this area.  For the purpose of this 
study, the terms ‘organisation’ and ‘company’ were regarded as having the same meaning and 
were therefore used interchangeably.   
 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
 
This section will provide an overview of the issues that are related to e-commerce, 
information security threats, risks and crime, and legal and policy aspects of information 
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security.  The section will also examine the legal framework of cyberlaw in the South African 
context. 
 
1.2.1 E-commerce and information security 
 
The terms ‘e-commerce’ and ‘information/knowledge economy’ are synonymously used by a 
number of authors (Hanser, 2011).  Agwu (2013) reports that e-commerce is based on the 
increased salience of information as a commercial resource.  The use of information resources 
is rapidly becoming central to the competitiveness of organisations.  This assertion is 
supported by Bellovin (2013), who argues that the competitiveness brought about by e-
commerce reflects the significance of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) 
as enabling tools in online transactions.  This is largely attributed to the growth of the 
Internet.   
 
ICT was the catalyst for the electronic transformation which has shifted from wealth based on 
goods manufacturing to that based on information resources (Luyinda et al., 2008;Trope & 
Humes, 2013).  According to Wu (2013), the increased use of information by organisations 
for commercial purposes leads to new industrial structures, services and products.  The most 
discernible indication of transformation is the transition from a marketplace to the Internet 
where business transactions take place in a wider area without physical contact (Sood & 
Enbody, 2013).  It is noted that the world in which the information economy functions is 
characterised by globalisation and disintermediation, yet life in the digital world relies on 
support from bricks-and-mortar life.  The drivers of globalisation are intricately bound to the 
world of the information economy (Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila, 2014).  Both electronic 
merchants and consumers need to be aware that e-commerce exists in the real world.  It is 
essential to bear in mind that amidst the excitement of ICT, there are people involved.  As in 
the real world, some of the people involved in e-commerce are vulnerable to risks, threats and 
crimes (Lu, 2013; Corrado, 2013).  It is on the basis of this premise that there is a business 
case for information security.  
 
Whilst several organisations are developing and implementing information security measures, 
national governments in countries in which they are based are introducing legislative 
measures in order to deal with information security issues (Campbell, 2005; Corrado, 2013), 
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and the current research explains how countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, India 
and Malaysia have employed national laws to deal with information security risks, threats and 
crimes.  Although national governments are responsible for introducing legislation and policy 
direction regarding information security, organisations should also develop policies at a micro 
level (Nikolayevich & Borisovna, 2014).  It was stated in the introductory section of this 
study that information security measures should not be confined to technical protection 
measures only.  It is the view of the researcher that technical measures should be employed 
within a particular legal and policy framework.  This study attempts to assess the impact of 
the information security legal and policy aspects on e-commerce in the South African context. 
 
1.2.2 Information security risks, threats and crime 
 
While information resources are essential in participating in e-commerce and/or the 
information economy, they are not exempt from risks, threats and crime (Nikolayevich & 
Borisovna, 2014).  It is therefore advisable for any organisation that uses information 
resources to have the necessary information security in place.  Information security provides 
e-commerce merchants and consumers with a false sense of safety and freedom from risks, 
threats and crime.  It has been observed that in e-commerce four different places are involved: 
the location of the user, the location of the Web server, the location of the Web owner, and the 
virtual location of the site, and thus information security is a central concern (Tiwari, 2013). 
 
Privacy is one of the challenges regarding information security. This, according to 
Charlesworth and Pearson (2013), is a major challenge for any financial transaction in the e-
commerce environment.  As far as privacy in e-commerce is concerned, the literature reflects 
three main areas of concern: 
 personal privacy, so that unauthorised entities and individuals should not obtain illegal 
access to private and personal information (McLaughlin & Devers, 2012); 
 confidentiality, therefore information should be protected from unauthorised 
individuals and organisations (Charlesworth & Pearson, 2013), and 
 obstruction and destruction by third parties or hackers (Pellot, 2013). 
 
The processing of e-commerce transactions raises the issue of information security.  Mahadeo 
and Shivaji (2013) report that during the early era of e-commerce, the Internet was generally 
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regarded as being an unprotected medium.  This perception, rightfully so, continues to persist 
(Nye, 2013).  News of hackers and online fraudsters made headlines and led to fear amongst 
millions of potential electronic shoppers (Rogerson & Milton, 2013), who believed that the 
Internet was not a secure environment in which to provide confidential information.  This, 
according to Overill (2013), held the information economy back from even earlier 
advancement. 
 
It should also be noted that viruses and other forms of hostile code (malware) are universally 
experienced as an information security problem (Lawande, 2012).  The infection rate 
continues to grow and this also affects e-commerce participants negatively. Malware has the 
ability to penetrate firewalls, hijack Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and also defeat digital 
signatures (Pisaric, 2013).  Aggressive code is the most well-known source of information 
security lapse (Lawande, 2012).  Huey, Nhan and Broll (2013) list several examples of 
malware, including worms, Trojan horses and macro viruses. 
 
Cyber-crime is an extension of traditional crime, but it takes place on the Internet.  In this 
environment, cyber-crime takes on the non-physical nature of cyber-space and becomes 
borderless, timeless and relatively anonymous (Gabrys, 2004).  Cyber-criminals therefore 
have the potential to reach any networked information resource in the world (Crume, 2000; 
Aleshnikov & Demin, 2013).  In fact, location is becoming irrelevant, due to the spread of 
wireless and satellite technology.  This statement is supported by Dolcil and Macadall (2014), 
who assert that the global reach of networked information resources is promoting a borderless 
platform for cyber-crimes.  Furthermore, the continuous around-the-clock accessibility to 
computer systems has made it difficult to trace the tracks of cyber-criminals.  Gabrys (2004) 
has learnt that cyber-criminals take advantage of the Internet by networking with other cyber-
criminals and creating gangs. 
 
Although information security risks, threats and crimes are serious problems in the e-
commerce environment, it is interesting to note that an organisation like Amazon.com is 
succeeding in online trading (Kalra & Sood, 2013).  It is believed that customers are 
conducting these kinds of e-commerce transactions because they know that information 
security can be achieved (ibid).  It is on this basis that customers should feel secure when they 
do online shopping (Skoudis, 2004).  Kamel and Lanet (2013) have noted that nowadays 
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supplying one’s credit card online can arguably be more secure than providing it over a cell 
phone or physically handing it over to the seller. 
 
Kalra and Sood (2013) state that organisations that succeed online, are those which post 
information security policies on their Websites.  The policies enable these organisations to 
explain their commitment to information security and give the customer an extra level of 
confidence (Mbaku & Yu, 2013; Aleshnikov & Demin, 2013).  In most instances, these 
policies deal with issues related to the credit card numbers and the confidentiality of personal 
data.  Some of these organisational policies are aligned with the laws of the countries in which 
they operate (Dolcil & Macadall, 2014). 
 
The researcher has noted that organisations in other countries are employing legal and policy 
aspects in their endeavours to provide information security in e-commerce transactions 
(Ardito & Procacciant, 2013), and this informs the study which aims to investigate how South 
African organisations employ legal and policy aspects when they provide information 
security.  
 
1.2.3 Policy aspects to consider when providing information security 
 
As mentioned, some organisations post their information security policies on their websites to 
diligently explain their commitment to information security.  These policies deal with issues 
such as the usage of credit cards and other personal data.  Bedard (2014) provide an example 
of how America Online posts a privacy policy on its website regarding the kind of 
information it collects about people who visit its website.  America Online also explains what 
it does or does not do with the collected personal data.  
 
Information security policy is formulated to inform all individuals who operate within an 
organisation as to how they should conduct themselves with regard to ICT information 
security issues (Julisch, 2013).  In some instances, policies are formulated because of 
regulatory requirements (Sharifi & Tripunitara, 2013).  Developing information security 
policies for the sake of satisfying regulatory obligations is not sufficient.  The Information 
security policy is also used as a communication tool amongst the information system 
stakeholders. 
7 
 
The advancement of the information economy in terms of the rapid growth of e-commerce 
places an obligation on government and organisations to develop information security policies 
and regulatory solutions (Corrado, 2013). In the era of information economy, information 
security policies will assist in providing users with security and privacy assurance (Hassan & 
Sabry, 2013). However, the differences in policy approaches amongst key role-players and 
countries make it difficult to provide an adequate information security policy and regulatory 
framework (Nanevski, Banerjee & Garg, 2013).  Although this difficulty emanates from the 
macro level, it manifests itself at the micro (organisational) level.  
 
The unavailability of information security policies is the most serious security breach for any 
organisation that has to protect its customers, networks, systems and data (Ruggiano & 
Brown, 2013).  Every organisation should subscribe to policies regarding its business (the 
business policy), how and with which resources it will achieve its objectives (technical 
policy), and how it will protect its assets and survival (information security policy) (Zinszer & 
Tamblyn, 2013).  All policies should be documented officially and agreed to by all the 
stakeholders. 
 
According to Shu’aibu and Sukri (2013), information security policies should be visible in 
order to be effective.  Visibility helps to fast-track the implementation of the policy because 
the policy is then known throughout the organisation.  It is therefore advisable to employ 
presentations, videos, workshops, speakers, discussion panel fora and newsletters, to name but 
a few deployment methods (Assaf, 2012; Ruggiono et al., 2013).  The organisations’ 
information security training and awareness initiatives can assist in informing users of new 
information security policies (Demirhan & Demirtas, 2011; Shu’aibu and Sukri, 2013). 
Information security policies should be introduced in a way that ensures the support of 
stakeholders, especially in organisations where workers feel overwhelmed by directives and 
procedures.  The information security policy in an organisation can also be seen as a 
reflection of management’s commitment to information security and expectations regarding 
staff responsibilities, actions and accountability.  Information security should also be 
integrated into other organisational policies.  This can be achieved by co-ordinating policies 
and involving other business units.  This will make it easy for users to implement information 
security policies. Campbell (2005) clearly indicates the role of law in information security.  
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The following section provides an overview of legal aspects to consider when providing 
information security. 
 
1.2.4 Legal aspects to consider when providing information security 
 
Countries such the Czech Republic (Loebl, 2005), Hungary (Szeman, 2005), India (Joshi, 
Salaria & Naidu, 2005), Malaysia (Fatt & Wahjanto, 2005), Singapore (Chia, 2005), Taiwan 
(Kuo & Fan, 2005), the United Kingdom (Griffiths & Harrison, 2005), and the United States 
of America (USA) (Weiser, 2005) have developed laws that deal with e-commerce and 
information security in particular.  The governments of these countries have also developed 
strategies that stimulate the advancement of information security (Salzberg & Jang, 2012).  
However, according to Sanchez-Pena & Fernandez-Vice (2013), there are countries in which 
e-commerce and information security are not supported by any legal framework. 
 
Some of the laws passed in various countries regarding e-commerce and information security 
include the Law of Electronic Communication of 2005 in the Czech Republic (Szeman, 
2005); the e-Commerce Act of 2001 in Hungary (Szeman, 2005); the Information Technology 
Act of 2000 in India (Joshi, Salaria & Naidu, 2005); the Electronic Transactions Act of 1996 
in Singapore (Chia, 2005); the Malaysia Digital Signature Act of 1997 in Malaysia (Fatt & 
Wahjanto, 2005); and the Uniform Electronic Act of 1999 in the United States.  
 
Most governments do not develop a legal framework to stifle e-commerce but rather to create 
the right conditions in which the information economy can flourish (Loblich & Wendelin, 
2012; Salzberg & Jang, 2012).  Government intervention in regulation should be in the 
background rather than at the forefront of the information economy. According to Ardito and 
Procaccianti (2013), governments’ laws and regulations do not always provide the corporate 
environment with space to formulate and implement its own policies.  This may have a 
negative impact on the growth of emerging technologies.  For example, Germany’s law on 
digital signatures imposed inflexible licensing terms on certification authorities (Hamadouche 
& Lanet, 2013; Sanchez-Pena & Fernandez-Vicente, 2013). 
 
Cecere and Rochelandet (2013) report that pushing through laws regarding eCommerce and 
information security by governments in several countries has led to the lack of a uniform 
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international legal framework.  The nature, scope and transitional nature of the information 
economy all exacerbate the problem.  While Abawajy (2014) supports a common global legal 
and regulatory framework, Ruggiano and Brown (2013) suggest that the industry should 
establish its own policies within the national, regional and international legal framework.  
Although some developed countries have recognised threats posed by inadequate information 
security, little has been done practically to implement legal measures that will deal with the 
problem (Ting & Yi, 2013).  This can be attributed to differences over the form of such a 
legal framework.  The disputes between the European Union (EU) and the USA over the 
assorted aspects of the Internet regulatory framework do not help to address the problem.  
However, there are some attempts being made at the international level to develop a 
legislative framework for information security (Ardito & Procaccianti, 2013; Borgmann, 
2013). 
 
Such attempts include the establishment of the Electronic Signatures Electronic Commerce 
Directive, as a consequence of various EU initiatives (Borgmann, 2013; Loblich & Wendelin, 
2012).  The United Nations International Trade Law Commission (UNCITRAL) introduced 
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (the 1996 Model Law) in 1996 (Joshi, Salaria & 
Naidu, 2005).  The introduction of the 1996 Model Law emerged from the challenge of 
developing a regulatory framework for the use of the Internet where existing legal systems 
were not entirely applicable to electronic transactions.  This study investigates how national 
and international legal frameworks are taken into account by South African organisations 
when they secure their information resources. 
 
1.2.5 Legal framework of e-commerce and information security in South Africa 
 
There has been a rapid rise in the use of e-commerce in South Africa and the need emerged to 
develop legislation that would provide security to Internet consumers and merchants (Dunlop, 
2005; Pellot, 2013).  South African Common Law does not address issues related to the 
security of electronic transactions sufficiently.   
 
According to Dunlop (2005), the South African government did not confine its concerns to 
information security, but intended to provide a legal framework that would address security, 
transparency and infrastructural commercial development.  The assumption was that e-
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commerce initiatives that are based on a sound legal framework would enable South Africa to 
become a leading technology power on the African continent (Dunlop, 2005; Dagada, Eloff & 
Venter, 2009).  It is on this basis that the South African Department of Communications 
established an ICT investment cluster in May 1998 to create a legislative framework on issues 
relating to e-commerce and information security (Groenewald, 2000; Dagada, 2013).    
 
Dunlop (2005) reports that the South African government established a task team in the early 
2000s to produce a document that would form a basis for the development of an e-commerce 
policy, followed by legislation.  The legislation was preceded by both a Green and a White 
Paper (Groenewald, 2000; De Wet & Du Plessis, 2004). 
 
According to Dunlop (2005:560), the South African government prescribed the following 
objectives in developing an e-commerce policy: 
 
 to create an enabling legal and regulatory environment for open and fair participation 
in e-commerce; 
 to support technological developments that will lead to the establishment of global 
connectivity; 
 to ensure that legal systems and international trade agreements between nations are 
adjusted and reformed to accommodate the new concepts of law; 
 to establish appropriate law enforcement to prevent crimes in the information space; 
and 
 to promote education that will increase information literacy among all citizens. 
 
The following statutory instruments predominantly regulate the South African legal 
framework regarding e-commerce and information security in particular: Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996 (specifically the right to privacy); the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act No. 25 of 2005 (providing the framework behind 
electronic communications and also addressing cyber-crime – chapter 13, sections 85-89); the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000 (which deals with records 
management, disclosure, confidentiality and access); the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-related Act No. 70 of 2002 (which 
prohibits interception and monitoring without permission from a Court of Law); the King 
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Reports on Governance for South Africa (King II, 2002 and King III, 2009); and the 
Protection of Personal Information Bill No. 9 of 2009 (which deals with the right to privacy).  
Furthermore, on 27 November 2013, the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 
2013 was signed into law; however, it was not significantly drawn on for the purposes of this 
research.  
 
The widely used King Reports on Governance for South Africa were named after Advocate 
Mervyn E. King, SC, Chairman of the King Committee on Corporate Governance (King & 
Lessidrenska, 2009).  This Committee was established in 1992 and issued the first report in 
1994 (King, 2006).  The King II Report was released in 2002 with a particular emphasis on 
good governance. It recognised that ICT has the capacity to bring security risks and 
challenges to the company and the Board of Directors should address this (King II Report, 
2002).  Inasmuch as the King II Report was not legislation, but rather a set of guidelines, 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange were compelled to comply with 
the report. The King II Report was replaced by the King III Report of 2009. One of the major 
differences between the two reports is that the King III Report has more information security 
and IT governance provisions than the King II Report, where the King III Report argues that 
information security is a critical component of the overall efficiency and sustainability of the 
enterprise. 
 
1.3 THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
As explained in Section 1.2, legal and policy aspects are important in the provision of 
information security.  Although several authors have written about legal and policy aspects 
regarding information security in the South African context, it has not been explained how 
these aspects are used in the provision of information security in the South African corporate 
environment. The question arises as to whether the range of legislation previously mentioned, 
as well as other information security-related legislation at macro level, and the organisations’ 
policies, are used by South African organisations in their endeavour to provide information 
security.  
 
According to Reinhardt Buys (2004) of Buys Incorporated Attorneys, “Both the 2002 and 
2004 website compliance surveys in South Africa ‘painted a bleak picture’ of non-compliance 
12 
 
and general indifference towards laws and regulations governing websites and the online sale 
of goods and services in South Africa”.  In 2002, 26% of South African website operators 
claimed that they were not aware of the compliance requirements, and this number increased 
in 2004 by 5% to 31% (Buys, 2004).   
 
The failure to comply with the law, according to Buys (2004), has led to an increase in 
website crime: “During March 2002, a defamatory statement posted to the website of Kick Off 
magazine, ended in the High Court.  A month later the Department of Health investigated an 
illegal online pharmacy in Table View and in June of the same year, the Gauteng Metro 
Police attempted to close down a website that warned motorists of speed traps around 
Johannesburg.”   
 
The problem was exacerbated by the fact that even after the promulgation of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act No. 25 of 2005 (ECT Act), most South Africans did 
not comply with the requirements of of Chapter 7 and Part III of Chapter 3 of this Act (Buys 
Incorporated Attorneys, 2005).They did not seem to realise that failure to comply with the 
provisions of the law exposes their websites to serious risk and liability.  Of the 1 550 
websites surveyed by Buys Incorporated Attorneys (2004), the Telkom website 
(http://www.telkom.co.za) was the only one to score a full 100% compliance rate.  Table 1.1 
below reflects the summarised results of the 2004 South African website compliance survey 
(Buys Incorporated Attorneys, 2004). 
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Table 1.1: South African Website Compliance 2004  
ASPECT SURVEYED 2002 2004 
Total number of websites surveyed 607 1 550 
Percentage of websites with legal notices at all 47.3% 81% 
Percentage of websites with terms and conditions available as hyperlinks 7.1% 6% 
Percentage of websites with liability disclaimers available as hyperlinks 3.8% 8% 
Percentage of website operators who do not know what to do to become compliant 26% 31% 
Percentage of website operators who understand the risks and liabilities of non-compliance 27% 43% 
Percentage of website legal notices that address the provisions of Chapter 3, Part II and 
Chapter 7 of the ECT Act 
5.06% 3.22% 
Percentage of website operators who claim compliance is too expensive 66.3% 85.8% 
Percentage of website operators who are likely to use affordable DIY compliance tools, if 
available 
94% 87% 
Percentage of websites that position and implement legal notices correctly No 
results 
9.3% 
Percentage of website legal notices that are printable or saveable as required by section 
11(3) of the ECT Act 
No 
results 
10.1% 
Source: Buys, 2004 
 
Other than the aforesaid website compliance survey conducted by Buys Incorporated 
Attorneys in 2002 and 2004, there has not been any substantial study that focuses on the 
compliance of information security related legislation by organisations in South Africa (Buys, 
2004). Moreover, it remains to be established whether the existing company policies are in 
line with the national and international legal regime.  The lack of results with regard to 
consideration of legal and policy aspects in the South African corporate environment seems to 
indicate the need for research in this field.  There is a gap in the literature as to how 
information security legal policy and legislation add value to the corporate environment not 
just within the South African corporate context, but also internationally.  Current literature 
does not indicate whether South African organisations are complying with the national legal 
and policy framework regarding information security. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
Within this context, the main research question was formulated as follows: 
 
Are South African companies employing legal prescriptions to enhance information security 
and how are they doing it? 
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In order to answer the research question, it was necessary to answer the following sub-
questions: 
 
1. To what extent are organisations in South Africa integrating information security legal 
requirements into their policy formulation and implementation? 
2. To what extent are organisations in South Africa implementing information security 
policies in which the legal aspects have been integrated? 
 
The abovementioned research question and sub-questions were answered by employing 
various data collection methods. 
 
1.4.1 Objectives of the study 
 
The aim of the study was to assess how South African companies integrate legal and policy 
aspects when they deal with information security issues.  In order to attain the set aim, the 
objectives were outlined as follows: 
 
i. To undertake a study of the literature to determine: 
 the nature of information security related problems; and 
 the relevant South African laws pertaining to information security. 
 
ii. To determine by means of the field study the following: 
 the way in which the South African companies are employing legislation imperatives 
in providing information security; 
 the extent to which the South African legal framework impacts on the formulation of 
information security policies at organisational level; and 
 the extent to which South African companies are complying with the commercial 
websites legal requirements. 
 
iii. To determine by means of studying documents (policies, procedures and strategies) 
collected from the participating companies how they are aligning their information 
security measures with legislation and policies.   
 
15 
 
iv. To suggest a concept model of legal compliance for information security in the 
corporate environment within the South African context.   
 
1.5 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study employed a generic qualitative approach with document analysis, website analysis, 
and key informant interviews being used for data collection purposes, apart from the literature 
review.  Qualitative analysis methods were used to analyse the collected data. Participants in 
this study were 45 South African organisations.  The study involved companies from different 
industrial sectors such as banking, transport, online retail, hotel, broadcasting, and 
telecommunications, and included the energy, mining, insurance, banking, telecommunication 
and services industrial sectors.   
 
Convenience and purposive sampling were used to select the participating companies.  The 
trustworthiness of this study, amongst other things, was guaranteed by using both internal and 
external validities.   
 
The researcher used data collection methods to identify the causal link between policy 
aspects, legal aspects and information security in the South African corporate environment.  
The research methodology used in this study is explained in Chapter 4. 
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is intended to provide important insights into the future application of legal and 
policy aspects in the provision of information security in the South African corporate 
environment.  Companies, boards of directors, ICT executives, information security 
practitioners, e-commerce participants, and policy formulators may use the findings of this 
study as a resource and guide.  It is envisaged that the findings and recommendations of this 
study will be transferable and applicable to other contexts and countries.  The study 
contributes both theoretically and practically in the area of compliance with legislation when 
implementing information security. 
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The originality of the contribution of this study to the academic and industry knowledge-base 
of information security benefited from additional contextualised corporate descriptions that 
add to the understanding of the complexities of employing legislation to enhance information 
security in the South African corporate environment.  This study produced the Concept Model 
of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the Corporate Environment.  This model 
embodies the contribution of the study.  The fieldwork of this study produced adequate 
empirical evidence and the importance of the Concept Model was illustrated within the 
discussion framework of this thesis to convince information security practitioners and experts 
that the proposed Concept Model has the inherent capacity and integrity to become a 
recognised corporate practice in the field of information security.   
 
Although this study focused on the legal aspects to consider when providing information 
security in organisations, it is important to clarify that this is not a legal study, but rather 
information system research.  Furthermore, the principle of IANAL (I am not a lawyer) is 
applicable to this study.   
 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Chapter 1 provided an introduction, overview of, and general orientation to the study, the 
rationale and aim for conducting the study, the research question and sub-questions, potential 
contribution of the study, the research programme and a summary of chapter 1. The next two 
chapters contain literature review – Chapter 2 focuses on information security and Chapter 3 
on the South African legislation pertaining to information security. 
 
Chapter 2 contains a descriptive outline of information security history, risks, threats, and 
crimes.  For the purpose of this study, the following information security issues will be dealt 
with – hacking, viruses, privacy, ethical issues and industrial espionage.  
 
Chapter 3 specifically provides a legal framework for information security in South Africa.  
This includes the topical issues which are covered in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa; as well as other relevant pieces of legislation. 
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Chapter 4 focuses on the research design of the study.  Details of the research approach and 
procedures are supplied, including details about participants in the research and sampling, 
data collection methods and analysis techniques. 
 
In Chapters 5 and 6 the analysed data and findings of the study are reported against the 
background of the literature review and the research questions. The analysis has shown that 
the participation of the board of directors in the development of information security policies 
was minimal; most information security practitioners were not familiar with the legal and 
policy aspects that they were supposed to integrate with the implementation of information 
security and thus most organisations were not complying with the law.  
 
Chapter 7 contains the Concept Model of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the 
Corporate Environment.  The Concept Model embodies the contribution of the study.  This 
chapter provides a model whereby legal requirements are incorporated into the information 
security endeavours.  The Concept Model is the intellectual property of the researcher and can 
be seen as a synthesis of theory, practice and cognitive perspectives gained over years of 
practical experience. 
 
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the whole study, the conclusion, recommendations for 
further study and recommendations to the policy makers and industry. 
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Figure 1.1 Relationship between the various chapters.   
 
The thesis concludes with a list of references consulted and appendices. 
 
1.8 SUMMARY  
 
Most organisations around the world, as in South Africa, use the Internet for business related 
transactions.  The use of the Internet for business purposes is called e-commerce.  As 
explained in Section 1.2 of this chapter, e-commerce is not immune to risks, threats and 
crime.  Organisations should therefore provide information security to protect online 
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merchants and consumers.  On the other hand, Section 1.2 also indicated that the 
responsibility of protecting online merchants and consumers cannot be left only in the hands 
of the corporate sector, and thus governments, regional and international organisations should 
also play a role.  The perception that the Internet is an unprotected business medium leads to 
doubts amongst electronic shoppers to embrace e-commerce.  These kinds of doubts tend to 
directly or indirectly negatively affect economic development.  Notwithstanding this, there are 
a number of organisations that are succeeding in e-commerce.  This could, at least in part, be 
attributed to their reputation for providing satisfactory information security.  Section 1.2 also 
showed that the companies that succeed in e-commerce are those that implement information 
security policies.  These policies are on their websites for the attention of Internet consumers 
and business partners.  In most instances, these policies deal with security and privacy related 
issues.   
 
The background section has explained the significance of international and national legal 
frameworks in the provision of information security.  Companies that want to succeed in e-
commerce should, amongst other things, go beyond technical security measures by employing 
policy and legal aspects of information security.  Based on the literature, it is the view of the 
researcher that technical measures should be applied within a particular organisational, 
national and international policy and legal framework. 
 
It was indicated in the section on research design that the researcher used data collection 
methods to identify the causal link between policy aspects, legal aspects and information 
security in the South African corporate environment.  The literature also discussed the legal 
framework of information security in South Africa.  This study investigated how this legal 
framework and South African organisational policies are applied at company level as 
measures to provide information security. 
 
Section 1.3, which deals with the problem statement, provides the rationale for this study.  
The literature does not show how the legal and policy aspects are used in the provision of 
information security in South Africa.  The section also shows the research question and sub-
questions.  It was stated that the aim of this study was, amongst other considerations, to 
provide important insights into the future use of legal and policy aspects in the provision of 
information security in the South African corporate environment.  It was stated that the 
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findings and recommendation of this study are transferable and applicable to other contexts 
and countries.  Chapter Two, the first of two literature review chapters, provides a descriptive 
outline of information security history, risks, threats, and crimes. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
INFORMATION SECURITY RISKS, THREATS AND CRIME 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Individuals and organizations need to protect their information from attackers or competitors 
as loss of information could lead to lawsuits or loss of business.  Simply put, information 
should always be protected and secured.  According to literature, Information Security refers 
to “measures adopted to prevent the unauthorized use, misuse, modification, or denial of use 
of knowledge, facts, data or capabilities” (Maiwald, 2004:4).  The aforesaid statements are 
supported by authors such as Wu and Ye, (2014) and Mukundan and Sai (2014). In other 
words, Information Security comprises the preventative measures put in place to protect 
information and capabilities, keeping these safe from threats and any exploitation (ibid). The 
field of information security is usually inter-related with other fields such as computer 
security and information assurance. These, though some subtle differences may exist between 
them, are characterized by the common aims of ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information (Westby, 2013). 
 
Society, technology and information security have evolved over time. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of guarding information today requires an understanding of how information 
security has been handled in the past (Westby, 2013).  Cassim (2012) postulates that 
Information Security breaches have increased dramatically in the past few years.  The attacks 
are becoming increasingly more sophisticated as the field of computer and network 
technology evolves.  This chapter outlines a brief history of information security. 
 
This chapter provides broad insights on information security history, risks, threats and crime.  
It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that the overall purpose of this study is to assess how 
organisations can, amongst other things, use legal and policy aspects to address their 
information security concerns.  The legal and policy aspects pertaining to information security 
do not occur in a vacuum and thus a broader understanding of issues that constitute 
information security risks, threats and crimes is essential.  For the purpose of this study, the 
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following information crimes will be dealt with: hacking, malicious code or viruses, privacy 
and ethical issues and social engineering. These are briefly defined below. 
 
Hacking is one of the most well-known types of information security related risks and crimes 
(Maiwald, 2004; Adrian, 2013).  Simply put, hacking involves breaking into information 
systems in order to make them dysfunctional or to steal information for whatever purpose.  It 
is indicated in this chapter that there are numerous causes for hacking.  This chapter also 
points out historical hacking techniques, such as open sharing, distributed attacks and kernel-
level Rootkit.  Technical protective measures to deal with hacking are also discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
Malicious code, widely known as malware or viruses, is one of the major information security 
related problems (Isaacs, 2013).  It is demonstrated in this chapter that just as in the biological 
field, it is difficult to contain computer viruses.  Malware has the ability to destroy 
information systems.  An historical overview of malware is presented in this chapter.  Some 
authors, such as Kehe and Schichao (2014) claim that viruses existed before the 1980s.  This 
claim is, however, contested by authors like James, Nottingham and Kim (2013).  It was 
found that during the early 1990s, malware authors improved them in such a way that it 
became very difficult to detect them.  Types of malware and measures to deal with them are 
explained. 
 
This chapter also reflects on the ethical issues in the context of information security and the 
defence mechanisms to eradicate these. Ethical issues include social engineering, privacy, and 
copyright matters.  The last part of this chapter reflects briefly on information security 
policies. 
 
2.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF ECOMMERCE AND INFORMATION SECURITY 
CONCERNS 
 
This section provides an overview of the history of e-commerce by reflecting on the 
emergence of the Internet and World Wide Web.  It also deals with electronic payments and 
information security challenges. 
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2.2.1 The emergence of the Internet and World Wide Web 
 
Richardson (2000) reported that the Internet started from humble beginnings as a USA 
government military project.  Nowadays, the Internet is one of the dominating communication 
and commercial tools in the corporate world. The Internet came into being during the Cold 
War in the 1950s.  The USA military was concerned about the potential of a nuclear attack 
that could destroy all their military data and information (Richardson, 2000).  It is on this 
premise that the Department of Defence worked with the Rand Corporation in dispersing their 
computers geographically.  These computers were networked together and no one computer 
would be in charge of all the data (Chance-Hill & Odell, 2014; James et al., 2013).  A 
message sent to another networked computer was labelled with the receiver’s address.  
Lawrence, Newton, Corbitt, Lawrence and Tidwell (2000) had noted that during the early 
days of the Internet, its activities were subsidised by the government and strictly kept out of 
reach of the business community.  
 
According to Moschovitis, Poole, Schuyler and Senft (1999) and Flanagin and Metzger 
(2014), the use of the networked computers has since then grown beyond the military.  The 
corporate sector and private citizens started to use the Internet for communication and 
commercial purposes.  In fact, according to Lawrence et al., (2000), in the 1960s some private 
people in USA were already using a forerunner of the Internet as we know it today. However, 
it was only in the 1990s that the Internet started to make its mark in communication, research 
and increasingly, to sell goods and services online.  The Internet has moved through four 
waves.  These waves are reflected in Table 2.1 below. 
 
24 
 
Table 2.1: Four waves of the Internet development 
Wave Countries Characteristics 
Wave 1 United States, Canada and the Nordics Characteristics by early adoption in the universities and 
government in the 1980s.  These countries are among the 
heaviest commercial users of the technology. 
Wave 2 The rest of the European Union, Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Israel 
Characterised by high level of private and public sector 
interest in developing broad information societies.  
Extensive commercial uses although focus on consumer 
applications varies widely. 
Wave 3 Developing countries across South East Asia, 
China, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, 
Egypt, and smaller islands states such as 
Tonga, Fiji, Barbados and French Polynesia 
Characterised by high levels of interest in initiating and 
developing business applications of online commerce. 
Wave 4 Least developed countries or other countries 
that deliberately shun Internet use. 
Characterised to date by unattractive investment 
environment.  In some countries there have been 
attempts to ban the Internet for political and social 
reasons. 
Adopted from Lawrence et al., (2000:2) 
 
Although Table 2.1 does not show the years in which particular waves happened, it provides 
important insights regarding the history and background of the Internet and e-commerce.  
Lawrence et al., (2000) wrote that in the mid-1980s, the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
developed a high speed, long-distance telecommunications network into which other networks 
could be connected.   This network is currently supported by other organisations.  By 1991, 
the NSF removed its restrictive usage policy and allowed the business community to have 
commercial sites.  This led to the arrival of the World Wide Web (WWW) (Moschovitis et al., 
1999).  Although in this study, the terms Internet, WWW, Web and Cyber will be used 
synonymously and interchangeably, it should be noted that the WWW is just one of the 
services offered by the Internet (Shipps & Philips, 2013; Kehe & Shichao, 2014).  The WWW 
has grown rapidly since its inception in the 1990s. 
 
The arrival of the WWW encouraged business interest in the Internet (Porrini, Palmonari & 
Vizzari, 2014).   The Web is a graphical hypertext environment, which functions within the 
Internet.  It consists of global collections of electronic documents that have hyperlinks 
connected to related documents (Elmalech & Sarne, 2014).  The WWW supports or/and 
incorporates multimedia (audio and visual) presentations, text and graphics.  Lawrence et al., 
(2000:4) reported that the protocol (rules, procedures and standards) that is employed by the 
Web is the “hypertext transfer protocol” (http), whilst the protocol for commercial activities 
on the Web is secure hypertext transfer protocol, which creates the basis for “secure 
communications, authentication, digital signatures and encryption”. 
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Nowadays, the use of the Internet for commercial purposes is still growing rapidly (Abdullah, 
Xu & Geva, 2013).  This is matched by the consumers’ accessibility to the Internet (Lostorto, 
2013).  Lower computer prices and easy Internet access are encouraging people to visit 
business Web sites.  Customers and prospective customers can now visit business Web sites 
more frequently (Bedard, 2014).  This is enhanced by the fact that surfing the Internet is 
becoming a habit amongst people which has led to both print and electronic media developing 
Web sites for regular news updates and breaking news.  
 
2.2.2 The emergence of electronic transactions  
 
Lawrence et al., (2000:6) reported that the use of e-commerce in the financial services 
industry started in the early sixties.  These include the automation/computerisation of cheque 
processing, credit card processing, and wire transfers (Porrini, Palmonari & Vizzari, 2014).  
This trend, according to Collin (1998), was followed by banking teller stations in local 
branches, which were automated to allow direct processing of certain transactions.  The 
automation of teller stations enabled customers to have direct access to their account 
information (Stampler, 2013). 
 
In the 1990s, personal computing was extended from the office to the home and thus the 
business sector started to extend their technology to bring services to customers at their homes 
(Lawrence et al., 2006).  The merchants found electronic transaction was a great cost-saver 
while on the other hand their revenue sources were increasing (James & Rajendran, 2013).  
According to Flanagin and Metzger (2014), the business sector also realised that electronic 
transactions made them more competitive in customer service and customer retention.  
 
According to Lawrence et al., (2000:7), there are four critical issues that have impacted the 
speed of e-commerce evolution.  These include the following: 
 
o the need for improved technology to ensure the security of the transaction; 
o the availability of a variety of payment protocols; 
o system reliability for twenty-four hours a day seven days a week operations, and  
o the flexibility of the platform to absorb new capabilities as they become available. 
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Lawrence et al., (2000) and Washah (2013) reported that electronic data interchange (EDI) 
and e-mail has been used for many years for commercial electronic transactions.  It was also 
used for work flow and re-engineering applications (Elmalch & Sarne, 2014).  It is on this 
premise that towards the end of 1999, American Online already had about 20 million 
subscribers (Fang & Qureshi, 2014).  EDI was eventually used in conjunction with the 
Internet.  As a result, some companies that did not use the Internet for business purposes 
started losing contracts and customers at the beginning of the 21st Century (Costante, Paci & 
Zannone, 2013). 
 
Lawrence et al. (2000) reported that throughout the recorded commercial history of 
humankind, people have engaged in the exchange of value in many ways.  In earlier times, 
people acquired goods and services by exchanging tokens of various sorts (Mathiesen, 1997; 
Chance-Hill & Odell, 2014).  This was referred to as bartering.  It is only two or three 
millennia ago that the first coins with specific value were introduced.  These primitive coins 
formed the basis of the modern forms of money.  In fact, today, people can engage in the 
exchange of services and goods in various ways other than coin and paper money.  This 
should be attributed to the inception of electronic forms of money (Mathiesen, 1997; Flanagin 
& Metzger, 2014). 
 
Lee (2012) reported that since the early 1990s, the Internet has grown rapidly in terms of the 
quantity of both users and applications.  On the other hand, merchants and consumers have 
noted the endless commercial potential of the Internet and thus commercial transactions 
emerged on the Internet (Shipps & Philips, 2013).  One should be quick to indicate that whilst 
agreement to sell and buy was conducted via the Internet, payment tendered would be 
arranged outside the Internet (Elmalech & Sane, 2014).  This would be done by resorting to 
conventional ways of paying (Lostorto, 2013).  The avoidance of using the Internet for 
electronic payment should be attributed to concerns regarding information security and 
privacy (Bedard, 2014).  According to Stampler (2013), it was really unsatisfactory to add 
another step of paying through a different medium of communication before the transactions 
could be finalised.  
 
To date, much effort and resources have been put into the establishment of security in the 
Internet to address the concerns of the merchants and consumers (Stampler, 2013).  
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Contemporary lawmakers have encouraged payment with paper-based methods, but lately 
they are increasingly allowing electronic alternatives (James & Rajendran, 2013).  Policy 
formulators agreed to this transactional method after recognising that uniformity among 
countries was essential to facilitate e-commerce (Washah, 2013).  Electronic payments 
include electronic cards, credit cards, debit cards, digital cash, and other digital currencies 
(Elmalech & Sarne, 2014).  
 
2.2.3 Information security issues: implications for e-commerce 
 
It has been stated in the preceding sections that e-commerce is growing fast.  It does seem 
however, that one of the major obstacles to a more rapid growth of e-commerce has been the 
customer concerns regarding information security related issues (Fang & Qureshi, 2014).  It 
should also be noted that, from the start, the Internet was designed to share information – and 
not to hide it (Elmalech & Sarne, 2014).  At that stage it did not seem to be necessary to build 
in tight information security features since it was taken for granted that all transmissions 
would be carried over private lines.  In fact, top secret military transmissions are still on 
private networks, but the basic technology has moved to the world’s public network – the 
Internet and companies’ internal networks (Washah, 2013).  It is here that consumers and 
merchants find themselves using insecure protocols which were primarily designed for 
connectivity and information security – going over inherently unprotected public and 
corporate networks where there is a serious “lack of sentries guarding the gates” (Crume, 
2000). 
 
A major concern in e-commerce has been information security for confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability: 
 
Information security for confidentiality: It has been stated in this section that credit and 
debit cards are some of the electronic payment methods in e-commerce environment.  One of 
the major impediments to the general use of these cards as a means of payment for the e-
commerce transactions has been the concern in some consumers’ thinking that they lack 
sufficient confidentiality (James & Rajendran, 2013) 
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Information security for integrity: Bedard (2014) wrote that one of the problems of using 
the Internet for commercial purposes is its questionable integrity.  It is here that some 
marketers find it difficult to convince consumers to buy their products and services online 
(Elmalech & Sarne, 2014).  On the other hand, some consumers would not even bother to 
consider an online advertisement due to the integrity concerns. This has led consumers to only 
trust established online retailers like Amazon.com and Kalahari.Net (Shipps & Phillips, 
2013).  The consequence of this is that small, micro, and medium enterprise end up suffering 
huge losses. 
 
Information security for availability: One of the major challenges facing online retailers is 
to secure the availability of their e-commerce Web sites consistently (Chance-Hill & Odell, 
2014).  The unavailability of a particular Web site could be due to an attack (Flanagin & 
Metzger, 2014).  According to Fang and Quresh (2014), attacks on availability are designed to 
forbid legitimate users from using an online resource, such as Internet banking. 
 
The above paragraphs have dealt with information security challenges that are confronting e-
commerce globally and South Africa, in particular.  Whilst there are technical remedies that 
could address the information security challenges, this study will argue that policy and legal 
aspects should be used to mitigate these problems.   
 
2.3 OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION SECURITY RISK, THREAT AND CRIME 
 
A chapter on information security risks, threats and crime would be incomplete without a 
section on hacking.  According to authors such as Kamel and Lanet (2013), a hacker is a 
person who breaks into computers and/or its systems.  Abdulla et al. (2013) notes that the 
term hacker has many definitions, starting from a corporate systems administrator who is able 
to make computer systems work.  The authors note that the term has been co-opted by the 
media and “stripped of its meaning”. This word used to be considered complimentary in the 
past rather than being an insult (ibid).  Some authors report that the word ‘hacker’ is a 
derogatory term (Maiwald, 2004; Abdulla et al., 2013).  Maiwald (2004) argues that perhaps 
the more appropriate term would be “cracker” or “criminal”.  Nevertheless, to comply with 
the current general usage and due to its derogatory meaning, the term “hacker” will be used in 
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this study to identify those people who intrude into computer systems and/or make such 
systems dysfunctional, and will include crackers. 
 
2.3.1 Historical hacking techniques 
 
An understanding of the hackers’ motivation is the key element to understand hacking.  The 
purpose and motive of hacking are interlinked.  Maiwald (2004) reasons that understanding 
the motivation enables us to understand what makes the computer and networks interesting to 
the hacker: “Is the system somehow valuable or enticing?” Answering this and other 
questions enables information security professionals to better assess the vulnerability of their 
computer systems.  They will also be able to determine how they could use technical, policy 
and legal measures to protect their systems.  Several authors assert that hacking is motivated 
by challenge, greed, malicious intent, crime, industrial espionage, press, policy and terrorism 
(Nye, 2013; Pisaric, 2013, Thaanum, 2013). This section provides an historical overview of 
the hacking techniques showing the evolution of techniques used by hackers.  
 
Open file sharing 
When the Internet was initially established, according to Maiwald (2004) and Xiong (2013), it 
was a platform of information sharing and collaboration amongst research institutions.  It is 
on this basis that most usage of computer systems was confined to the sharing of information.  
Maiwald (2004) provided an example of the UNIX systems – it allows a computer to mount 
the drives from any another computer across the network.  This is also applicable to the 
Internet and Local Area Network (LAN).  File sharing via the Internet, Network File System 
(NFS) and LAN was used by some of the first hackers to infiltrate systems (Martin & De 
Andrade, 2013). 
 
Maiwald (2004) reports that NFS utilised user identity numbers to allow access to the drive 
that contains information: “So if a file were limited to a user Joe with user identity 104 on its 
home machine, another user Alice with user identity 104 on a remote machine would be able 
to read the file.  The danger associated with that was that some systems allowed the sharing of 
the root file system and the hacker could change the configuration files of that particular 
remote system (Maiwald, 2004; Thompson, 2014).  Most operating systems have now been 
improved to avoid this. 
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Distributed attacks 
One of the trends in the evolution of hacking is the move towards distributed attack 
architectures (Skoudis, 2004; Xiong, 2013).  The hackers are maximising the distribution 
ability of the Internet itself to enhance their hacking capabilities.  The hacker takes a 
traditional system attack and divides the work amongst several computer systems (Maiwald, 
2004; Martin & De Andrade, 2013).  Most systems are collaborating and thus the hacker’s 
probabilities for success are good.  It is still very difficult to detect and/or trace a hacker who 
uses distributed attacks.  Poorly protected systems in government departments, learning 
institutions, companies and homes with Internet connectivity are easy targets for a hacker.  
According to Skoudis (2004), these hackers use, “automated vulnerability scanning tools, 
including home-grown scripts and freeware tools such as the Nessus Vulnerability Scanner, 
amongst many others, to scan large swathes of the Internet”. 
 
Kernel-level Rootkit 
Hackers are not just attacking major protocols such as address resolution protocols and 
domain name service (DNA); they also target the “heart” of an operating system (Skoudis, 
2004; Agwu, 2013).  The subsections below detail the evolution of kernel-level Rootkits as 
espoused by Skoudis (2004). 
 
(a) Traditional Rootkits 
A traditional Rootkit is a set of hacking tools that enables the hacker to obtain super-user 
access on a computer system (Skoudis, 2004; Alazab & Venkatraman, 2013).  Once the 
hacker obtains root-level control on a computer, the Rootkit allows the hacker to maintain that 
access.  Traditional Rootkits would normally include a backdoor so that the hacker could get 
into the system and penetrate the normal information security defence.  It is recorded that 
traditional Rootkits create backdoors and hiding techniques by substituting important 
executable programmes included in the operating system (Mohite & Kumthekar, 2013). 
 
(b) Kernel-level Rootkits 
Whilst traditional Rootkits substitute critical system executables, hackers have gone a step 
further by implementing kernel-level Rootkits (Skoudis, 2004).  The kernel is the heart of 
many operating systems, regulating access to resources such as the computer disk, system 
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processor and memory.  Kernel-level Rootkits change the kernel itself rather than just 
tampering with application-level programmes (Lawande, 2012). 
 
Most common capabilities of kernel-level Rootkits are execution redirection and file hiding.  
Each of the kernel-level Rootkits’ capabilities is very powerful on their own and thus they 
provide a hacker with the ability to totally modify the machine at the hacker’s whim 
(Lawande, 2012).  It is more difficult to create defences against the traditional Rootkit than 
the kernel-level Rootkits. The tracing and detection of the kernel-level Rootkits is usually 
difficult (Huey, Nhan & Broll, 2013).  This should be attributed to the fact that getting into 
the system depends on the hacker-modified kernel.  The next section deals with measures to 
tackle malicious code. 
 
2.3.2 Malicious Code as information security risk, threat and crime 
 
The world is confronted by the fast growth of computer viruses and it is difficult to address 
the impact of these viruses, similar to biological viruses (Slade, 2004; Williams, 2013).  Slade 
(2004) reports that, due to the rapid evolution in the corporate and biological world, IBM’s 
computer virus research task team has investigated possible similarities and differences 
between biological and computer viruses and epidemiology extensively.  The researchers 
found that the evolution of computer viruses is faster than their biological counterparts.  Slade 
(2004:1259) attributes this to the huge growth of computer technology, “as well as 
homogenisation of computers, operating systems, and software”. This aforesaid statement is 
supported by Bedard (2014). 
 
Malicious code/software is an information security problem for most organisations, 
institutions, government departments and individual home users (Ceccagnoli, Forman, Huang 
& Wu, 2012).  According to Maiwald (2004:67), the term “malicious code” refers to 
computer viruses, Trojan horse programmes, worms and others. Together they are called 
malware (Cecere & Rochelandet, 2013).  Malware is a relatively new term in the ICT field 
and was coined to describe software programmes that are deliberately created to penetrate a 
system, breaking security, carrying malicious or destructive payloads (Cecere & Rochelandet, 
2013; Ceccagnoli et al., 2012).  The term malware is sometimes used loosely as a synonym 
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for virus, whilst the word virus is sometimes used simply to refer to any type of computer 
problem. 
 
Cecere and Rochelandet (2013) declared that viruses are the biggest group of malware, both 
in terms of quantities of entities and their impact on the information security field.  Viruses 
will therefore receive more attention in this section but will not be the only type of malware 
reviewed.  It should also be noted that once the attacker launches a malware attack, it will 
continue to attack without reference to the attacker or user, expanding the attack to other 
computer systems (Cassim, 2012).  It is on this premise that Slade (2004) argues that there is 
a qualitative difference between malware and the hacking toolkits, or scripts, which are 
supposed to function under the hacker’s control.   
 
2.3.3 Historical overview of malware 
 
According to Slade (2004) and Cassim (2012), many claims have been reported regarding the 
existence of computer malware before the 1980s.  However, these claims lack evidence or are 
directed to entities that can be regarded as a virus under the loose definition of the term.  
Slade (2004:1259) reports that the Core Wars programming contests included self-replicating 
code.  In fact, other types of malware have been known since the invention of computers.  
 
Two Apple II viruses were reportedly created in the early 1980s.  According to Slade (2004), 
Fred Cohen’s leading scholarly research conducted during the course of that decade provided 
some evidence that the first malware that attacked successfully was developed in the 1980s.  
Schneier (2000) reports that in 1983, a certain student named Fred Cohen authored the first 
computer virus.  He reportedly did it to make a point after realising that most people did not 
believe it was possible to have a computer virus.  According to Schneier (2000), some IT 
experts then started to copy him, most of them just to provoke the world.  It is estimated that 
there are more than 150 000 different viruses in circulation and more than 148 000 computers 
compromised daily (Tiwari, 2013).  In the 1980s, the only available malware was boot-sector 
viruses and file infectors.  This malicious software spread very slowly, largely disseminated 
on floppy disks, and was slow to distribute geographically (Slade, 2004; Adrian (2013). 
However, during the early 1990s, malware authors began to improve malware so that it would 
be difficult to detect and easier to spread via networks.  
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Slade (2004) recalls that in the middle of the 1990s, macro and script malware in the wild 
were introduced.  Macro viruses also created new variants rapidly because the malware 
carried their own source code.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the e-mail virus became a 
major force in information security. E-mail viruses grew extensively by spreading themselves 
worldwide within a short space of time.  According to Slade (2004:1259), some versions of 
malware would reproduce copies of themselves to such an extent that organisations’ mail 
servers became dysfunctional.  The subsequent convergence of technologies has led to the 
creation of malware with a greater capacity for destruction (Brenner, 2013).  The next section 
provides broad descriptions of malware types. 
 
2.3.4 Malware types 
 
As previously explained, viruses are not the only type of malware.  Other forms of malware 
include worms and Trojans.  Brenner (2013) and Slade (2004) advise that some types of 
malware include qualities of more than one class and it is therefore difficult to draw any 
distinctions pertaining to individual examples.  There is also an increase in the convergence of 
malware. 
 
Viruses 
Schneier (2000:152) uses a metaphor to describe a computer virus: “A biological virus is a 
simple sub-microscope infections agent that often causes disease in plants, animals, and 
humans.  It consists essentially of a core of RNA or DNA surrounded by a protein coat.  
Viruses are unable to replicate without a host cell, and are typically not considered living 
organisms”.  For once, this metaphor is a true reflection of its meaning. A computer virus is a 
computer programme which embeds itself to another computer programme (Bin-Baba, 
Tamjid & Gholipour, 2013). 
 
Adrian (2013) reports that a computer virus is a programme/code/software which is written 
with the capacity to replicate and spread itself, without the knowledge and consent of the 
computer system user.  Slade (2004:1260) defines a computer virus as, “a programme that 
modifies other programmes to contain a possibly altered version of itself”.  Nye (2013) 
claimed that virus’s use the resources of the host of the computer or system to duplicate 
themselvesand disperse without instructions of the operator or author.  Viruses have the 
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ability to attach themselves to other programmes as an infection (Bin-Baba et al, 2013).  
However, viruses can also attach to an object without the intervention of the user.  According 
to Slade (2004:1260), the object can be an, “e-mail, programme file, document, floppy disk, 
CD-ROM, short message system (SMS) on cellular telephones, or any similar information 
medium”. 
 
Pisaric (2013) and Slade (2004) stress the fact that a virus should be distinguished by its 
capacity to reproduce and spread.  Lawande (2012) is quick to point out that a virus is not 
simply anything that goes wrong with a computer.  It has also been stated in preceding 
paragraphs that a virus is not merely another type of malware.  For example, Trojan horse 
programmes and logic bombs do not have the ability to reproduce themselves (Latimer, 
2013).  Viruses and worms are distinguished by the fact that the viruses need an action (not 
instructions or command) of the user to trigger reproduction and distribution (Williams, 
2013).  The actions of the user in this instance are not deliberate instructions or commands to 
the virus, but rather the usual general computer actions. 
 
According to Maiwald (2004) and Agwu (2013), a virus is a programme that piggy-backs on 
other executable programmes.  Viruses are not designed to live by themselves.  It is on this 
basis that when a programme that is infected by a virus is executed, the virus becomes 
executed and carries out its actions.  Wu (2013), Wu and Ye (2014) observed that the users do 
not always realise the implications of their actions.  Slade (2004) supports this reasoning by 
declaring that sometimes users are helping the virus. 
 
Viruses have the ability to modify systems and applications.  Other types of viruses are 
malicious and erase files (Thaanum, 2013).  They also have the capacity to make the systems 
and applications redundant.  However, certain types of virus are not malicious except that 
they disperse themselves to other systems (Maiwald, 2004; Latimer, 2013).  Some of the 
changes caused by a virus have negative input to the virus themselves.  Schneier (2000), and 
Nikolayevich and Borisovna (2014) have noted that modifications in the underlying 
computers impact on the ability of the virus to function and it dies.    
 
There are different forms of viruses.  The differences do not necessarily reflect a high degree 
of distinct division.  For example, according to Slade (2004), a file infector may also infect 
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the system.  It is also difficult to determine a strict division between macro and script viruses.  
Examples include File infectors; Boot-sector infectors; System; Companion; E-mail; 
Multipartite; and Script viruses (Slade, 2004).  This assertion is supported by authors such as 
Demirkan and Delen (2013), and Wu and Ye (2014). 
 
Trojan Horses 
Slade (2004) and Behr (2013) claim that apart from viruses, Trojans, or Trojan horse 
programmes are the second largest form of malware.  Maiwald (2004:68) observes that just as 
the ancient Greeks used a gift to conceal evidence of their attack, the Trojan horse programme 
similarly conceals its malicious nature under the pretext of something useful or interesting.   
 
Schneier (2000:155) provides a reminder of the original Trojan horse: “The Greeks besieged 
Troy for ten years, and it was showing no sign of falling.  Out of desperation – and probably 
boredom – Odysseus had the Greek soldiers build a large wooden horse and put some of them 
inside.  He left it for Trojans as an admission of defeat and then told his army to pretend to 
sail away, trying not to giggle as they did.  The Trojans took the wooden horse inside the 
walls – every artist’s rendition puts the horse on a wheeled platform – despite the better 
judgement of their priests.  That night, the Greeks crept out of the horse, opened the gates, and 
let the rest of the Greek army inside.  The Greeks then massacred the Trojans, looted their 
wealth, and burned the city.”  This is a widely accepted story, although its authenticity cannot 
be proven, but it provides an understanding of how the Trojan horse virus operates 
(Stantchev, Petruch & Tamm, 2013).  
 
According to Wu and Ye (2014), a Trojan horse is a malware programme attached to a 
genuine piece of software, structured to mislead the user into thinking that it is not harmful.  
Technically, a Trojan horse is a code that secretly inserts itself into the user’s machine, 
analyses the user keyboard buffer until it discovers what seems to be a credit card number – 
“right number of digits, checksum matches – and sends that number via TCP/IP” to the 
attacker (Schneier, 2000:156).  Morrison (2013) claims that Trojan code has the ability to 
identify usernames and passwords and convey these to their sender.  In a very subtle way, 
they can modify the user or host’s encryption programme to select keys from a small random 
pool, thus weakening the key space (Ifinedo, 2014; Stantchev et al, 2013). 
36 
 
Abawajy (2014) observes that the most difficult part for the potential attacker is getting the 
Trojan horse secretly into the computer of the victim. Sometimes a hacker breaks into the 
victim’s office and puts the Trojan horse in his/her computer.  Some hackers may go to the 
extent of persuading someone to install it on his/her computer (Schneier, 2000; Mbaku, 2013).  
However, Slade (2004) notes that some Trojans can be installed remotely.  This claim is 
supported by Li, Zhang, Chu, Suzuki and Araki (2012). 
 
Worms 
A worm, as the name implies, is a malware programme which ‘crawls’ from system to system 
via networks without any help from its targeted victims (Malware, 2004:68).  This assertion is 
supported by Mohite and Kumthekar (2013) who note that a worm disperses and replicates on 
its own.  All that is required is for the author of the worm to get it going.  The first recorded 
type of worm was a popular Internet worm authored by Robert Morris in 1988 (Malware, 
2004; Li et al., 2012).  The Morris Worm was structured to exploit several computer system 
weaknesses, including poor passwords.  In 1988, the Morris Worm crashed 6 000 computers 
which at that time comprised 10 percent of the computers linked to the Internet. 
 
The worm exploits the system weaknesses to search systems in the Internet to manipulate and 
penetrate (Sowan & Jenkins, 2013).  Once it settles into a system, it starts looking for 
additional victims.  The convergence of technologies provides worms with a platform to 
launch attacks (Slade, 2004; Lin, 2012).  The next section deals with information security 
ethical related issues. 
 
2.4 ETHICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO INFORMATION SECURITY 
 
Ethical issues in information security include, but are not limited to social engineering, 
priracy and copyright.  Only these three issues will be discussed because of their direct 
relationship with legal aspects that are relevant to this study. 
 
2.4.1 Social engineering as an information security risk, threat and crime 
 
According to Berti and Rogers (2004:147), social engineering is the term that originated in 
the field of social control, and that, “a social engineer can refer to the process of redefining a 
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society or more correctly, an engineering society – to achieve some desired outcome”.  Radha 
and Mimal (2012) define social engineering as a process of trying to manipulate people’s 
behaviour in a predictable manner, in order to get them to comply with the requirements of 
the manipulator.  Vijaya (2013) observes that in information security, social engineering 
refers to endeavours to influence a system’s host or user into either disclosing or acting in a 
way that will enable the intruder to obtain unauthorised access to, unauthorised use or 
unauthorised revelation of  a computer system, network or data.   
 
From the above definitions, one can conclude that social engineering is somehow 
synonymous with deception.  In information security, it would mean deceiving the system 
host or user (Lin, 2012).  According to Berti and Rogers (2004), deceiving someone is an old 
phenomenon in the history of crime, but is still very effective. Social engineering tends to 
attack the person’s intelligence or inherent kindness. It is on this basis that the victims of 
social engineering do not want to admit to having been deceived because it makes them look 
stupid or unhelpful.  The reluctance to divulge being deceived has led to the lack of proper 
statistics regarding social engineering in the field of information security (Lin, 2012).  
Nonetheless, many computer-related criminals have used social engineering rather than any 
other technical means to attack or intrude on information systems.  The following paragraphs 
detail the factors that enable social engineering to succeed.   
 
Factors that make social engineering succeed 
There are several factors that make social engineering succeed, including the flaws of human 
nature and the commercial environment.  This section briefly discusses these factors. 
 
(a) Human nature 
Berti and Rogers (2004:148) argue that being deceived has nothing to do with being less 
intelligent, but has everything to do with being human, and “being somewhat naïve, and 
having proper mind set and training to deal with” this kind of deception.  Generally, people 
are trusting and co-operative by nature.  This has been confirmed by studies in the field of 
social psychology that focused on human interactions (Dixit, 2013).  These studies have 
found that almost everybody who is placed in the right circumstances and who interacts with a 
manipulative person can be influenced to behave in a particular way (Kalmbach, 2013).  This 
may include revealing information he/she would not divulge under normal circumstances. 
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It has also been observed that people in authority exert a lot of influence over their 
subordinates (Jirasek, 2012).  Depending on the morals and values of these people, their 
influence may be used in ways that constitute social engineering.  According to Berti and 
Rogers (2004:148), in most instances, social engineering involves individual dynamics more 
than group dynamics.  That is why most targets of social engineering are help desks and 
technical support staff and the interactions are mostly one-on-one, although not always face-
to-face.  The interaction may be online or virtual (Yoshikane, 2013; Kalmbach, 2013).  People 
who use social engineering to commit computer crimes are always looking for prospective 
victims or rather individuals who appear to be susceptible to this kind of psychological attack. 
 
(b) Commercial environment 
Proff and Dettmann (2013) argue that the current commercial environment, which is 
characterised by rapid growth in ICT, creates a situation that is conducive for social 
engineering.  ICT has led to the reduction of face-to-face interactions, but at the same time 
increased the rate of communication.  Organisations are providing their employees with 
networked computers and thus their communication capacities have improved tremendously 
(Moore, Clayton & Anderson, 2009).  ICT is used to communicate and do business with 
people who are unknown to each other physically.  Due to human nature, people tend to trust 
and co-operate with counterparts they have not previously met.  
 
The emphasis on team work and consumer satisfaction requires employees to be more civil 
and co-operative towards their colleagues, counterparts and customers (Moore et al., 2009; 
Proff & Dettmann, 2013).  Whilst this is positive, it also lends itself to social engineering 
attacks.  Customer service, friendliness and collaborative work make people in the business 
environment highly vulnerable to deception.  Berti and Rogers (2004:148) report that it is 
difficult to measure the employees’ sensitivity pertaining to information security when they 
perform their duties.  This negligence and ignorance regarding information security has to 
change if companies want to deal with the risks, threats and crimes related to social 
engineering.  Several authors assert that there are different motives for social engineering, 
including, but not limited to, intelligence gathering and political and business subversion 
(Williams & Karahanna, 2013). 
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(c) Intelligence gathering 
Studies indicate that the main motive for social engineering is to obtain critical information 
(Singh & Singh, 2013).  Studies have unfortunately also revealed that it is much simpler to 
collect sufficient sensitive information from a company and its employees in order to sound 
like an employee of that company (Dixit, 2013).  Once the social engineer has gained 
sufficient information that enables him/her to sound and behave like a genuine employee of 
the company, he/she will then be able to penetrate its systems.  Some conmen may steal the 
information that will enable them to talk and behave as if they belong to a certain regulator or 
law enforcement agency (Singh & Singh, 2013).  Dagada and Mukwevho (2013) contend that 
attackers find it easier to examine the company information through its Website.  Companies 
place a lot of information on their websites for marketing purposes.  This information usually 
provides details such as staff lists, their contact details, branch offices and locations. 
 
Whilst information published on a company’s website is useful in attracting customers, it may 
also create a base for social engineering (Pozon, 2013; Dagada & Mukwevho, 2013).  Most 
organisations have poorly constructed websites that are sources of easy intelligence-gathering.  
It is on these websites where companies give away critical information (Pozon, 2013; Singh 
& Singh, 2013).  Goel and Shawky (2009) notes that, “going through an organisation’s 
garbage can reveal invoices, correspondence, manuals etc.” that would allow the attacker to 
collect critical information.  Many convicted computer criminals have confessed to using the 
websites to gather critical information pertaining to their targets. 
 
It has already been stated that the goal of intelligence gathering in the social engineering 
context is to enable the attacker to use the learnt information to sound and act as if he/she is a 
bona fide “employee, contractor, vendor, strategic partner, or, in some cases, a law 
enforcement official” (Berti & Rogers, 2004:149).  The phenomenon wherein one acts like the 
legitimate person is called subversion (Pozon, 2013). 
 
Launching social engineering attacks 
Preparations for social engineering usually follow a gradual approach (Berti & Rogers, 2004).  
In most instances, social engineering attacks are similar to those of intelligence agencies when 
they infiltrate their targets (Chance-Hill & Odell, 2014).  Social engineering attacks include 
target selection and the actual attack. 
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 (a) Target selection  
Once a sufficient amount of information has been collected from the targeted victim, the 
attacker will look for visible weaknesses in the organisation’s staff (Berti & Rogers, 2004; 
Jirasek, 2012).  Usually, help desk staff are the most common targets of social engineering.  
They are seen to be more willing to provide assistance, and they also deal with passwords and 
accounts.  In most cases, the help desk staff is outsourced and thus they do not belong to the 
targeted company.  This creates favourable conditions for successful attacks since the third 
party staff may not always know most of the targeted company’s employees (Simonds & 
Christopher, 2013).  Other than collecting information, another goal for social engineering is 
to gain a foothold in a targeted system.  Attackers know that once they gain preliminary 
infiltration, it is easier to get more penetration, launch destructive attacks and erase their 
tracks. 
 
After the help desk personnel, administrative assistants are the next most common targets of 
social engineering attackers (Newington & Metcalfe, 2014).  Due to the nature of their job 
descriptions and work, administrative assistants are privy to huge quantities of information 
which usually move between members of senior management (Ioannidis, Pym & Williams, 
2012; Dagada, 2013).  However, social engineers prefer to know the names of the prominent 
people in organisations for the purpose of name-dropping. Sood and Enbody (2013) was 
surprised to realise that many administrative assistants know their managers’ computer 
passwords.  This is due to the fact that administrative assistants usually perform duties for 
their executives that require their executives’ account privileges. 
 
(b) Carrying out the actual social engineering attack 
Social engineering attacks can be grouped into the following categories: firstly, attacks that 
appeal to the ego of the victim; secondly, attacks that take advantage of sympathy or empathy; 
and thirdly, attacks that are based on intimidation. 
 Ego attacks 
Social engineering attackers tend to appeal to the most primary human qualities – people like 
being told how intelligent they are (Warren & Leitch, 2010).  Attackers use this human 
characteristic to get information from the employee of the targeted organisation.  In most 
cases, this would be an employee who feels under-appreciated and that his/her position is 
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beneath his/her skills.  Usually, the victim does not know that he/she did something wrong 
(Williams, 2013; Ionnidis et al., 2012). 
 
 Sympathy attacks 
In this category, according to Berti and Rogers (2004:150), the social engineer usually 
portrays himself/herself, “to be a fellow employee (usually a new hire), a contractor, or a new 
employee of a vendor or strategic partner”, who is experiencing difficulty related to the work 
and needs some help to perform a task urgently.  The social engineer ensures that he/she wins 
the trust of the victims (McGraw, 2013).  The attacker does this by name-dropping and 
appropriate jargon to win the confidence of the victim.  The attacker may appear to be time-
pressed to complete a task, but cannot because he/she has forgotten the account name or 
password, or has inadvertently been locked out. 
 
The social engineering perpetrator tends to use the sense of urgency to win the sympathy or 
empathy of the victim (Berti & Rogers, 2004:150).  However, the sense of urgency creates 
circumstances that are suitable for circumventing the necessary procedures.  The attacker will 
then be able to get access in future without the assistance of the victim.  Makinen (2013)  and 
McGraw (2013) reasons that human beings naturally sympathise or empathise with the person 
who the social engineer is portraying himself/herself to be and thus in the majority of cases, 
victims innocently assist the attackers.  If the attacker fails to get the required sympathy from 
the employee, she/he will keep on trying until such time one employee decides to assist 
(McGraw, 2013).  Once the social engineer realises that the organisation is becoming aware 
of his/her attempts, he/she will withdraw. 
 
 Intimidation attacks 
In this category, according to Lu (2013), the social engineering attacker portrays him/herself 
as an authority figure.  This can either be as a prominent person in the company or a law 
enforcement official.  In this case, the attacker will target employees within an organisation 
who are on lower levels of the position he/she pretends to be occupying (Moore, Clayton & 
Anderson, 2009).  The social engineer will create circumstances that will make it justifiable to 
ask for password information, account details, accessibility to the systems, or the required 
critical information (Navarra, 2013). 
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In a situation in which the social engineer pretends to be a law enforcement official, he/she 
may demand to access the systems or sensitive information that certain people have access to, 
such as, for example, national security concerns (Cox, 2012).  Consequently, the employee 
may be instructed not to reveal the incident so that the investigation may not be hampered 
(Maswera, Edwards & Dawson, 2012).  The attacker may even threaten the employee with a 
charge of defeating the ends of justice by divulging the incident.  As with a sympathy attack, 
which has been dealt with above, the attacker will pretend to be in hurry, so that the necessary 
procedures are circumvented (Yaokumah, 2013).  If the employee is not co-operating, he/she 
will be threatened with sanctions. 
 
2.4.2 Breach of Privacy as an information security risk 
 
This section demonstrates how ethical issues and privacy in particular can pose as information 
security risk.  Privacy on the Internet; electronic database and privacy; traffic analysis and 
privacy; electronic surveillance and privacy; publicity attacks and privacy; and legal attacks 
and privacy are also discussed. 
 
Privacy on the Internet 
For several years, United States citizens have raised concerns about privacy after it came to 
their attention that information regarding their personal details was being stored in computer 
databases by government entities and commercial agencies (Saunders & Wu, 2011).  As time 
went on, people in other parts of the world also started to express fears regarding the invasion 
of privacy.  There is a growing awareness that using the Internet and the World Wide Web 
(WWW) affects that privacy (Hilmi, Pawanchik, Mustapha & Ali, 2013).  In 2003, the USA-
based advocacy group, Centre for Democracy and Technology, reported that only one third of 
USA government agencies inform visitors to their websites about the nature of information 
which is collected about them (Saunders & Wu, 2011; Overill, 2013). 
 
Other studies reported that Internet users were sometimes reluctantly prepared to surrender 
their e-mail addresses online, but not other contact and personal details (Overill, 2013).  Users 
tend to be very anxious concerning personal information, such as credit card numbers and 
identity numbers.  The rapid availability and use of e-commerce in the corporate world allows 
companies to gather specific items of information.  Some manufactures and companies put 
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tracking numbers into their computer programmes and their Websites for information security 
purposes (Zissis & Lekkas, 2012). 
 
Krause (2004) reports that in 1998, the United States Social Security Administration 
considered establishing a website that would allow full access to salaries and other personal 
details, which is contrary to the 1974 Privacy Act.  
 
Electronic databases and privacy 
Schneier (2000:33) observes that some technology has made it automatic for people to leave 
their “electronic footprints” on a regular basis. More of these “footprints” are being gathered 
and cross-correlated. Moreover, much of this kind of information is available on the Web 
(Roman, Zhou & Lopez, 2013).  Due to the electronic databases, it is easy to compile a 
dossier about a particular person. 
 
Most electronic databases are for commercial purposes and include major credit databases, 
such as those owned by Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion (Roman et al., 2013).  There are 
also large electronic databases containing records of telephone calls, credit cards, individual 
purchases, individual health status and other personal details.  These electronic commercial 
databases can be used by their owners, creators or be sold for other purposes.  The web has 
thus exacerbated privacy violations.  Some online retailers store records of products and 
services which individual consumers buy.  According to Schneier (2000:33), the online stores 
“can also keep records of everything you look at, every item you ask to see more information 
about, every topic you search for, how long you spend looking at each item – not just what 
you buy, but what you look at and don’t buy”. Google has the same feature and may predict 
what you are looking for (Hilmi et al, 2013).   
 
Simmonds and Christopher (2013) reported that these electronic databases are very useful in 
law enforcement.  The police use them to fight crime by downloading a criminal record 
automatically.  Whilst this should be applauded, it could also lead to privacy invasion 
(Kshetri, 2013).  Hackers can break into the very police database and steal some individual’s 
personal information for whatever purposes.  Schneier (2000) and Kshetri (2013) reasoned 
that police databases are not necessarily better secured than corporate databases while the 
information they contain is even more sensitive. 
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Traffic analysis and privacy 
According to Schneier (2000:34) traffic analysis involves the study of communication 
patterns – not the content of the message – but characteristics about them: “Who 
communicates with whom? When? How long are the messages?  How quickly are the replies 
sent, and how long are they? What kinds of communication happen after a certain message is 
received?”  These are typical traffic analysis questions and their answers can disclose a lot of 
personal information.  Lu (2013) were quick to warn that traffic patterns of communication 
are as crucial as the content thereof.  Schneier (2000:34) provides an example to support the 
above assertion: “The simple fact that Alice telephones a known terrorist every week is more 
important than details of their conversation.  The Nazis used the traffic analysis data in 
itemised French phone bills to arrest friends of the arrested; they didn’t really care what 
conversations were about”. 
 
Some authors observe that even if one encrypts his/her web traffic, traffic analysis drawn on 
the amount of the encrypted web pages is an adequate picture to indicate what one is 
browsing (Thompson, 2014).  Scheneier (2000) and Burda and Teutenberg (2013) argue that 
although militaries have used traffic analysis for many years, it remains a relatively new area 
of research in academia. 
 
Electronic surveillance and privacy 
Interception of e-mail communication by intelligence agencies around the world could be 
interpreted as a violation of the public’s privacy (Burda & Teutenberg, 2013).  In some cases, 
this kind of interception or electronic surveillance is illegal even though it is carried out by 
government law enforcement agencies.  Schneier (2000) as well as Mamaghan, Madani and 
Sharifi (2012), report that several intelligence agencies used an automated interception system 
to intercept about 3 billion communications daily.  These include e-mail messages and 
Internet downloads (Mitropoulos, Othonos & Douligeris, 2013). 
 
Intelligence agencies reported to be using this automated interception system include the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  The system collects 
communications indiscriminately, “then sorts and distils the information through artificial 
intelligence programmes” (Schneier, 2000:35).  This statement is supported by Burda and 
Teutenberg (2013). 
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Publicity attacks and privacy 
There are hackers who launch attacks on a critical system like government communication 
networks and the military in order to gain publicity.  Most publicity seeking system attacks 
are launched by skilled hackers who are very familiar with systems and their security (Gupta, 
Jin, Sanders, Sherman & Simha, 2012).  They usually have access to resources that enable 
them to break the system.  
 
By breaking into the system, the victim’s privacy becomes vulnerable to the hacker and 
possibly the media (Nehinbe, 2012).  On the other hand, the very fact that the media will 
publicise a successful hacking can, in some cases, constitute a privacy violation of the 
company being victimised.  It should, however, be borne in mind that publicity seeker system 
attackers do not belong in the same threat category with criminals.  According to Schneier 
(2000) and Mamaghan et al. (2012), criminals only launch an attack if they will benefit 
materially; publicity seekers will attack a system if there is a possibility of the media covering 
it.  Large scale systems that are owned by prominent organisations are more likely to be 
victims of the publicity seeker hackers. 
 
Schneier (2000) argues that in some instances, the rationale for these attacks is the desire to 
correct the problem.  Most organisations appear to ignore their information security 
weaknesses until they are revealed publicly.  Once a certain newspaper announces the attack, 
the victim organisation will rush to correct the problem.  In this way, the publicity seeking 
attackers have increased the security of the victim’s systems (Demirkan & Delen, 2013; 
Mitropoulos et al, 2013).   
 
The problem with the publicity seeking attacks is that it damages the integrity and reputation 
of the company attacked (Stone, 2013).  The victim company will soon realise that the 
negative publicity is very costly (Schneier, 2000; Nehinbe, 2012).  Customers and investors 
will naturally shy away from a company whose information security is vulnerable (Singh & 
Singh, 2013).   
 
Legal attacks and privacy 
There are social activists or customers who will reveal the vulnerability of a weak security 
system by challenging it through the judicial system.  According to Schneier (2000:40): “The 
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aim here isn’t to exploit a flaw in a system.  It isn’t even to find a flaw in the system.  The aim 
here is to persuade a judge and jury (who probably aren’t technically savvy) that there could 
be a flaw in the system”.  This can be achieved by discrediting the system, to put sufficient 
doubt in the minds of the judge and the jury that the system has some security loopholes 
(Andoh-Baidoo, Osei-Bryson & Amoako-Gyampah, 2012). 
 
There are occasions when organisations will take a suspected criminal to court, only to be 
proven wrong.  Schneier (2000:40) reports that in 1994, in the United Kingdom, a certain 
client found his bank account emptied, and, “When he complained about six withdrawals he 
did not make, he was arrested and charged with attempted fraud.  The British bank claimed 
that the security in the ATM system was infallible, and that the defendant unequivocally 
guilty.  When the defence attorney examined the evidence, he found, (1) that the bank had no 
information management or quality assurance for its software, (2) that there was never any 
external information security assessment, and (3) that the disputed withdrawals were never 
investigated.  In fact, the bank’s programmers claimed that since the code was written in 
assembly language, it could not possibly be the problem (because if there was a bug, it would 
cause the system to crash).  The man was convicted anyway.  On appeal, the bank provided 
the court with a huge information security assessment by an auditing firm.  When the defence 
demanded equal access to their systems in order to evaluate the information security directly, 
the bank refused and the conviction was overturned.” This assertion is also supported by 
authors such as Williams and Karahanna (2013) and Andoh-Baidoo et al., 2012).  
 
It is clear from the above information that a number of the aforesaid bank’s information 
security issues were made public during the court case and jeopardised its privacy regarding 
information security and internal operational policies.  The legal system attack is very 
forceful.  Isaacs (2013) observed that people who resort to legal attacks are very skilled in 
dealing with high profile cases.  Furthermore, they are able to access many resources, 
including researchers and technical experts.  Schneier (2000:41) concludes that a legal attack 
should be viewed, “as a publicity attack with a bankroll and more relaxed victory conditions”.  
This point of view is supported by authors such as Navarra (2013) and Isaacs (2013). 
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2.4.3 Copyright as a information security risk 
 
The inception of ICT and the Internet in particular has led to the abundance of information 
available in many forms.  Networked computers globally and the Web provide a platform for 
access to ever increasing amounts of information (Silva & Fulk, 2012),  yet the same 
technological platforms that enable access to information create copyright and intellectual 
property rights challenges (Rahman & Ramos, 2013). 
 
Internet and benefits of copying, using and distributing online materials 
The Internet has provided many opportunities for sharing information, art, music and other 
works internationally (Ting & Yi, 2013)  but, whilst the Internet has opened up a wide range 
of benefits to its users, there are serious concerns amongst copyright owners about 
maintaining control over the copying, using and distribution of their work (Silva & Fulk, 
2012).  This should be attributed to the ethical issues emanating from copyright in the Internet 
arena (Jairak & Praneetpolgrang, 2013).  It should also be emphasised that copyright in the 
computing environment lends itself to information security problems, challenges and crimes.  
The information security concerns arise because the nature of the online environment makes it 
easier for some people to copy and/or distribute literature and audio-visual items than in the 
physical word (Strang, 2013).  
 
Copyright challenges are aggravated by the simplicity of producing multiple copies of online 
materials quickly (Pardo, Pino, Garcia, Baldassarre & Piattini, 2013).  On the other hand, 
these online materials are internationally available and Internet users are able to hide their 
identities.  Given the information security problems posed by the copying, using and 
distribution of online-based materials, it is anticipated that copyright owners will increasingly 
turn to other measures to assist them with enforcement of their rights (Julisch, 2013; Jairak & 
Praneetpolgrang, 2013).   
 
Internet challenges the status quo of property rights and intellectual property protection 
According to Tsolis, Tsolis, Karatzas and Papatheodorou (2002:53), “the evolution of 
technology is challenging the status quo of intellectual property protection” and the 
management thereof, in various ways.  The situation is exacerbated by the fact that users of 
the copyright information in whichever form ─ print, digital, material, music, films – have 
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some expectations about their own right to, “use and copy that information and to 
communicate it to others” (Kauffman, Techata & Wang, 2012: 117).  This is highly 
problematic because although users rightly have expectations, they do not necessarily have 
the legal right to conduct the aforesaid activities without the permission of the copyright 
owner (Paliwala, 2013).  Notwithstanding this, users have, for many years, acted on their 
expectations without ramifications. 
 
2.4.4 Measures to deal with ethical issues 
 
As explained, for the purpose of this study, ethical issues are constituted by social 
engineering, privacy, and copyright (see section 2.4).  This section provides an overview of 
defence mechanisms against ethical related issues within the context of the ICT domain.  
Although social engineering, privacy, and copyright are different ethical concepts, their 
defensive measures are similar, and include physical security, administrative measure, policy 
and legal education. 
 
Physical security measures 
According to Koskosas (2012), ICT ethical related risks, threats and crimes can, amongst 
other things, be dealt with by providing adequate physical security.   This is supported by Cox 
(2012) and Pardo et al. (2013), who suggests that physical security is the easiest to 
comprehend and possibly the simplest to implement.  Berti and Rogers (2004:147) describes 
physical defence of the security of tangible and intangible assets from, “theft, vandalism, 
catastrophes, natural disasters, deliberate or accidental damage, and unstable environmental 
conditions such as electrical, temperature, humidity, and other such related problems.” 
 
Efficient physical security requires adequate building and facility construction.  This view is 
supported by Berti and Rogers (2004:147) who argue that building and facilities that house 
ICT infrastructure require, “emergency preparedness, reliable electrical power supplies, 
reliable and adequate climate control, and effective protection from both internal and external 
intruders.” 
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Logical and administrative security measures 
Logical and administrative security can be employed to protect information assets.  According 
to Alazab and Venkatraman (2013), logical security uses technical solutions to protect 
information assets.  Berti and Rogers (2004:152) provides the following examples of 
technical measures: “firewall systems, access control systems, password systems, and 
intrusion detection systems.”  Schneider (2000:30), however, cautions that technical controls 
can be productive but they also depend on the human element to be effective.  Administrative 
security, on the other hand, is those measures that usually include policies and procedures 
(Schneider, 2000; Koskosas, 2012). Although these measures do not employ controls, they 
deal with ICT ethical related risks, threats and crime. 
 
Policies, awareness, and education 
ICT ethical related risks, threats and crimes are difficult to counter.  This is attributed to the 
fact that technical security controls are not always effective as protection mechanisms 
(Schneider, 2000; Xiong, 2013).  Ethical problems, such as social engineering, for example, 
are attacks targeting the human element (Makinen, 2013).  It is on this basis that protective 
measures need to focus on user centred information security defences.  These measures are 
constituted by policies, users’ awareness and education. Schneider (2000) strongly suggests 
that policies should be introduced and publicised to the whole enterprise as a measure to 
counter ethical related problems.  Policies are very useful in providing guidelines on how 
people should behave (Gupta & Narain, 2012).   
 
2.5 INFORMATION SECURITY POLICIES 
 
Information security policies play a critical role when dealing with information security risks 
(see §1.2.3, §2.4.4, and Chapter 6 of this thesis).  In actual fact, the main aim of this study 
was to investigate how corporate South Africa employs policy and legal aspects in their 
endeavours to provide information security. Most information security-related policies in the 
corporate environment are in fact derived from relevant sections of legislation.  Maiwald 
(2004:144) observes that policy formulation is a “thankless job” since most people within 
organisations do not like being regulated: “Policy sets rules.  Policy forces people to do things 
they do not want”.  The aforesaid assertion is still relevant at the present time (Gonvalves & 
Jesus, 2013).  
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This section reflects on the necessity of information security policies and the policy 
management hierarchy.  The findings of this study related to information security policies are 
found in Chapter 6. 
 
2.5.1 The rationale for information security policies 
 
Policies are essential in the provision of information security as they provide rules that guide 
the configuration of the systems and actions of users within an organisation (Rogerson & 
Milton, 2013). Policies explain how information security should be implemented and 
maintained.  Policies define the appropriate measures to employ when protecting information 
assets and systems (Gonvalves & Jesus, 2013).  According to Goo and Yim (2014), 
information security policies are not merely confined to technical mechanisms but they also 
define how employees should behave when they are using information systems that belong to 
or are connected to the organisation’s network.  Nichols-Hess and LaPorte-Fiori (2015) 
declares that policies define how organisations should operate information systems under both 
normal and unusual circumstances.  If a security breach or systems failure occurs, the 
organisation policies and procedures should provide guidelines on correctional and remedial 
steps to be taken. 
 
Another reason for employing policies in the provision of information security is that they 
tend to put everybody within a company on the same footing (Maiwald, 2004).  For that 
reason, each person in an organisation should work within the operational framework that has 
been provided by the policies and procedures.  This will assist in the provision of information 
security.  Goo and Yim (2014) supports this view and claims that policies provide the scope 
for the employees in the same organisation to work together in ensuring that information and 
systems are protected.  On the other hand, Mainwald (2004:144) has observed that policies 
and procedures define the goals and objectives of the organisation’s information security 
programme.  If these goals and objectives are well communicated to all employees, the basis 
for organisation wide security teamwork will be established.  This observation is supported by 
(Nichols-Hess & LaPorte-Fiori, 2015) 
 
Interestingly, Schneier (2000:308) compared information security policies with the 
government policy on foreign affairs: “When a government is accused of not having a 
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coherent foreign policy, it’s because there is no consistency in its actions: no overall strategy.  
Similarly, a digital system without security policies, is likely to have a hodgepodge of 
countermeasures”.  This view is supported by Niu and Reith (2014).  In the provision of 
information security, the policy is glue that put everything together (Nichols-Hess & LaPorte-
Fiori, 2015). 
 
According to Schneier (2000:308), the policy is about the information security strategy: “You 
can’t decide what kinds of antifraud countermeasures you need for your cell phone unless you 
have a policy you want those countermeasures to enforce.”  Equally, one cannot expect 
several information officers who are responsible for the system security to carry-out their 
functions coherently in the absence of policies that guide their actions and they are supposed 
to follow. 
 
2.5.2 The policy management hierarchy 
 
These following paragraphs will demonstrate that there are three main categories of 
information security policy: regulatory, advisory and informative. 
 
Regulatory policy 
Hare (2004) declared that it is imperative for each organisation to have an information 
security policy that results from legislation.  In South Africa, the King III Report (2009) 
directs the Board of Directors to establish information security-related policies.  Although the 
King III Report is not legislated, organisations listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) are compelled by law to adhere to its provisions (see Paragraph 1.2.5 of this thesis).  It 
is on this basis that South African organisations should establish information security policies 
as a response to the regulatory requirement.  Inevitably, some of these policies will have to 
address information security in the e-Commerce environment. On the other hand, information 
security policies should have a section referring to the South African laws it is based on.  
These include the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 25 of 2005, the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000, the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-related Act No. 70 of 2002, and the 
Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013.  
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Other than complying with the regulations, information security regulatory-aligned policies 
should provide consistent operational and behavioural processes (Niu & Reith, 2014).  
Organisations that provide services and/or products to the consumers are expected to show 
some similarities regarding the application of the regulations without prejudice. 
 
Advisory policies 
Goncalves and Jesus (2013) reports that advisory policies are targeted at knowledge for 
employees to enable them to make informed decisions regarding information security-related 
situations.  The enforcement of the advisory policy is usually not applied with much effort.  
Nevertheless, the policy will mention the implications for not applying the advice provided in 
the policy (Goo & Yim, 2014).  According to Hare (2004:934), the possible impact associated 
with non-compliance includes, but are not limited to, the following: 
 
 Omission of information that is required to make an informed decision. 
 Failure to notify the correct people who are involved in making the decision or to 
complete the process. 
 Missing important deadlines. 
 Lost time in evaluating and discussing the alternatives with auditors and 
management. 
 
The above points remain relevant (Nichols-Hess & LaPorte-Fiori, 2015). Goncalves and Jesus 
(2013) emphasises the fact that failure to comply with the information security advisory 
policy can be substantial to the organisation.  The aforesaid claim is supported by Hare 
(2004:934), who notes that the cost of squandered productive time attributable to the 
consideration of alternatives can have a strong impact on the organisation. 
 
Informative policy 
The purpose of the informative policy, according to Hare (2004) and Niu and Reith (2014), is 
to communicate certain information security issues to a particular audience.  There are no 
penalties for not complying with this kind of policy.  Whilst the informative policy is lesser in 
stature when compared with both regulatory and advisory policies, it conveys important 
information security-related messages to the targeted audience (Rogerson & Milton, 2013).  
The next section presents a summary of this chapter. 
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2.6 SUMMARY  
 
This chapter has provided broad insights on information security history, risks.  Chapter 1 
explained the overall purpose of this study, which is to assess how organisations can, amongst 
other things, use legal aspects to address their information security concerns.  The legal and 
policy aspects pertaining to information security do not occur in a vacuum and thus a broader 
understanding of issues that constitute information security risks is essential.  Therefore, this 
chapter examined and defined information security risks such as hacking, viruses, privacy, 
ethical issues and social engineering.  The chapter reviewed the history of information 
security because for organizations and individuals to be successful in attempting to secure 
existing systems and networks, there is a need to draw on the comprehensive pool of 
information security that exists.  It is important to understand how information security crimes 
were committed and what measures were put in place to prevent more sophisticated crimes 
from taking place.  This chapter also presented a brief overrview of the information security 
policies. The next chapter presents the South African legal framework with regards to 
information security.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGARDING 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As mentioned in preceding chapters, dealing with information security problems requires the 
application of relevant policies.  These policies should be based on international and national 
frameworks.  Whilst the previous chapter focused on information security issues, this chapter 
will deal with the legal framework in South Africa and how it relates to information security.   
 
There are several laws in South Africa which deal directly or indirectly with information 
security issues.  These laws relate to, amongst others, trademarks, malicious code, hacking, 
copyright, patents and privacy, to name but some of the issues.  It is thus important that South 
African companies base their information security policies on these laws.  These laws include, 
but are not limited to, the following: the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996); 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000; the Companies Act No. 71 of 
2008; the Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 2002; the National 
Credit Act No. 34 of 2005; the Protection of Personal Information  (PoPI) Bill of 2007; the 
Copyright Act of 1978; the Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995; the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provisions Communication-related Information (RICA) 
Act No. 70 of 2002; Consumer Protection Act No. 68 of 2008; and the King III Report.  This 
list is not exhaustive, but includes the most significant legislation that governs information 
security in South Africa.  
 
It is useful to clarify, for the purposes of this research, the difference between a bill and an 
act. The Bill is a draft law submitted to Parliament by the relevant Minister (Member of the 
National Executive) for consideration.  Once Parliament passes the Bill and the President 
signs it, it becomes an Act (law). The chapter also reviews the King III Report.  This is not, 
however, a law, but a set of recommendations with which all companies listed on the 
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Johannesburg Stock Exchange are legally compelled to comply.  It was therefore deemed 
necessary to include it in this chapter.   
 
3.2 THE PROVISIONS OF INFORMATION SECURITY ISSUES IN THE 
CONSTITUTION 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) is the supreme law of the Republic 
and is the foundation of all laws passed by the South African Parliament.  The Constitution 
has a direct impact on information security related issues, in particular, the Bill of Rights.  
Taken at face value, one may deduce that the constitutional provisions related to information 
security contradict each other.  Such provisions include the following: privacy vis-à-vis access 
to information; and freedom of expression vis-à-vis human dignity.  The legislators were 
aware of these rudimentary contradictions and thus Clause 36 of the Constitution prescribes 
limitations of rights.  No right should be exercised at the expense of other rights.  In other 
words, the right to freedom of expression cannot be exercised in a manner that undermines 
someone’s human dignity.   
 
The following are some of the South African government laws that address IT-related risks, 
threats and cyber-crime: 
 
 Protection of Personal Information (PoPI) Bill of 2009;  
 Privacy and Data Protection Act of 2006;  
 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002 (ECT Act, 2002); 
 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
related Information Act of 2002 (RICA Act 2002); 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000;  
 Patents Act No. 57 of 1978; 
 Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978; 
 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act No. 38 of1997; and 
 Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993. 
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3.3 COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE INFORMATION SECURITY CONTEXT 
 
The inception of ICT and the Internet in particular has led to the abundance of information 
available in many forms.  Computers networked globally and the World Wide Web (WWW) 
provides a platform for access to ever increasing amounts of information (Schonwetter, Ncube 
& Chetty, 2010).  Yet the same technological platforms that enable access to information 
create copyright and intellectual property rights challenges (Lu, 2013).  
 
3.3.1 Internet and benefits of copying, using and distributing online materials 
 
The Internet has provided many opportunities for sharing information, art, music and other 
works globally (Lee, 2012).  Yet, whilst the Internet has opened up a wide range of benefits to 
its users, there are serious concerns amongst those who have copyright to sustain control over 
the copying, using and distribution of their material.  This relates to the ethical issues 
emanating from copyright in the Internet arena (Lee, 2012; Wu & Sun, 2013).  It should also 
be emphasised that copyright in the computing environment lends itself to information 
security problems, challenges and crimes.  The information security concerns arise because 
the nature of the online environment makes it possible for literature and audio-visual items to 
be copied and/or distributed other than in the physical world without affecting the original. 
 
These copyright challenges are aggravated by the simplicity of producing multiple copies of 
online materials quickly (Paterson, 2012).  In addition, these online materials are 
internationally available while Internet users are able to hide their identity.  Given the 
information security problems posed by the copying, using and distribution of online-based 
materials, it is anticipated that copyright owners will turn to other measures to assist them 
with the enforcement of their rights.   
 
3.3.2 Internet challenges the status quo of intellectual property protection 
 
According to Tsolis et al. (2002:53), “the evolution of technology is challenging the status 
quo of intellectual property protection” and the management thereof in various ways.  The 
situation is exacerbated by the fact that users of the copyright information in whichever form, 
whether print, digital, material, music or films, have some expectations about their own right 
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to “use and copy that information and to communicate it to others”.  This is problematic 
because, although users rightly have expectations, they do not necessarily have a legal right to 
undertake such activities without the permission of the copyright owner (Washah, 2013), 
although in fact users have for many years acted on their expectations without consequences 
(Paterson, 2012). 
 
3.3.3 Infringements of copyright and legal remedies in South Africa 
 
Herman (2012) suggests that there are several measures to deal with copyright crime, 
including physical security and logical and administrative security measures.  Herman (2012) 
further emphasises user education and the use of policies as effective measures to deal with 
infringements of copyright.  It is critical to bear in mind that policies should be informed by 
the relevant legislation.  
 
South Africa is informed by the Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978. Although this Act is not 
recent, it is still effective in South Africa and it has been augmented by regulations published 
in 1985.  According to Clause 23 of the Copyright Act, the infringement of copyright is 
constituted by, among other things:  
 
(i) The encroachment of copyrights by any other person, other than the owner, who uses 
the rights without permission from the owner.  Examples of such encroachment would 
include:- 
a) Bringing items into the country to be used differently from the intended 
owner’s use.  The abuse here could be in terms of selling, letting or hiring the 
item in the country 
b) Unlawful acquisition of software in the country  
  
(ii) The encroachment of copyrights could also be committed when a person who gives 
permission to another to use places of public entertainment where the individuals use 
items like music without proper permission from the copyright owner. 
 
The next section deals with penalties for infringement. 
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3.3.4 Action by owner of copyright, and penalties for infringement 
 
Regarding the action which copyright owners can take when their rights have been infringed, 
Clause 24 of the Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 stipulates that: 
 
(i) Use the same margins as above for (i) and (ii) or change the above to be the same as 
this Any item produced due to infringement of copyright should be made available to 
the plaintiff.  In case of damages, the plaintiff will be paid the amount which the 
licensee would have paid for the activity concerned. However, according to the clause, 
the copyright owner may in writing, before establishing the course of action, inform 
the licensee about the proceedings. The licensee may intervene and pay for the 
damages incurred.  
(ii) In the case where the offender did not know about violating any copyrights, damages 
may not be paid for the infringement. However, in the case where the infringement is 
admitted or liability is otherwise proven then the offender will be required to pay for 
all damages relating to the violation as assessed by the court. 
 
Regarding the penalties incurred as a result of infringement, Clause 27 of the Copyright Act 
No. 98 of 1978 stipulates that: 
 
(i) If the individual is convicted for the first time, then he or she will get a fine of not 
more than five thousand Rand or imprisonment for not more than three years. 
However, the offender may be subjected to both paying the fine and the imprisonment 
for the individual articles related to the infringement. 
(ii) If not the first offence, then the offender could get a fine of not more than ten thousand 
Rand or imprisonment for not more than five years. The offender may also be 
subjected to both paying such a fine and imprisonment for the individual items related 
to the infringement. 
 
3.3.5 Reproduction regulations and permitted reproduction 
 
The Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 with Regulations of 1985, regarding reproduction of a 
piece of work, stipulates that reproduction of a work is permitted provided only one copy of 
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the piece of work is reproduced. Again, reproduction may be permitted if the repeated copies 
are within the acceptable exploitation of the production and author’s rights.  With these 
regulations in mind, libraries or archives may reproduce a work with its employees acting 
solely within the scope of their job. According to the Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 
Regulations of 1985, the employees may distribute the reproduction on the condition that:  
 
(i) there is no intention of establishing by deduction direct or indirect commercial 
advantage; 
(ii) the recreated work shall be open to the public or available to researchers affiliated to 
the library or archive depot;  
(iii)the recreated work incorporates a copyright warning; 
(iv) reproduction rights and distribution conform to a copy of an unpublished work 
duplicated in facsimile form completely for purposes of preservation and security;  
(v) the library or archive depot shall display prominently, at the place where orders are 
accepted, and include on its order form, a copyright warning. 
 
The section below provides an example of copyright case law. 
 
3.3.6 Judgement regarding infringement of copyright in South Africa: Sure Travel v 
Exel Travel 
 
A High Court judgment made on the 19
th
 November 2004 regarding the infringement of 
copyright between Sure Travel and Exel Travel has had an effect on the interpretation of 
copyright law in South Africa (Buys, 2006).  This judgement assessed the extent of software 
protection and how to prove the infringement thereof.   
 
About the case and its judgement 
Sure Travel, the company which has a travel agent’s franchise, makes use of a new software 
application known as Matchmaker. The respondents in the case, as a franchised agent of Sure 
Travel, signed a contract that included their right to use the Matchmaker system. Later the 
respondents abandoned Sure Travel group to establish their own group of travel agents. 
However, they continued using the software application. Consequently, Sure Travel alleged 
that the continued use of the software application violated the rights attached to the 
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Matchmaker system. Since the respondents broke the contract with Sure Travel, they were 
hence unlicensed to continue using the software application. 
 
According to Buys (2006), Sure Travel’s application for an interdict was dismissed by the 
court on the basis that Sure Travel, the complainant, failed to prove that the Matchmaker 
system contained any confidential or proprietary information. Again, based on this argument, 
the court also ruled that no unlawful competition took place. The section below deals with e-
commerce. 
 
3.4 E-COMMERCE PATENTS LAW IN THE INFORMATION SECURITY 
CONTEXT  
 
3.4.1 Overview of patent law 
 
Patents are the basic protection provided for inventions.  According to Bagby (2003:233), 
patents are a strong form of Intellectual Property and thus “patent law protects inventions”.  
The invention process includes the production or machination of a product not known before.  
This may be as a consequence of creativity or research.  According to Bagby (2003:233), a 
patent is a limited monopoly licensed by the government to the initial producer of “useful, 
novel, and non-obvious inventions.”  Patents for inventions are not easily distinguishable 
from trade secrets.  The fact is that the patent system grants the inventor of new and 
innovative technology limited right to prevent others from practising the technology, as an 
encouragement and in exchange for releasing the technology to the public.  The patent laws 
have contributed immensely to the success of US technology during the past two centuries 
(Wu & Sun, 2013). 
 
It was imperative for patent law to be applicable to e-commerce in particular.  In effect, the 
patent system has proved to be valuable for ICT and thus Berman, Reister and Kregel 
(2003:6.1) reported: “As with many new technologies, there has been a “land grab” rush to 
obtain Internet technology and Internet business method patents, and some relatively broad 
patents have been issued.”  This assertion is supported by, inter alia, Xu and Sun (2013). 
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3.4.2 Types of e-commerce patents 
 
An e-commerce patent is defined as a patent that can be granted to an organisation/individual 
conducting business through the Internet (Yaokumah, 2013).  Liu (2013) went further to 
observe that patents can cover technology that (1) provides a better or different experience for 
a Website’s users (user experience patents); or (2) makes the e-commerce more efficient or 
more profitable (business enhancement patents).  In addition, several broad aspects involve 
technology that is basic to the Internet operation (common use patents) (Yoshikane, 2013).  
 
Berman et al. (2003:6.02) provides examples of types or groups of patents to demonstrate 
several aspects of patent law pertaining to e-commerce: 
 
 Amazon’s one-click patent, which covers methods for enabling consumers to buy 
items on the Internet with a single click (a user experience patent); 
 Priceline’s reverse-action patents, which cover methods for enabling consumers to 
name their own prices for goods or services (user experience patents); 
 Patents held by numerous different companies on targeted advertising, which cover 
ways of directing particular advertisements to users based on information about those 
users (business enhancement patents); and 
 e-Data Corporations Freeny patent, which its owner originally asserted covered all 
Internet sales involving downloads of digitised material, such as music (a common use 
patent). 
 
The views of Berman et al. (2003) are supported by several authors, including Collan, 
Fedrizzi and Luukka (2013) and Issacs (2013). In most countries, patent rights are enforced 
through civil litigation in a court designated for this purpose in a particular country. 
 
3.4.3 Provisions of the South African Patents Act  
 
The legislation that specifically focuses on patents in relation to Information in South Africa 
includes the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997, and the Patents Act 
No. 57 of 1978.  The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997 is 
constituted by sections of various Acts in South Africa: 
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 Sections 1-18: Amendment of Merchandise Marks Act No. 17 of 1941; 
 Sections 19-25: Amendment of Performers’ Protection Act No. 11 of 1967; 
 Sections 26-49: Amendment of Patents Act No. 57 of 1978; 
 Sections 50-58: Amendment of Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978; 
 Sections 59-68: Amendment of Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993; 
 Sections 69-79: Amendment of Designs Act No. 195 of 1993; and 
 Section 80: Short title and commencement. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the main focus will be on the Patents Act No. 57 of 1978, 
hereafter referred to as the Patents Act.  The provisions reflected in the paragraphs below are 
those that have an impact on information security. 
 
Patentable inventions 
In accordance with clause 25 of the Patents Act, patents are granted for new inventions with 
the capacity to benefit industries. However, a patent is not granted for any invention that may 
encourage immoral or offensive behaviour. The patent is also not available for a new 
invention for production of living things that are not subjected to micro-biological processes. 
 
Debate about the legality of software patents in South Africa 
According to the article written by ICT journalist, Brian Bakker (2007:26), software patents 
are supposedly not legal in South Africa.  They should not be deemed legal until such time as 
they are proven to be by the legislator of the Court of Law.  Section 25 (reflected above) of 
the Patents Act indicates that software (a programme for a computer) cannot be registered as a 
patent in South Africa.  According to Bakker’s (2007) article, “this prohibition takes the form 
of an explicit exclusion, one of seven”.  He quotes the Innovation Fund’s Biago: “The Act 
basically says that computer programmes ‘as such’ shall not be an invention.  Everybody asks 
how the ‘as such’ is supposed to be interpreted but, unfortunately, we don’t yet have any case 
law in South Africa regarding the patentability of computer programmes”.  The CSIR’s Bob 
Joliffe who is also mentioned in the aforesaid article argued that there is a huge amount of 
case law in Europe which may inform the South African judgements if and when they happen. 
Joliffe claimed that the South African patent law “was essentially copied from the UK statute 
which, in turn, was derived from the European Patent Convention.  As a result, the language 
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is almost identical.”  This situation remains unchanged to date (Behr, 2013; Collan et al., 
2013), and will be dealt with in detail in the findings of this study. 
 
Disputes as to the rights in or to patents 
As stated in Section 28 of the Patents Act, rights disputes between individuals should be 
settled by the commissioner following an application by any of the parties. If, however, an 
individual is not willing or is not able to participate in an application for a patent, the 
individual may be asked to execute an assignment by the commissioner. If the execution is 
just and equitable according to the commissioner, the compensation may be due to the non-
participating individual.  
 
In a situation where an individual declares a right to exclude any other individual from 
applying for a patent, directions from the commissioner may require such other individual to 
perform any deed of assignment that may be requested and that the deed of assignment be 
extended to other countries. 
 
Infringement of the patents 
In conformity with Section 65 of the Patents Act, which provides the proceedings for 
infringement, the patentee may file such proceedings regarding a patent. The complainant 
may be compensated through an interdict, or by bringing to him/her the infringed products, or 
the damages. However, the accused may react for annulment of the copyright based on any 
base on which such a copyright may be revoked. Nevertheless, before filing such proceedings, 
the complainant should provide a notice to the registered licensee of the copyright in question, 
who may have the right to intervene as a co-complainant.  In the case of damages, the 
complainant may opt for an amount which the defendant could have paid in respect of the 
copyright in question, as compensation. The section below deals with trademarks legislation. 
 
64 
 
3.5 TRADEMARKS LEGISLATION IN THE INFORMATION SECURITY 
CONTEXT  
 
3.5.1 Overview of the Trademark concept  
 
This section provides an overview of the trademark law in the context of e-commerce and 
information security in particular.  Before one focuses on the trademark law, it is important to 
understand the meaning of the word trademark.  A trademark, according to authors such as 
Leverich, Gallagher-Duff, Lavelleye and Rosette (2003:7.01), “is a distinctive work, name, 
phrase, symbol and/or design that identifies and distinguishes one’s goods (or services) from 
the goods and services of others.”  Bagby (2003) opines that trademarks are the most 
significant form of recent commercial symbols.  Trademarks are the compartment of business-
related symbols that obtain legal protection.  This view is supported by authors such as Proff 
and Dettmann (2013) and Simon (2013). 
 
Trademarks law grants the owner of the trademark the right to prevent other individuals 
or/and entities from employing the trademark or mark to market their products or services 
(Proff & Dettmann, 2013).  According to Bagby (2003:278), trademark law is a complicated 
and challenging field, “because the standards of analysis and much of the case law are based 
on artistic and cognitive judgements about human perception and commercial behaviour.” 
This assertion is supported by authors such as Behr (2013), Assaf (2012). This section will 
mainly focus on the South African Trademarks Act No. 194 of 1993 and how it pertains to 
information security. 
 
3.5.2 South African trademark law 
 
Trademarks - Registration and Penalties  
In accordance with Section 16 of the Trademarks Act No. 194 of 1993 regarding an 
application for registration, it is required that such application should be made to the registrar 
as recommended. Based on the Act, the registrar may accept the application or conditionally 
accept it, or reject it provisionally or completely reject. In the situation of conditional 
acceptance and provisional rejection, the registrar should, in writing, advise the reasons for 
the decision made. However, at any point in time, the court or registrar may make corrections 
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to mistakes in, or in connection with, the application or ask the applicant to make any 
recommended amendments as deemed fit. 
 
Section 11 of the Act outlines a framework to be followed when registering trademarks 
regarding particular services or goods. According to this section, registration of a trademark 
for such services or goods should be made in accordance with the dictated classification as 
deemed fit on the registration date. 
 
Punishment regarding registration fraud is stipulated in Section 60 of the Trademarks Act No. 
194 of 1993. According to this section, any individual who provides or influences untrue 
information regarding the registration commits an offence and should be subjected to paying a 
fine or face imprisonment for not more than a year. If any individual uses a mark which is not 
registered as a registered trademark, according to Section 62 of the Act, s/he commits an 
offence and should be fined or imprisoned for not more than 12 months. 
 
3.5.3 A trademark judgement in South Africa: Nandos v Farkhi 
 
The World Intellectual Property Organisation’s (WIPO) Arbitration which took place in 
South Africa on 23 May 2000 with Justice Austin Amissah presiding, has influence on the 
interpretation of trademark law in South Africa (Buys, 2006).  The subsections below provide 
some detail regarding the case. 
 
About the case and the judgement 
“Nandos” and “Nandos Chickenland” were trademarks registered and used both locally and 
abroad for trading by the plaintiff continuously from 1989. Despite the effort to own the rights 
of the domain names <nandos.com> and <nandoschicken.com>, the plaintiff was 
unsuccessful because of the earlier registration by some other party. VWV Interactive, 
previously the plaintiff’s Internet Service Provider, tried to obtain the <nandos.com> domain 
name in May 1998. However, they could not succeed due to the payment the registrants 
demanded, which, according to the plaintiff, was excessive. In 1999, the plaintiff tried again 
to gain the domain name after switching on to Digital Mall as its Internet Service Provider. It 
was during this process that the plaintiff discovered that the defendant had already registered 
<nandoschicken.com> as a domain name and that they had legal control of the domain name 
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<nandos.com>. However, the domain names in question were, as yet, not attached to any 
website. 
 
According to the judging panel, the plaintiff’s registered trademarks and the domain names 
registered by the defendant were perplexingly similar, and therefore ruled that the registration 
of the domain names by the defendant was mala fide and the defendant thus had no rights to 
the domain names. The panel accepted the plaintiff’s request to take over the possession of 
the domain names <nandoschicken.com> and <nandos.com>. 
The next section reflects on the patents laws. 
 
3.6 PRIVACY LAWS IN THE INFORMATION SECURITY CONTEXT 
 
The violation of privacy electronically is considered to be an information security problem.  
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution of South Africa (2006) stipulates the right to privacy – 
everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have: 
 
 their person or home searched; 
 their property searched; 
 their possessions seized; or 
 the privacy of their communications infringed. 
 
There are various laws in South Africa which protect privacy and provide for privacy based 
on the abovementioned constitutional directives.   
 
3.6.1 Protection of personal information 
 
The PoPI Bill No. 9 of 2009 specifies in Clause 11 that, “personal information must be 
collected for a specific, explicitly defined and legitimate purpose.”  Furthermore, the person 
whose information is gathered should be made aware of the purpose of collection and the 
recipients of such personal information.  As stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, on 27 
November 2013 the President of South Africa signed the aforesaid Bill into law as the PoPI 
Act No. 4 of 2013. This study focused on the Bill since the Act was only signed into law 
when this study was being finalised. 
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The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 2 of 2002 (ECT Act 2002), which 
in some quarters is regarded as the South African e-commerce law, addresses the protection of 
personal information that has been obtained through electronic transactions.  According to 
Clause 50 of the aforementioned Act, the principles for electronically collecting personal 
information require that, before any such information is collected, a data collector should 
obtain consent from the individual concerned regarding their personal information. The 
consent should be in writing and may not be requested electronically. The request should 
specify why the information is required and what it will be used for. The information should 
not be made available to a third party without authorisation from the owner of the 
information. The individual’s privacy as regards personal information should be respected at 
all times.   
 
According to the scope of the abovementioned Act, the data controller may choose to follow 
the principles outlined above.  However, s/he will have a record of this fact in any agreement 
entered into with the data subject.  The data controller must fully subscribe to these principles, 
and not just selectively.  This Act also provides for the protection of critical databases. 
 
3.6.2 Information security to ensure integrity of personal information 
 
Legislators in South Africa have taken the security of personal information seriously.  
According to Clause 34 of the PoPI Bill No. 9 of 2009, there should be an Information 
Protection Commission established.  Amongst other things, the objectives of this Commission 
are to, “undertake research into, and to monitor developments in, information processing and 
computer technology to ensure that any adverse effects of such developments on the 
protection of personal information of persons are minimised, and to report to the responsible 
Minister the results of such research and monitoring.” 
 
Clause 17 of the PoPI Bill prescribes the following security measures required to ensure the 
integrity of personal information:   
“The party responsible must implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures to secure protection of personal information from any harm or unpermitted 
access. The party responsible should put in place measures to protect personal 
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information which is under its control from any within and external threats or risk. The 
measures need to be updated regularly.” 
 
The abovementioned Bill also makes provisions regarding, “information processed by a 
person acting under authority; security measures regarding information processed by a 
processor; and the notification of security compromise.”  All these measures’ provisions have 
been stipulated by the legislators to ensure that information security pertaining to personal 
information is safeguarded.  The National Credit Act No. 34 of 2005 (Part D) places much 
emphasis on the confidentiality of personal information and consumer credit records.  The 
Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 also makes provision for the preservation of secrecy.  The 
aforementioned Acts are supported by the Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995, in particular 
Clause 91, which deals with the breach of confidentiality, and Clause 126 that deals with the 
limitation on disclosure of information. 
 
3.6.3 Exemptions and exclusions to provisions of personal information 
 
The PoPI Bill provides for the exemption of processing of personal information as long as 
certain conditions are met.  These exemptions concern the processing of personal information 
regarding a person’s religion or philosophy, race, political persuasion, trade union 
membership, health and sexual life, criminal behaviour and special personal information.  The 
Information Protection Commission may authorise the processing of personal information by 
a responsible party even if this constitutes a breach of the information protection principle, but 
only if: 
 
a) the public interest in that processing outweighs, to a substantial degree, any 
interference with privacy of the data subject that could result from that processing; or  
b) that processing involves a clear benefit to the data subject or a third party that 
outweighs any interference with privacy of the data subject or third party that could 
result from that processing. 
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3.6.4 Enforcement of privacy legislation 
 
As stated in section 3.6 above, the right to privacy emanates from the Constitution of the 
Republic as part of the Bill of Rights.  When one focuses on the enforcement of the privacy 
legislation, reference to the provisions in the Constitution is unavoidable.  Clause 38 in the 
Constitution deals with the enforcement of rights.  Any person or entity whose rights have 
been infringed “has the right to approach a competent court” and the court may grant “correct 
relief.” 
 
The PoPI Bill, as introduced in Section 3.1 of this study, is an enforcement Act rather than a 
guiding Act, and that is why it stipulates enforcement measures where there is interference 
with the protection of personal information. Any aggrieved person may lodge a complaint 
with the Information Protection Commission in the prescribed manner and form, explaining 
how the protection of his/her personal information was compromised.  The Commission has 
powers to facilitate settlement between the affected parties.  The Bill gives the Commission 
powers to conduct investigations.  However, the Commission may also, after careful 
consideration, decide not to take any action on a particular complaint.   
 
The Commission may request the judge or magistrate to issue a warrant, “to enter the 
premises as identified in the warrant, to search them, to inspect, examine, operate and test any 
equipment found there which is used or intended to be used for the processing of personal 
information and to inspect and seize any record, other material or equipment found there 
which may be such evidence as is mentioned in that sub-section.”  Failure to comply with the 
provisions of this Act may lead to various penalties.  A person found guilty of an offence in 
terms of this Act may be fined or sentenced to, “imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 
years, or to both a fine and imprisonment.” 
The next section deals with the recognition of the data messages legislation. 
 
3.7 LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO THE RECOGNITION OF DATA MESSAGES  
 
In South Africa, the ECT Act of 2002 recognises the legality of data messages, providing for 
the, “admissibility and evidential weight of data messages”.  The Act also recognises digital 
signatures.  This should be seen as an information security measure for electronic documents 
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and transactions. Amongst others, data message can secured by ecryption and digital 
signatures. 
 
3.7.1 Legal provisions for data messages 
 
According to the ECT Act (2002), there are legal provisions concerning data messages and 
the protection thereof. Information is under legal force and effect merely by:  
 
 being completely or partially in the nature of a data message; 
 bearing an electronic signature;  
 passing the integrity assessment based on the time it was created to its final form as a 
data message.  
 
In a court case the data in a message should not be rejected as evidence simply by virtue of it 
being constituted as a data message. 
 
3.7.2 Cryptography 
 
As stated previously, the acceptance of digital signatures by legislation provides information 
security and integrity for the data messages.  The ECT Act of 2002 makes provision for the 
encryption of the data messages and electronic transactions.  Cryptography is the practice of 
hiding information.  Amongst other requirements, companies that are interested in providing 
cryptography services in South Africa should register with the Department of 
Communications.   
 
3.7.3 Regulations governing electronic signatures and digital certificates 
 
Establishment of the accreditation authority 
In 2004, the Department of Communications in South Africa published the regulations 
governing electronic signatures and digital certificates.  The industry had waited for these 
regulations for several years and they are now implemented.  According to these regulations, 
an Accreditation Authority will be established to accredit the products or services of those 
who provide authentication services.  The regulations also deal with issues such as the form 
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and manner of applications for product accreditation, the establishment of a public database of 
accredited products, technical requirements applicable to digital certificates, and seven-year 
record retention obligations. 
 
In its basic form, an electronic or digital signature and digital certificate are used to verify 
where a communiqué originated from a particular individual or where a website is operated 
by a particular person.  According to Reinhardt Buys of Buys Attorneys (2004), “the draft 
accreditation regulations will govern the provision and use of these technologies in South 
Africa and hopefully establish further trust in e-commerce and promote the use of email and 
the Internet for commercial and legal reasons.”  Unlike conventional signatures, digital 
signatures and certificates are provided by certification authorities like VeriSign 
(http://www.verisign.com) and Thawte (http://www.thawte.com).  It is notable that 
exceptional software applications that allow the use of digital signatures and certificates have 
also been developed in South Africa, by Shuttleworth, for example, who established Thawte.  
Buys (2004) notes that websites of South African banks use digital certificates to authenticate 
certain pages on their websites.  Users of online banking may click on the small padlock icon 
at the bottom of these websites to view the applicable certificate.  
 
Technical requirements of digital certificates 
Chapter VI of the ECT Act (2002) regulates the use of the so-called authentication of 
“products and services designed to identify the holder of an electronic signature to other 
persons”.  Whilst encryption technologies are required to be registered in order to avoid 
criminal prosecution, authentication technologies are subject only to voluntary accreditation.  
Nonetheless, those authentication providers that fail to apply for accreditation will not be 
allowed to provide advanced electronic signatures.  Regulation 13 prescribes the technical 
requirements for digital certificates that should be included, namely ITU X.509 compliance.  
The following section deals with the cyber-crime legislation. 
 
3.8 LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO CYBER-CRIME 
 
The paragraphs below reflect on the literature review pertaining to hacking, industrial 
espionage and the legislation thereof (ECT Act, 2009).   
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3.8.1 Hacking  
 
A chapter on the legal framework governing information security would be incomplete 
without a section on hacking (see Section 2.3.1).   A hacker is a person who breaks into 
computers and/or their systems (Nye, 2013).  Schneier (2000:43) reported that the term 
“hacker” has many definitions, starting from a corporate systems administrator who can make 
computer systems work.  He further notes that the term has been co-opted by the media and 
“stripped of its meaning”. This word used to be complimentary in the past rather than being 
an insult.  However, some authors report that the word “hacker” has become a derogatory 
term (Mahadeo & Shivaji, 2013; Tiwari, 2013).  The word is used in this research in its 
derogatory form.  Maiwald (2004:46) argues that a more correct term would be “cracker” or 
“criminal”.  Nevertheless, to comply with the current general usage, the term “hacker” will be 
used in this study to distinguish those people who intrude into computer systems and/or make 
such systems dysfunctional and include crackers and computer criminals (Pisaric, 2013). 
 
Crume (2000) and Lawade (2012) claim that some hackers are offended by being bundled 
together in one group.  They hasten to indicate that their rationale for breaking into systems 
should be appreciated because real hackers break into the system in order to reveal its 
weaknesses rather than just being destructive.  On the other hand, there are those who praise 
themselves for breaking into computer systems as a way of fighting injustices imposed by 
governments and the commercial world (Schneier, 2003; Morrison, 2013). 
 
Maiwald (2004:46) claims that studies indicate that most hackers are male, between the ages 
of 16 and 35, socially solitary, highly intelligent, and technically proficient, although there 
may be some hackers who may not meet this description.  In most instances, hackers have a 
broad understanding of computers and systems and how they function (Huey, Nhan & Broll, 
2013).  Equally, some of them understand how protocols work and how protocols can be 
manipulated to make the computer systems act in a certain way.   
 
3.8.2 Industrial espionage in South Africa 
 
South African organisations are not immune to industrial espionage.  According to Mamaila 
and Green (2002), the South African National Intelligence Agency (NIA) has offered to assist 
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the business community to prevent the theft of its trade secrets.  A large number of prominent 
South African companies, including those who are in mining and ICT sectors, are victims of 
industrial espionage (Ngobeni, Lubisi & Mahlangu, 2005).  A former Director General of the 
NIA, Mr Vusi Mavimbela, reportedly confirmed these allegations (Mamaila & Green, 2002).  
The NIA had intercepted information indicating that many South African companies have 
been plundered of their business strategies.  This information is worth billions of Rands 
(Ngobeni et al., 2005; Dagada, 2013). 
 
Industrial espionage in South Africa is aggravated by the fact that some of these organisations 
whose information is being looted are using the services of foreign IT firms that steal strategic 
information and pass it on to their mother countries (Mukwevho, 2009; Ngobeni et al., 2005).  
Mavimbela emphasised this assertion:  
“Corporate South Africa should wake up to the reality that it was under serious threat 
from international competitors, some of whom resorted to industrial espionage.  You 
might be wondering why one puts so much emphasis on information and information 
warfare.  The fortunes of nation-states are today governed by who has better access to 
resources and who can better gain as well as defend strategic information” (Mamaila & 
Green, 2002). 
 
Foreign companies find it easy to conduct industrial espionage in South Africa because 
corporate South Africa is very naïve and ambivalent about these issues (Sole & Letsoalo, 
2005).  Corporate South Africa needs to change its attitude so that it can address the 
plundering of its intellectual property (Rantao, 2004).  This view is corroborated by 
Mavimbela, who claims that when NIA agents warned some business people that they were 
being hacked by foreign intelligence agencies, they treated the advice with contempt 
(Mamaila & Green, 2002).  They assumed that the NIA only deals with state security and not 
business interests.  Moreover, some of the companies who were being spied on went to the 
very same foreign companies who were hacking them and told them that the South African 
intelligence agency suspected them of industrial espionage (Dagada & Mukwevho, 2013). 
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3.8.3 Legislation dealing with cyber-crime in South Africa 
 
The ECT Act (2009) contains provisions that deal with cyber-crime and hacking in particular.  
In the context of this Act, “access” includes the actions of a person who, after taking note of 
any data, becomes aware of the fact that s/he is not authorised to access that data, yet 
continues to access that data.  Detailed information about the sections in the Act that deal with 
cyber-crime is presented below. 
 
Unauthorised access to, interception of, or interference with data 
As stipulated in Section 86 of the ECT Act, any individual who is not authorised to access 
particular data, but does so without obtaining the required consent, should be accused of an 
offence. Again, any such individual who causes interference with the data in any way, such as 
making any alterations, selling, distributing or performing any unlawful act on the data, 
should be accused of an offence. Basically, any unauthorised interference with access to an 
information system is punishable by law. 
 
According to Section 87 of the Act computer-related extortion, fraud and forgery, and states 
that any malpractice in this regard should be punishable.  Examples of such malpractice could 
be undertaking to restore any damage caused as a result of such actions identified under 
Section 86, and also initiating non-authentic data to be created with the intention that it should 
be regarded as authentic. Section 88 shows that any individual who influences anybody to 
commit the offences covered in Sections 86 and 87 mentioned above, should be punished by 
law. 
 
Cyber inspectors in South Africa 
Legislators and policy formulators in South Africa, noting cyber-related problems regarding 
patents, trademarks, copyright, privacy and cyber-crime, undertook to legislate measures to 
deal with these.  It is in this context that the ECT Act of 2002 was promulgated and makes 
provision for the appointment of cyber inspectors. 
 
The Director General of the Department of Communications may appoint any employee as a 
cyber inspector empowered to perform duties that relate to cyber-crime detection and 
prevention.  Powers of the cyber inspector as reflected in the ECT Act (2002) include 
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monitoring and inspecting “any web site or activity on an information system in the public 
domain and reporting any unlawful activity to the appropriate authority”.  Cyber inspectors 
will also assess the activities of the cryptography and authentication service providers.  Cyber 
inspectors have powers to inspect, search and seize.  They may also request a warrant from a 
magistrate or judge when this is deemed necessary.  The following section deals with the 
legislation related to malicious code. 
 
3.9 LEGISLATION RELATED TO MALICIOUS CODE 
 
This section deals with the information security concerns of malicious code, its historical 
overview and the legislation thereof (ECT Act of 2002) (please see Section 2.3.2).   
 
3.9.1 Malicious code as information security risk, threat and crime 
 
The world is confronted by the fast growth of computer viruses and it is difficult to solve the 
impact of these viruses, in the same way as in the biological field (Thaanum, 2013).  Slade 
(2004) reports that, due to rapid evolution in the corporate and biological world, IBM’s 
computer virus research task team has extensively investigated possible similarities and 
differences between biological and computer viruses and epidemiology.  The researchers 
found that the evolution of computer viruses is increasing more dramatically than that of their 
biological counterparts.  Slade (2004) attributes this to the huge growth of computer 
technology, “as well as homogenisation of computers, operating systems, and software”. 
 
Malicious code/software is one of the information security related problems in most 
organisations, institutions, government departments and individual home users (Ting & Yi, 
2013).  According to Maiwald (2004:67), the term “malicious code” refers to computer 
viruses, Trojan horse programmes, worms and others.  Together they are called malware 
(Radha & Mimal, 2012).  Malware is a relatively new term in the ICT field and was coined to 
describe software programmes that are deliberately created to penetrate a system, breaking 
security, and carrying malicious or destructive payloads.  On the other hand, the term malware 
is sometimes used loosely as a synonym for a virus, whilst the word virus is sometimes used 
simply to refer to any type of computer problem (Zinszer & Tamblyn, 2013). 
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Infenedo (2014) declares that viruses are the biggest group of malware, both in terms of 
quantities of entities and their impact on the information security field.  Viruses will therefore 
receive more attention in this section, but will not be the only type of malware reviewed.  It 
should also be noted that once the attacker launches malware, it will continue to attack 
without reference to the attacker or user, expanding the attack to other computer systems.  It is 
on this premise that Lai (2013) argues that there is a qualitative difference between malware 
and hacking tools, kits or scripts that are supposed to function under the hacker’s control.   
 
3.9.2 Information security concerns with regard to malware 
 
Malware can attack and damage a computer system’s integrity in several ways.  Lai (2013) 
report that viruses are usually defined on the basis of the ability to attach to computer 
programmes where they will compromise the integrity of applications.  According to Slade 
(2004:1258), claims have been made that ‘good’ viruses exist.  This is problematic because 
there is sufficient evidence to support the fact that viruses compromise systems and therefore 
the concept of a ‘good’ virus is contradictory (Stone, 2013). 
 
Some types of malware have payloads which have the capacity to erase data files or tamper 
with application data over a period of time (Chahar, Chauhan & Das, 2012).  This may lead to 
the integrity of data being compromised and such data may be rendered useless.  Malware is 
created to use the target computer system as a platform to launch further attacks, without 
necessarily requiring the instructions of the original author or attacker.  This has created 
problems within intranets, extranets and domains where systems tend to trust each other.  It 
also results in bad will when the system of a particular company inadvertently sends out 
viruses to other systems.  This can also create negative perceptions regarding the adequacy of 
information security and thus presents a reputational risk to companies (Corrado, 2013).   
 
Slade (2004:1258) claim that malware can compromise programmes and data to such an 
extent that they are no longer functional and that “malware generally uses the resources of the 
system it has attacked, and it can, in extreme cases, exhaust [central processing unit] cycles, 
available processes, memory, communications links and bandwidth, open ports, disk space, 
mail queues, etc”.  Malware can also lead to a denial-of-service attack.  The aforementioned 
assertion is supported by Chahar, Chauhan and Das (2012). 
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3.9.3 Legislation dealing with malicious code   
 
In the bricks-and-mortar commercial environment, consumers are able to check their 
prospective purchases.  However, in the online environment, it is not possible for consumers 
to “taste the food, try on clothes and test drive a new car” and “for this reason online 
consumers are given extra protection rights on top of the general and offline consumer 
protection rights that apply to any specific transactions” (Buys, 2004:138).  Chapter 7 of the 
ECT Act of 2002 requires that online consumers should be protected.  Amongst other things, 
consumers should be protected from malicious code and spam.  Consumers should also be 
protected against unsolicited goods, services or communications.  Buys (2004:138) notes that, 
“in terms of Section 3 of the ECT Act, other consumer protection statutes in South Africa 
shall also apply to electronic transactions, if and where applicable”.  
 
3.10 ICT RISK REGULATORY ASPECTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This chapter thus far provided an overview of the information security-related laws in South 
Africa. Hare (2004) declares that it is compulsory for each organisation to have an 
information security policy that emanates from legislation.  In South Africa, the King III 
Report (2009:81) compels the Board of Directors to ensure that ICT-related policies are 
established.  Whilst the King II Report solely focuses on the companies that are listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), King III applies to all organisations notwithstanding the 
method and form of incorporation or establishment – whether listed on the JSE or not, large 
and small, public and private.  Although the King III Report is not a law, organisations are 
expected to adhere to its guidelines on an ‘apply or explain’ basis as follows (King III Report, 
2009:11):  
“It is the legal duty of directors to act in the best interests of the company.  In following 
the ‘apply or explain’ approach, the board of directors, in its collective decision-making, 
could conclude that, to follow a recommendation would not, in the particular 
circumstances, be in the best interests of the company.  The board could decide to apply 
the recommendation differently or apply another practice and still achieve the objective 
of the overarching corporate governance principles of fairness, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency.  Explaining how the principles and recommendations 
were applied, or if not applied, the reasons, results in compliance”.   
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The King III Report’s guidelines for information security are contained in seven principles as 
follows: 
 
Principle 1: The board should be responsible for IT governance.  This includes the 
establishment of IT governance framework, structures and policies. 
 
Principle 2: IT should be aligned with the performance and sustainability objectives of the 
company.  If the information security of the company is properly implemented and tightened, 
this may pose a risk to the sustainability of the organisation.  
 
Principle 3: The board should delegate to management the responsibility for the 
implementation of an IT governance framework.  Amongst others, management should, on 
behalf of the board, ensure that information security processes, procedures and standards are 
implemented to ensure that IT risk is minimised. 
 
Principle 4: The board should monitor and evaluate significant IT investments and 
expenditure.  The investments in IT hardware and software should also cater for the 
information security related services. 
 
Principle 5: IT should form an integral part of the company’s risk management.  Information 
security should be viewed and dealt with as part of the overall risk management. 
 
Principle 6: The board should ensure that information assets are managed effectively.  
Amongst others, this should include ensuring confidentiality of information, integrity of 
information, and the availability of information and information systems at all times. 
 
Principle 7: A risk committee and audit committee should assist the board in carrying out its 
IT responsibilities.   
 
From the above paragraphs, one deduces the importance which the regulatory authorities 
place on information security.  It is on this basis that organisations in South Africa should 
establish information security policies as a response to the regulatory requirements (Abawajy, 
2014).  Inevitably, some of these policies will have to address information security in the e-
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commerce environment.  The policy should stipulate in detail, “what must be done, when it 
must be done, who does it,” and can give insight as to why it is significant to do it (Hare, 
2004:933).  Other than complying with the regulations, information security regulatory 
aligned policies should provide consistent operational and behavioural processes (King II 
Report, 2006:76).  Organisations that provide services and/or products to consumers are 
expected to show some consistence regarding the application of the regulations without 
prejudice.  Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis indicate how organisations in South Africa can 
incorporate the regulatory requirements when they develop their information security policies. 
 
3.11 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3 
 
This chapter provided a legal framework pertaining to information security in South Africa.  
The main tenet of this chapter is that information security policies at organisational level 
should be based on the relevant laws of the Republic.  Information security should not solely 
rely on technical measures.  Technical measures dealing with information security should be a 
consequence of the policies that are derived from the legislation.  This chapter explained that 
there are more than ten laws in South Africa that focus on information security related issues 
such as trademarks, malicious code, hacking, copyright, patents and privacy. 
 
Some of the South African laws that deal with the above-mentioned information security 
problems are the following: The PoPI Bill No. 9 of 2009; the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act No. 2 of 2000; the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008; the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act of 2002; the National Credit Act No. 34 of 2005; the 
PoPI Bill No. 9 of 2009; the Companies Bill of 2007; the Copyright Act of 1978; the Labour 
Relations Act No. 66 of 1995; and the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Provisions Communication-related Information Act No. 70 of 2002; as well as the King III 
Report.  The next chapter focuses on the research methodology of this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN GENRE 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, a detailed description of the research design is provided, including the 
description of the research methodology and data collection methods.  Qualitative data 
analysis methods employed in this study are explained. The trustworthiness of the study and 
the ethical aspects relating to research of this nature is discussed. 
 
The term genre of design is deliberately chosen for the purpose of this study instead of the 
term design type.  The rationale for doing this was, as part of the research method, to include 
the researcher’s reflexive knowledge of how theory contributes to interpretation and 
understanding, how ideology, context and politics manifest in the study (Lautenbach, 2005).  
This stance is supported by Henning, Van Rensburg and Smit (2004) who observes that the 
term genre encapsulates various types of qualitative research more adequately than the 
terminologies type and format. Other authors who support this assertion are Bowers, Cohen 
and Elliot (2013). 
 
In this study, research design was employed as a means to decide what the study purpose and 
questions would be; what kind of information would be relevant to address specific research 
questions; and what strategies would be the most appropriate in the process of the enquiry and 
the analysis of the gathered information (Mouton, 2001; Simmonds & Christopher, 2013). 
The first question should be not which research methodology to use, but rather what the 
researcher wants to find out and why. The way in which a study is conceived and executed, 
and how findings will be analysed, should be inter-connected and grounded in the 
researcher’s philosophical perspective (Lautenbach, 2005; Bowers et al, 2013).  Authors such 
as Henning et al. (2004:30) refer to this as the “epistemological and thus the methodological 
home of the study”.  On the other hand, Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000:7) declare that, “it is 
not methods but ontology and epistemology which are the determinants of good social 
science”.  It is on this premise that this study is an interplay between the author’s personal 
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philosophical perspective and the empirical findings of the study (Lautenbach, 2005).  The 
way in which the researcher views and interprets the world (the researcher’s ontological 
position) should determine what questions the researcher asks during the study and how the 
researcher designs the enquiry (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000).  This view is supported by 
Scammon, Tamoaia-Cotisel and Day (2013). 
 
4.2 SAMPLING AND PROFILE OF THE ORGANISATIONS  
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the participants in this study were executives, managers and 
specialists in information security who are based in 45 South African organisations.  In all 
instances, professionals whose companies’ websites are used to conduct financial transactions 
between buyers and sellers were targeted.  The age, gender, qualifications and race of the 
participants were not recorded as this was not deemed necessary to the study.  However, the 
positions of the participants were recorded as they show the responsibilities and jobs of 
participants in terms of legal and policy aspects to be considered in the provision of 
information security in the corporate environment. 
 
It was previously explained that convenience and purposive sampling were used because the 
abovementioned organisations have a presence, including head offices, in Gauteng and it was 
economical to interact with them as the researcher is based in Johannesburg.  However, 
certain organisations were purposively targeted because of the value they would add to this 
study. Other than these organisations, the researcher also liaised with experts based with 
vendors, at universities, non-profit organisations, and consulting organisations. More detailed 
information is provided in Appendix A1: Request to participate in the study, and Appendix 
A2: Profile of the organisations that participated in this study.  
 
This section depicts the context in which this investigation took place.  The participating 
companies/organisations are briefly described here and then classified into different industrial 
sectors. This will enable readers to contextualise the integration of legal and policy aspects in 
the provision of information security in these organisations.   
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Table 4.1: Sampling and positions of respondents  
Organi-
sation by 
No. 
Title/Position the interviewee/s Industrial Sector 
No. 1 - Managing Executive of Digital Banking Channels 
- Head of Internet Channel 
Banking 
No. 2 - Senior Channel Manager: Cell phone & Electronic Channels 
- Head of Virtual Channels 
Banking 
No. 3 - Webmaster for Self-Service Banking 
- Director of Self-Service Banking 
- Senior Manager: Integration Strategy 
Banking 
No. 4 - CEO: Mobile & Transact Solutions 
- Head of Messaging 
Banking 
No. 5 - Channel Manager: Mobile Portals Banking 
No. 6 - Executive Head: Mobile Money Telecommunications 
No. 7 - Restaurant Franchise Webmaster Services Sector 
No. 8 - Florist General Manager Services Sector 
No. 9 - Chief Information Officer Airline Transportation 
No. 10 - Senior Information Technology Consultant Airline Transportation 
No. 11 - Information Security Officer Airline Transportation 
No. 12 - Business Analyst  Airline Transportation 
No. 13 - Manager: Applications Architecture Airline Transportation 
No. 14 - Webmaster Airline Transportation 
No. 15 - Data Room Supervisor Online Retail 
No. 16 - Supply Chain Manager Online Retail 
No. 17 - ICT Operations Manager Online Retail 
No. 18 - Business Analyst  Airline Transportation 
No. 19 - Assistant Director: ICT Infrastructure Airline Transportation 
No. 20 - Webmaster Airline Transportation 
No. 21 - General Manager Online Retail 
No. 22 - Manager: Information Services Online Retail 
No. 23 - Information Security Officer Online Retail 
No. 24 - Supply Chain Manager  Online Retail 
No. 25 - Marketing Manager Cinema 
No. 26 - System Administrator Cinema 
No. 27 - Compliance Officer Hotel 
No. 28 - Help Desk Manager Hotel 
No. 29 - Executive Director: Information Technology Hotel 
No. 30 - General Manager: Networks  Hotel 
No. 31 - Chief Information Officer Hotel 
No. 32 - Senior System Engineer (Unix) Hotel 
No. 33 - Data Centre Manager Hotel 
No. 34 - Team Leader: IT Security University 
No. 35 - General Manager: Support Services University 
No. 36 - Technical Administrator  Hotel 
No. 37 - General Manager: ICT & Knowledge Management Broadcasting 
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Organi-
sation by 
No. 
Title/Position the interviewee/s Industrial Sector 
No. 38 - IT Support Senior Manager Broadcasting 
No. 39 - Assistant General Manager: Business Solutions Online shop  
No. 40 - Systems Engineer: Standard Operating Environment Car hire 
No. 41 - Business Process Analyst Car hire 
No. 42 - Manager: ICT Corporate & Commercial Services Car hire 
No. 43 - Senior Systems Programmer Telecoms 
No. 44 - Team Leader: Application Development Telecoms 
No. 45 - Systems Engineer Telecoms 
 
During the first engagement with the organisations that participated in this study, the 
commitment was made that by all possible means it would be ensured that their participation 
in the study was not to their disadvantage (see Appendix A1). Therefore pseudonyms were 
given to all participants to protect their identity. 
 
4.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The research design was used as a plan according to which information from the study 
participants was obtained (Welman & Kruger, 2001; Miller, Crabtree, Harrison & Fennell, 
2013).  The detailed research design is explained in the sections below. 
 
4.3.1 Overview of the research design  
 
Merriam (1998) and Sowan and Jenkins (2013) explain that the research design is a map or 
plan which guides the researcher during the course of the enquiry.  It is a product of several 
research questions (Kalmbach, 2013; Cresswell, 2007).  A qualitative research design was 
used in this study.   
 
Pluye, Grad and Johnson-Lafleur (2013) and Welman and Kruger (2001) are of the view that 
positivists and anti-positivists constitute two paradigms about the research design.  The 
positivists advocate for the research design to be determined before data gathering, while the 
anti-positivists prefer emergent designs (Dixit, 2013; Miller et al., 2013).  According to the 
emergent design, the researcher may amend his or her data gathering methods during the 
course of the study.  In this study, it was decided to use the research design before data 
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gathering (Bertens, Broekhuizen & Naaktgeboren, 2013).  This was done so that the research 
could be conducted within a certain framework and focus. The design that would allow the 
phenomenon to articulate for itself was chosen.  In actual fact, the researcher proceeded 
within the specific design because a decision was required regarding the study topic, approach 
and location to the research.  
 
4.3.2 Qualitative research design in the context of this study  
 
Qualitative study is a broader concept which entails multiple kinds of research that will allow 
researchers to comprehend and describe the meaning of the social phenomena with minimal 
disruption of the natural setting (Merriam, 1998; Newington & Metcalfe, 2014).  There are 
many types of qualitative research designs (Strang, 2013; Bertens et al., 2013). This study 
took the form of a generic study (Drabble & O’Cathain, 2014).  In this research, the reality of 
how legal and policy aspects are integrated in information security endeavours in corporate 
South Africa was constructed through interacting with individuals in their social worlds.  This 
interplay is referred to in section 4.1 as ontology and epistemology. 
 
In this study, the social worlds were 45 South African organisations (see Appendix A2), 
consultancies, non-profit organisations and universities (see section 4.2).  The researcher 
assumed that meaning regarding the integration of legal and policy aspects in information 
security is attached to the experiences and perceptions of executives, senior managers, 
webmasters and information security specialists who were interviewed as part of this study.  It 
is further acknowledged by the researcher that the reality integration of legal and policy 
aspects in information security in the corporate environment could be mediated through his 
own perceptions (Merriam, 1998; Drabble & O’Cathain, 2014) (compare section 4.1: 
“researcher’s own ontological position”).  The qualitative research design enabled the 
researcher to comprehend the phenomenon of interest from the participants’ perspective rather 
than his own.  
 
In this study, the researcher was the primary tool for data collection and analysis. Through the 
fieldwork, several companies were approached, as well as consultancies, non-profit 
organisations and universities in order to interview relevant people.  The purpose of the visits 
to the aforesaid organisations was to interact with people and observe their behaviour in their 
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natural setting.  Documents were collected from the above-mentioned organisations and the 
functionality and content of the websites of the participating organisations was observed. 
 
4.4 DATA COLLECTION METHODS USED IN THE STUDY 
 
The research made use of generic techniques for qualitative collection and analysis 
(Kauffman et al., 2012).  This study is generic in that it involves many companies and it was 
not conducted within a bounded system (Merriam, 1998:27).  The integration of legal and 
policy aspects in information security in the corporate environment is not a phenomenon 
which is bounded, nor is it a case (Merriam, 1998:27).  In fact, Welman and Kruger (2001) 
and De Guinea, Titah and Leger (2013) loosely describe a study of this nature as generic 
survey research.  No experiments were conducted as part of this study and nothing was 
manipulated in order to observe the outcome of such intervention.  This study merely 
investigates how legal and policy aspects are integrated in the implementation of information 
security in corporate South Africa. 
 
Interviews, document analysis, and websites functionality and content were used as data 
collection methods.  More detail on the functioning is provided in the sections below. 
 
4.4.1 Interviews in the study – Overview  
 
The interview was an exceptionally appropriate data gathering method for this type of study, 
and made it possible to collect substantial information pertaining to the types of research 
questions outlined in Chapter 1.  Interviews provided the opportunity to liaise directly with 
participants in the study, and to collect information directly from executives, managers, 
webmasters, information security specialists, information security experts, legal experts, and 
ICT legal experts.  
 
At the beginning of each interview, the purpose of the study was explained to the potential 
participants and their co-operation requested.  Each participant was given a provisional 
indication of how long the interview would take.  The interviewer was candid and honest 
during the interviews in order to build up trust.  Although 56 interviews were conducted in 
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this study, interest was shown in each individual participant and recognition of the fact that 
their perceptions and experiences about information security were unique. 
 
During the course of the interviews, interviewees were guaranteed their anonymity.  They 
were also encouraged to communicate their genuine opinions, experiences and perceptions 
without fear of condemnation. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used because they were more suitable for this study due to 
the fact that participants came from divergent backgrounds and an interview protocol was 
available to guide the interviewer (Welman & Kruger, 2001; Ma, 2012).  The interview 
protocol had a list of topics to be addressed (Appendices B1 & B3).  Although all 
interviewees were asked the same questions, the formulation was modified to suit the context 
and level of the respondent.  Interviews were conducted from January 2011 to December 
2011. The average length of an individual interview was about forty minutes.  The interviews 
were recorded so that data could later be transcribed and analysed (Ma, 2012).   
 
The researcher intentionally targeted highly experienced respondents in line with what 
Naimark and Teklina (2011) and De Guinea et al. (2013) refers to as an elite interview and/or 
an expert interview. Several such interviews were conducted with executives, managers, 
webmasters, information security specialists, information security experts, legal experts, and 
ICT legal experts in several organisations.  These professionals were either directly or 
indirectly responsible for the information security in their organisations or client 
organisations.  Calafiore, Dabbene and Tempo (2011), and Ma (2012) describe elite 
respondents as powerful, renowned and knowledgeable about specific subjects.  In the context 
of this enquiry, the executives, managers, webmasters, and information security specialists 
provided information about challenges and issues to integrate legal and policy aspects in the 
implementation of information security in their organisations.   
 
Eleven elite and individual interviews were conducted with information security experts, 
academics, and ICT legal experts who were not in the corporate environment, but were based 
in non-profit organisations, consultancies, and universities.  Although these people are not in 
the corporate environment, they provide consulting expertise to companies and many of them 
are regarded to be thought leaders in the field of information security in South Africa as well 
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as being highly respected internationally. Table 4.2 below summarises the profile of experts 
who were interviewed using pseudonyms. 
 
Table 4.2: Elite and individual interviews with experts 
Name of expert Title/role of expert Industrial sector 
Expert A - Lawyer A Legal Firm 1 
Expert B - Lawyer B Legal Firm 1 
Expert C - Lawyer C Legal Firm 2 
Expert D - Lawyer D Legal Firm 3 
Expert E - Lawyer E Legal Firm 3 
Expert F - Lawyer F Legal Aid Clinic 
Expert G - Managing Director (A) Legal Firm 3 
Expert H - Senior Lecturer Law School 
Expert I - Researcher  Security Institute 
Expert J - Journalist Print Media 
Expert K Managing Director (B) ICT Consultancy and Training Firm 
 
The interview questions that were posed are contained in the Appendices: Appendix B1: 
Protocol for Semi-Structured Interview: Information Security Practitioners within the 
Participating Organisation; Appendix B2: An Example of Individual Interview: Information 
Security Practitioner within the Participating Organisation; Appendix B3: Protocol for Semi-
Structured Interview: Information Security or Cyber Law Expert; and Appendix B4: An 
Example of Individual Interview: Information Security or Cyber Law Expert.   
 
4.4.2 The use of website analysis in the study  
 
In addition to employing individual interviews as a constructive and direct way of 
determining the integration of legal and policy aspects with the implementation of 
information security in the South African corporate environment, websites were also used for 
data gathering.  Feng, Ma and Fan (2011) declare that observation (website analysis) as a data 
collection method has several advantages over interviews. This was proved to be correct 
during the course of this study.  In this study, website analysis enabled the researcher to 
obtain information about the functionality and content of the websites of the participating 
organisations and how these websites address the legal requirements pertaining to information 
security. Secondly, website analysis enabled the researcher to capture certain behaviours that 
respondents often took for granted.  During website analysis, it was possible to obtain 
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information about matters that participants had not been able to describe adequately in the 
interviews.  Another advantage of using website analysis as a data gathering method was that 
the data gathered was used to verify and complement the information obtained from 
individual interviews and corporate documents.   
 
During the website analysis, webmasters were not asked to create extraordinary functionality 
or to upload certain content in their websites.  Every attempt was made to maintain the 
authenticity of the setting to allow website functionalities to be observed as they occurred or 
the content as it appears. This kind of analysis made it possible to gain insights that might 
have been missed had special activities been requested.  Moreover, website analysis allowed 
for greater emphasis to be placed on the depth rather than the width of data, thus illustrating 
the detail, difficulty and subtleties of the normal setting.  An holistic perspective was also 
emphasised, with information security being studied in relation to its context.  A website 
analysis protocol was used to guide the website analysis sessions (Feng et al., 2011).  In this 
study, the researcher used the guidelines appearing in Table 4.3 below.  It was not, however, 
the intention of this study to test and observe the security strength of the websites of the 
participating companies.   
 
Table 4.3: Analysis of the websites legal compliance 
No. ASPECTS ANALYSES YES NO 
1. Does the website have functionality for online payments?   
2. Does the website have any legal notices?   
3. Does the website have terms and conditions available as hyperlinks?   
4. Does the website have liability disclaimers available as hyperlinks?   
5. Does the website contain legal notices that address the provisions of Chapter 3, 
Part II and Chapter 7 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 
2002? 
  
6. Does the website position and implement legal notices correctly?   
8. Are the legal notices in the website printable or saveable as required by section 
11(3) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002? 
  
9. Does the website contain policies that address legal compliance pertaining to 
websites? 
  
 
4.4.3 The use of document analysis in the study  
 
Data was also collected through document analysis in line with Merriam’s (1998) 
recommendations.  Data collected through other methods – individual interviews and website 
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analysis – was also evaluated against South African legislation pertaining to information 
security.  These include the following pieces of legislation (as discussed in Chapter 3): the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996; the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act No. 2 of 2000; the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 25 of 2002; the 
RICA, 2002; the Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act of 1997; the Copyright Act of 
1978; the Merchandise Marks Act of 1941; the National Archives and Records Service of 
South Africa Act No. 43 of 1996 (as amended); the National Archives and Records Service of 
South Africa Regulations of 1997; the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000; 
and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000.  During the course of the 
fieldwork, the researcher collected and analysed documents, policies and legislation 
pertaining to hacking, interception and surveillance, intellectual property, malware, copyright, 
trademarks and privacy from all 45 organisations that participated in this study.  Several 
information security related policies from the participation organisations or generic policies 
within the focus of the study were also analysed, including the ICT Acceptable Use Policy; 
Information Security Policy; Data Privacy Policy; Access to Information Policy; Interception 
and Surveillance Policy; Records Management Policy; Electronic Communications Policy; 
Intellectual Property Policy; and Plagiarism Policy. Other documents collected and analysed 
include the Records Retention Schedules and Guidelines of the National Archives.  Table 4.4 
below presents the data collection protocol used to guide the researcher in respect of the 
necessary documents.  
 
Table 4.4: Document collection and analysis protocol 
Area of Information 
Security 
Relevant Policy 
Relevant 
Legislation 
No. of Organisations 
Complying 
Hacking     
Malware    
Interception and 
surveillance 
   
Intellectual property    
Copyright    
Trademarks    
Privacy    
 
In line with Merriam’s (1998) advice, during the course of the fieldwork and document 
collections, the value of each document was assessed as a source by determining its relevance.  
This approach is supported by Pan, Yang and Tang (2012).  Most of the documents were 
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requested from the companies that participated in this study and the researcher received most 
of these documents after providing an undertaking that documents would not be shared and 
the identity of the company would not be disclosed.  Some of the companies that participated 
in this study regarded information contained in these documents as confidential and of a 
strategic nature.  Appendix C: an Example of a Document Gathered from an Organisation 
provides detailed information.  
 
4.5 THE USE OF QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS IN THIS STUDY 
 
4.5.1 Overview 
 
Zhang, Zhang and Mi (2012) observe that qualitative data analysis is generally in the mode of 
written language. It can, however, also entail other forms such as audio-visual recordings or 
sketches.  The focus of data analysis in this study is information obtained from executives, 
managers, webmasters, information security specialists, information security experts as well 
as verbal information from academics obtained in individual interviews.  Data analysis in this 
study is also focused on website analysis and documents collected from the organisations that 
participated in this enquiry. 
 
4.5.2 Data management and reduction in this study 
 
Due to the fact that 56 interviews were done and extensive documentation was collected from 
the participating organisations, it became apparent that the raw data should be selected, 
focused, simplified and transformed (Hassan & Sabry, 2013; Zhang et al., 2012).  This was 
done by sub-dividing the raw data into units (Alazab & Venkatraman, 2013).  These units 
comprised portions of the respondents’ verbal responses.  Portions of the participants’ verbal 
expressions were initially coded (Haahr, Norlyk & Hall, 2014).  Portions from transcribed 
interviews were compared with portions of website analysis, verbal expressions recorded in 
the field notes and documents collected from the participating organisations.  That is why 
cross-analysis was used in order to go further than a categorical integration when drawing 
inferences (Saeedi & Doolen, 2012).  The researcher condensed the large sections of raw data 
by reducing it to certain categories, and thus began to draw conclusions from the start of the 
data gathering process. 
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4.5.3 Methods of data analysis in this study 
 
Data analysis in this study has been presented in the mode of descriptive printed words.  
Serrano, Rovatsos and Botia (2013) observe that the intention of data analysis is to 
acknowledge components of meaning.  In this study, reading each sentence of the raw data 
that was attained through literature review and several interviews identified units of meaning.   
 
The data acquired from individual interviews was analysed using open coding. A rigorous 
comparative method was applied to analyse data within and between the research interviews.  
Content analysis was also used to analyse the interview data. This process entails the 
concurrent coding of raw data and the composition of categories. 
 
Data was analysed with the intention of identifying frequent patterns and establishing 
categories; these were compared with the literature, information security policies, and 
legislation.  These categories were used to answer research questions. Data obtained from 
website functionalities and content was also analysed with the aim of identifying common 
patterns and formulating categories. Content analysis was used to analyse field notes 
compiled during website analysis sessions. Common patterns and themes were identified and 
categories established.  
 
Data collected through interviews and website analysis was analysed by comparing it with the 
South African information security related legislation and policies collected from the 
participating organisations. Content analysis was also applied to analyse the legislation and 
policies. The data gathered was weighed against existing literature.  The results were 
contextualised to the South African legislative framework and corporate environment. An in-
depth account in a narrative form has been used in this study for reporting the findings of this 
enquiry.   
 
4.6 THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
At the beginning of the fieldwork, participants were assured that their identities would not be 
revealed.  In instances where mentioning names was unavoidable, written consent was 
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obtained from the relevant individuals and organisations.  The following sections explain the 
steps embarked on to guarantee the trustworthiness of the study. 
 
4.6.1 Measures to ensure validity of the study  
 
According to Saeedi & Doolen (2012), there are different views of validity.  Derrida 
(1997:31) observes that several things, including validity, “do not have definable meaning”.  
The following discussion illustrates how validity was established regarding the integration of 
legal and policy aspects in the implementation of information security in the South African 
corporate environment. 
 
What is internal validity 
Internal validity deals with how the research findings tie in with the reality (Saeedi & Doolen, 
2012).  In this study, the research findings were matched with the reality of information 
security implementation in corporate South Africa. The following themes, as espoused by 
Merriam (1998), and Simon (2013), demonstrate the measures that were taken to ensure the 
validity of the study.  
 
(a) Triangulation 
This study employed multiple data collection techniques to establish how legal and policy 
aspects were being integrated in the implementation of information security in corporate 
South Africa.  Data was gathered by applying three data collection methods: semi-structured 
individual interviews, website analysis, and document analysis.  The use of numerous sources 
also satisfied the validity of this study.  These sources include interviews with executives, 
managers, webmasters, information security specialists, information security experts, and 
academics.  Multiple data analysis techniques were employed in the study and assisted in 
promoting the principles of validity.  Data analysis methods used include open coding, 
content analysis and document analysis. 
 
(b) Member checks 
Organisations and people participating in this study were given the opportunity of examining 
the evolution of the research report as it was being written up.  This was done to make it 
possible for them to identify information which may not be an accurate reflection of what was 
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said, read and/or observed during the fieldwork. Further discussions often took place between 
the participants and the researcher to ensure that the findings of the study were valid.  
Furthermore, some research participants occasionally enquired about the progress of the 
research report. 
 
(c) Long-term website analysis 
The websites of the participating organisations were analysed from January 2011 to 
December 2011.  During the website analysis sessions, the researcher took notes relating to 
the content and functionalities of the websites.  
 
(d) Peer examination 
During the course of this study, ideas and findings were subjected to peer review and 
discussion to establish credibility in the study. This was achieved by publishing the following 
papers: 
 
 Dagada, R., Eloff, M.M., & Venter, L.M. (2009). Too many laws but very little progress! 
Is South African highly acclaimed information security legislation redundant? ISSA 2009 
Conference.  University of Johannesburg, 6-8 July 2009. 
 Dagada, R., & Eloff, M.M. (2013).  Integration of policy aspects into information security 
issues in South African organisations. African Journal of Business Management, 7(31), 
3069-3077. 
 
In 2009, the researcher presented a paper emanating from the literature review and pilot 
fieldwork of this study at the School of Computing 2009 Post-Graduate Symposium, held at 
the University of South Africa on 14 September 2009, where the paper was rated as the best 
doctoral study presentation.  In this way, the researcher was able to obtain invaluable 
feedback from both the academics and professionals within the field of study.   
 
External validity 
The predicament faced by the qualitative researcher by and large revolves around the 
justification for generalising the findings of that specific portion of research to some wider 
context (Kwuida & Schmidt, 2011).  According to Klimova and Mikheyenkova (2012), 
transferability is used to establish the applicability of the findings to other contexts.  It was 
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mentioned in chapter 1 that this study may impart crucial insights into the future 
implementation of information security by South African organisations, boards of directors, 
information security practitioners, e-commerce participants, ICT executives and those in 
charge of policy formulation.  Although the organisations selected for this investigation are 
situated in South Africa, most of them operate worldwide.  The findings and 
recommendations of this study may therefore be very useful and applicable to similar 
organisations globally.   
 
For the purpose of this study, external validity also means that there is sufficient narrative of 
the context of the study to allow readers to match it up to other contexts.  To enhance the 
ability of the reader to make the findings of this qualitative study transferable to other 
contexts, the following strategies as illustrated by Merriam (1998:211) were applied: 
 
a) Rich, thick description 
Since adequate description about organisations and individuals that participated in this study 
has already been provided, the reader should be able to determine how directly their own 
situations match up to the research setting and whether findings can be generalised.  Section 
4.2 describes the research sites as fully as possible by: 
 
 Providing the industrial sector of the organisations that participated in this study; 
 Providing positions of professionals who participated in this study.  The job titles of 
participants would make it possible for the reader to ascertain the trustworthiness of the 
respondents that provided information during the interviews; and 
 Evaluating the findings of this research against the literature.  The literature also contains 
what is happening in terms of information security in other countries and thus readers 
could compare the South African context with other settings in other countries. 
 
b) Multisite design 
This study involved 45 organisations and the fieldwork was therefore conducted in a number 
of different locations, including, but not limited to, in the banking, transport, online retail, 
hotel, broadcasting and telecommunications sectors.   
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4.7 ETHICS 
 
Ethical considerations were observed in this study although some readers may not view this 
work as being sensitive research.  Research participants, both at organisational and individual 
levels were asked to take part in this study.  The requests were conveyed through e-mailed 
letters (Appendix A1: Request to Participate in the Study).  Almost all research participants 
who agreed to be involved this study approved in writing. 
 
All interviewees consented formally to their participation in the study. They also consented to 
the recording of conversations during data collection.  The researcher then coded the audio-
recorded interviews, using pseudonyms, and stored the recordings in a locked facility.   
Interviewees were also at liberty to withdraw from the study at any time and were not 
required to provide a reason.  The researcher undertook all measures to ensure that 
organisations and individuals participating in the study are not caused any harm by doing so 
and for that reason; pseudonyms were used to safeguard the identity of the participants and to 
ensure that any information revealed, either personal or professional, would be treated as 
completely confidential. 
 
There were, however, benefits for organisations and individuals for being involved in this 
enquiry.  These included short presentations on preliminary and final findings, conference 
papers and articles with regard to this study.   
 
Ethical clearance was obtained from the College of Science, Engineering and Technology’s 
Ethics Clearance Committee (Ref: 062/RD/2013).  
 
4.8 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 
 
This chapter started with an overview of the research context, followed by brief descriptions 
of the organisations participating in this study.  This information was provided to enable 
readers to contextualise the implementation of information security and its integration with 
legal and policy aspects in these organisations.   
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It was stated that this study employed a generic qualitative methodology.  The interviews, 
website analysis and document analysis as data collection methods used in the research were 
discussed.  It was explained that qualitative data analysis was employed in the context of this 
study.  Trustworthiness and ethical considerations were discussed.   
 
Chapter 5 presents the findings of the research which is expected to demonstrate how South 
African companies are employing the provisions of these laws in their information security 
endeavours.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY: FINDINGS OBTAINED FROM 
INTERVIEWS 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, the study focused on the research design of the study.  Details of the 
research approach and procedures were provided. This chapter discusses the findings that 
were obtained through interviews.  It may be noted that throughout the chapter, the researcher 
offers his own interpretation and understanding of the data. This is in line with the selection 
of the ‘genre of design’ as stated in Chapter 4 (section 4.1).  The author also stated in the 
Disclaimer which appeared at the beginning of this thesis. The IANAL principle of, “I am not 
a lawyer”, clarifying that this research is not a legal study but rather an information systems 
study.  These findings address the research questions and are presented in categories and sub-
categories.   
 
Categories and sub-categories of the findings obtained through interviews were generated by 
analysing all the interview transcripts.  Interviews addressed three main topics: the attitude of 
corporate South Africa towards information security legislation; the manner in which 
organisations in South Africa integrate legal aspects into their information security policies; 
and users’ knowledge regarding information security policies.  Several sub-categories were 
derived from these three main categories. This study found that the participation of some 
Boards of Directors in the establishment of the ICT policies was minimal.  Section 5.2 
discusses the findings in more detail. 
 
Table 5.1 below summarises the analysis and shows the relationship between categories and 
sub-categories. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of Analysis showing the Relationship between Categories and Sub-
categories  
Data 
collection 
technique 
Main category Sub category 
Individual 
interviews 
Attitude of corporate 
South Africa in the 
study towards 
information security 
legislation 
 The Board of Directors is not involved in the formulation 
of information security policies   
 Very few organisations in South Africa incorporate 
legislative requirements in their information security 
policies 
 Government slowness in implementing information 
security laws impacts on the corporate environment’s 
attitude towards legislation 
The manner in which 
South African 
organisations 
integrate legal aspects 
in their information 
security policies 
 The delegation of trademark responsibilities is not well 
defined 
 Legal provisions to fight cyber-crime are redundant 
 Legal provision that deals with unsolicited communication 
has a serious loophole 
 South African Copyright Law is outdated 
 The Implementation of the Privacy Bill has been delayed 
 The Patents Law is ineffective 
 The provisions regarding the prevention of hacking and 
malicious code are difficult to implement 
The level of users’ 
knowledge of 
information security 
policies 
 Users have elementary knowledge of information security 
policies 
 The organisation’s seriousness towards its policies affects 
users’ knowledge 
 Information security policies awareness programmes are 
superficial 
 Users are suffering from compliance fatigue 
 
Each of these sub-categories will be discussed in more detail. 
 
5.2 FINDINGS OBTAINED FROM INTERVIEWS 
 
Although only 45 organisations participated in this study, 56 interviews were conducted.  
Some of the interviewees were not employed in the 45 organisations that participated in this 
study but are information security experts based in law firms, institutes, universities and 
media houses (see Table 4.2).  Interviews yielded three main topics: the attitude of corporate 
South Africa towards information security legislation; the manner in which organisations in 
South Africa integrate legal aspects in their information security policies; and users’ 
knowledge regarding information security policies.  Several sub-categories were derived from 
these three main categories.  Appendix B provides information on the following documents: 
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 Appendix B1: Protocol for Semi-Structured Interviews: Information Security 
Practitioners within the Participating Organisation;  
 Appendix B2: An Example of an Individual Interview: Information Security 
Practitioner within the Participating Organisation;  
 Appendix B3: Protocol for a Semi-Structured Interview: Information Security or 
Cyber Law Expert, and  
 Appendix B4: An Example of an Individual Interview: Information Security or Cyber 
Law Expert. 
 
5.2.1 Attitude of corporate South Africa in the study towards information security 
legislation 
 
This study found the attitude towards the legal aspects of information security in the 
organisations that participated in this study to be negative.  It was found that the Board of 
Directors in most of the companies that participated in this study did not provide leadership in 
the formulation of information security policies.  Analysis of the findings shows that some 
organisations in South Africa do not incorporate the requirements of relevant legislation into 
their information security policies.   
 
The Board of Directors is not involved enough in the formulation of information security 
policies   
This study found that the involvement of some Boards of Directors in the development of the 
information security policies is minimal or non-existent.  This is in conflict with the spirit of 
good corporate governance as espoused by the King III Report (2009).  This was confirmed 
by a Senior Lecturer (Lecturer A), who is an expert in information security law in the Law 
School of a prominent South African university: “King III has more IT governance 
provisions.  IT governance and security are the responsibility of the Board of Directors.  
According to the King III Report, IT security is an important element of the overall business 
efficiency and sustainability.”   
 
This study found that policies in all 45 organisations that participated in this study were 
actually approved at the Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) level.  The CIO would convene an 
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ICT Steering Committee comprising representatives from various departments.  The problem 
is that most of these representatives are not in very senior positions.  This indicates that some 
organisations do not appear to take information security seriously.  However, according to the 
King III Report, information security policies should be approved by the Board and the IT 
Steering Committee should be chaired by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); furthermore, 
“all Group Executives are expected to serve on the IT Steering Committee.”  Therefore, 
flouting this provision demonstrates deviance from the King III compliance requirements. 
 
During the interview with the Corporate Governance Senior Lecturer, reservations were 
raised with regard to certain wording in the Draft King III Report: “There is somewhere where 
it says that legislation is not the answer, but the international guidelines such as COBIT or 
ITIL may be used to measure the satisfactoriness of the organisation’s information security.  
It seems the message they wanted to communicate was that legislation only is not adequate 
and thus international guidelines and standards should be used.  That is why the section was 
concluded with the phrase that says that it may not be possible to have one size fits all.  I had 
hoped they would change that wording in the final King III Report; but unfortunately they 
didn’t, despite our submission.  The problem is that, that assertion would make the IT 
professionals and information security practitioners more cynical about the legislation”.  This 
gives cause for concern, since South Africa is a constitutional democracy and the rule of law 
should be respected. 
 
Very few organisations in South Africa incorporate legislative requirements in their 
information security policies 
Legislation in South Africa has a major impact in policy formulation.  An information 
security legal expert (Lawyer A) who participated in the study observed that: “The problem is 
that very few IT security experts and practitioners are conscious about this.  Technology 
people are more familiar with the standards; unfortunately there is a myriad of legislation 
and governance internationally and in South Africa.”  In South Africa, in particular, one of 
the crucial pieces of legislation is the ECT ACT (2002).  This Act deals with the removal of 
legal barriers to electronic transactions and provides an information security framework for 
both the merchants and buyers. Lawyer A continues: “You would expect most information 
security practitioners to be familiar with sections that deal with security related aspects in 
this Act, but unfortunately very few security experts and practitioners incorporate the Act’s 
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security requirements in their IT policies.  I really think this is highly irregular because it 
exposes consumers who use the websites of the companies that are not integrating the 
requirements of the Act for e-commerce purposes.”   
 
The Johannesburg-based Managing Director A of an IT legal firm concurred: “One of the 
observations that I have made is that people buy batches of the policies and they do ISO 
compliance, for instance ‘27000’ and they will immediately implement those policies rather 
than drafting the policies based on legislation.”  Most IT departments are aware that they 
should have information security policies but they do not have the awareness to actually make 
the policies relevant to their own organisations, while also adhering to the legal requirements 
of the South African laws; instead, “they’d rather purchase just broadly generated policies 
and apply those.”  This means that some corporate information security executives are not 
diligent in the execution of their information security mandate.  In addition, they are lax, lack 
commitment and are characterised by an unprofessional demeanour.  This account of 
information security professionals and their approach to their vocation permeated 
overwhelmingly during the data collection stage. 
 
During an interview with the Information Security Officer who works for an online 
bookseller, it was indicated that neither their legal department nor any outside lawyers were 
involved in four of their information security-related policies and there was no effort to ensure 
that these policies integrate the legislative requirements.  However, it was emphasised that the 
drafting of their Records Management Policy and Data Retention Schedule was guided by the 
legal requirements.   
 
A Senior Systems Programmer in one of the biggest mobile telecommunications networks in 
South Africa and the African continent confirmed that when the IT department drafts the 
information security policies, they, “don’t consciously look at the legislation and try and 
match that scientifically against, for example, the Promotion of Access to Information Act.”  
However, interestingly, it was noted that they, “relied on the legal department to do that and I 
think to some extent they did review that and made sure that it was compliant to legislation.” 
The respondent was not certain whether the legal department did ensure that the policy 
complied with legislation.  
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Government slowness in implementing information security laws impact the corporate 
environment’s attitude towards legislation 
It was revealed that the attitude of corporate South Africa towards the implementation of the 
requirements of information security laws is partly affected by the manner in which 
government performs its responsibilities towards the implementation and improvement of the 
legislation.  Certain provisions in the ECT Act, 2002 have not yet been implemented by the 
time of writing up this research, despite the fact that the legislation was promulgated already 
in 2002.  Amongst others, this pertains to the appointment of the Cyber Inspectors (Cops).  
The Head of Messaging in one of the four largest South African banks argues that that Cyber 
Inspectors in South Africa are largely found in the banks and other organisations.  South 
African banks have dedicated teams of information security professionals who ‘combat’ 
Internet-related crimes.  After noticing clients’ concerns regarding Internet and Cell Phone 
Banking crime, banks have responded forcefully to crime, and with superiority, in order to 
prevent financial losses and reputational damage.  The Cyber Cops in the banking industry are 
removing phishing and spoofing websites whilst suspicious emails are blocked before they 
reach the targeted victim.  This observation was supported by a Managing Executive of 
Digital Banking Channels in another Bank: “We ensure that we have got monitoring systems, 
behaviour pattern analysis, and early warning systems. For example, if a spoofing site is 
picked up worldwide on the Internet or a phishing email goes out, we typically shut the site 
down within 45 minutes to two hours.  It doesn’t matter where it sits in the world.”  Banks are 
also available 24 hours a day to help their customers in cases where they suspect their Internet 
Banking accounts are being defrauded.  Customers can phone the contact centre, “and there is 
also a button on the Internet banking screen that says “do you want to report a fraud 
incident”, press the button – they will close your account immediately” (Managing Director 
A).   
 
A Head of Virtual Channels in one of the banks asserted that there are times when Cyber 
Cops in South Africa literally prevent money from leaving the Internet Bank accounts 
fraudulently.  They also ensure that transactions via Internet Banking are undertaken in an 
encrypted environment.  It is not possible for criminals to intercept encrypted transactions.  It 
was also found that banks were more compliant with regard to the information security 
aspects of the legislation than all other industrial sectors that participated in this study.  A 
researcher attached to a security institute argued that the South African banks had no choice 
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but to comply with the legal aspects of information security: “They are however motivated by 
business considerations rather than solely being loyal to what the legislation prescribes.  
Companies in other industrial sectors don’t have huge volumes of transactions across the 
Internet like the banking sector.  Consequently, they have very little interest in establishing 
organs like SABRIC (South African Banking Risk Information Centre) or establishing their 
own sophisticated teams to fight Internet related crimes”.  
 
The Head of Enterprise Information Architecture at a hotel group concurred: “We work with 
the government through the Business Against Crime initiative, but the government should take 
leadership when it comes to information security crimes, otherwise companies in South 
African will end up operating paramilitary entities and that is not good in a constitutional 
state; I mean we are not in the business of securing the country; we are hoteliers. You can 
argue that the government is actually breaking the law by delaying the implementation of 
certain aspects of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act”.  The registration of 
cell phone SIM cards, as required by law, was done seven years after the promulgation of the 
RICA, 2002. Criminals in the Internet sphere are becoming highly sophisticated and the 
government should ensure that the legislation is updated and implemented in line with the 
changing requirements.  A lawyer (Lawyer B), who was interviewed in this study, observed 
that: “Corporate South Africa will continue to treat legislation with disdain as long as the 
government itself does not appear to be carrying out its part of the legal requirements”.  It is 
on this basis that it may be concluded that failure by the government to appear to be taking its 
own laws seriously has negative ramifications in relation to the attitude of corporate South 
Africa towards information security legislation.  
 
5.2.2 The manner in which South African organisations integrate legal aspects in their 
information security policies 
 
Findings contained in this section reflect that the delegation of trademark responsibilities is 
not well defined; some legal provisions to fight cyber-crime are not implemented; legal 
provisions that deal with unsolicited communication have serious loopholes; South African 
Copyright law is obsolete; the implementation of the Privacy Bill has been delayed; the 
Patents law is ineffective; and the provisions regarding the prevention of malicious code are 
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difficult to implement.  The main category and sub-categories of these findings are illustrated 
in Table 5.1 above. 
 
The delegation of trademark responsibilities is not well defined 
Even in organisations where the protection of trademarks has been incorporated in policies; 
the responsibilities of implementing them are not well defined and this has the potential of 
rendering the policy redundant.  In a particular car rental company, the IT Department has 
initiated the establishment of the Intellectual Property Policy which, amongst other things, 
caters for the protection of trademarks: “Although we have this kind of policy, it is important 
to stress that we don’t regard things like websites and trademarks to be part of the IT 
Department’s domain; they actually belong to the Corporate Communications and Marketing 
Department.  The problem with our Corporate Communications and Marketing Department is 
that it is very lousy”1.  When scrutinising the abovementioned Intellectual Property Policy, it 
was revealed that it did not specifically delegate the responsibility to any particular 
department.  The researcher raised this issue with the interviewee (Business Process Analyst) 
and the response was that certain things are common sense.  The interviewee further argued 
that Corporate Communications and Marketing know that they are responsible for the 
websites and trademarks: “That’s what they get paid for, otherwise they are redundant”.  This 
lack of clear delegation of authority has other serious ramifications.  The researcher 
established that even the top management in a certain hotel group viewed the websites, 
Intranet and the related organisational trademarks that appear in these sites as being the 
responsibility of the IT Department.  This was regarded by the researcher as being highly 
problematic because then these issues, including the budget thereof, are misplaced.   
 
In a particular airline company, the IT Department found itself involved in a legal dispute 
pertaining to the domain name which was illegally taken by another company: “To us this 
constitutes a battle for the trademark since our former Internet Service Provider illegally sold 
our website to some US company.  Our website constitutes a very famous brand in South 
Africa and we’re going to fight this vigorously.  The problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
our own legal department is not knowledgeable regarding ICT related matters.  The matter 
has since been referred to a legal firm which specialises in Information Technology law; but 
                                                 
1
 Interview with the IT Support Senior Manager (and her colleague Business Process Analyst) 
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you would have expected our lawyers to give instructions to this legal firm, but they are 
unable to do so due to lack of knowledge.  So they have asked the IT Department to give the 
instructions; this is highly improper.  But still, we are engaging those outside lawyers and 
someone has to do this.  A formal complaint has been submitted to the World Intellectual 
Property Organization’s (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Centre in Geneva, Switzerland2”, 
said the Senior Information Technology Consultant.  The researcher was subsequently 
informed that the company won the case and they got their domain name back.  It was of 
interest to the researcher to note that even the Legal Department could not carry out their 
responsibilities and that the IT Department had to become involved in legal matters.  
  
During an interview with a Data Centre Manager at a certain hotel, the issue of the lack of a 
clear mandate regarding Internet-related trademarks again emerged: “Last year, we received a 
communiqué from a certain organisation which deals with domain name dispute and 
registration in Asia.  They alleged that they have received an application from a certain 
company requesting to register domain names that closely resemble our organisational name 
and trademark.  It was not for the first time that this has happened.  The problem is that each 
time matters of this nature arise; the IT Department is expected to take leadership instead of 
the Legal and Communications departments.  This is grossly wrong, and it is something that 
we shall never win however we debate the matter”.3 
 
Some legal provisions to fight cyber-crime are not implemented 
Some of the South African legal information security provisions were highly acclaimed when 
they were introduced, but unfortunately, they have not yet been implemented.  These include 
provisions to prevent viruses, hacking, and industrial espionage.  Provisions to fight against 
such IT-related crimes are contained in Chapter 8 of the ECT Act (2002).  Hacking, industrial 
espionage, viruses, spam emails and other cyber related crimes are characterised by an 
unauthorised access to, interception of, or interference with data and thus they are supposed to 
be tackled by cyber inspectors.  A Senior Lecturer who specialises in information security law 
explained that the provision for the cyber police is, “articulated in Chapter 12 of the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act.”  It is unfortunate that this provision has 
not yet been implemented, even though the Act was passed more than eleven years ago. 
                                                 
2
 Interview with the IT Support Senior Manager. 
3
 Interview with the General Manager: IT Support Services. 
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After realising that cell phones were contributing to criminal activities, law-makers in South 
Africa established the RICA Act, 2002. Amongst other things, this Act stipulates that the 
buyers of pre-paid SIM cards should be registered by cell phone network operators so that the 
law enforcement agencies could identify them if and when their cell numbers are used to plan 
or commit a crime.  A legal expert (Lawyer C) indicated that, “With effect from 1st of July 
2009, the relevant sections of which requires the mobile network operators to register and 
verify the identity of the ‘pay-as-you-go’ subscribers came into effect.  Parliament has given 
the network operators 18 months in which to comply. To me this is highly problematic 
because during the course of these 18 months cell phones will continue to be used to commit 
crimes.  This view was supported by a General Manager: Group Information Services who is 
based at a broadcasting company, and viewed this as a blow in terms of dealing with crime: 
“The delay in implementing this requirement is not justifiable, especially when you consider 
the fact that the Act was passed in 2002.” 
 
One is not sure if the arrests of mobile banking fraudsters which took place in July 2009 had 
anything to do with the eagerness of the government to prevent crimes that are perpetrated 
with the assistance of cell phones. During an interview with a journalist who wrote a front 
page newspaper article regarding the aforesaid arrests, it was indicated that: “It seems the 
SAPS [South African Police Services] are making some ground-breaking progress regarding 
the SMS [mobile] banking related crimes.  Security breaches have been taking place between 
the banks and SMS banking customers.  Two members of an alleged sophisticated SMS 
Banking fraud syndicate were arrested on the 9
th
 and 10
th
 July 2009 respectively.  One of the 
suspects holds a Bachelor of Science Engineering Degree and works for a leading mobile 
network operator in South Africa”. The syndicate would block and delay SMS (Short 
Message Service) notifications from the banks to the relevant account holders whose accounts 
were then being plundered by the criminals.  The network operator employee was responsible 
for diverting messages to their own cell phones.  That is how they would get access to the 
victim’s details such as the account number and user names.  They would then get the OTP 
(One Time Password/PIN) from the diverted SMS and thus they would obtain easy access to 
the targeted account.  An Executive Head: Mobile Money in a mobile telecommunications 
network operator confirmed that the police would have used the provisions of the RICA Act 
of 2002, because it allows them to work with the mobile network operator to intercept 
communications of people suspected of being involved in criminal activities.  
107 
 
Chapter 10 of the ECT Act, 2002 advocates strongly for the establishment of the 
Cryptography Providers.  This is one of the legal measures to prevent IT-related crimes by, 
amongst others, legitimising electronic signatures.  The Manager: Applications Architecture 
at an airline transportation company commented that, “The ECT Act recognises and 
encourages the use of reliable electronic signatures which are referred to as AES (Advanced 
Electronic Signature).  This can be seen as some sort of SABS (South African Bureau of 
Standards) approval stamp.  The AES’s should only be issued by an ASP (Authentication 
Service Provider) and for several years the government has not established the ASP”.  This 
has been highly problematic in terms of information security because AES provides 
authenticity, credibility and security of digital transactions and information.  After nearly 
eleven years had lapsed since the abovementioned Act was passed, the government eventually 
appointed a South African-based cryptographic security provider, LawTrust. Whilst the 
government should be commended for the aforesaid appointment, the delay in doing so, and 
thereby ensuring compliance, does not encourage South African organisations to abide by the 
law. 
 
Legal provision that deals with unsolicited communication has a serious loophole 
Unsolicited emails, famously known as spam emails, are addressed in Chapter 7 of the ECT 
Act, 2002.  This chapter of the Act deals with consumer protection.  Spam emails are dealt 
with in Clause 45, which prohibits unsolicited commercial communications to the consumers.  
However, during the interviews, interviewees indicated that this prohibition is not effective.  
Sellers of goods, products and services use a loophole in the Act to send chains of unsolicited 
messages to consumers.  The Head of Internet Channel in a particular bank noted: “The Act 
says the sender should give the recipient a choice to stop the subscription.  However, 
consumers are uninformed and thus they are swamped with spam emails.  In reality, the first 
email that is sent is unsolicited, but it is legal because it gives the recipient an option to opt 
out.  Usually, recipients don’t opt out and thus the subsequent emails cannot be defined as 
unsolicited because the consumer is deemed to have opted to receive the adverts since he did 
not opt out.  This is entirely within the law.” The problem is that most banking clients and 
others in South Africa have received unsolicited emails with viruses and spyware attached. 
After several years, the government has now, to some extent, dealt with this legal loophole 
through the Consumer Protection Act No. 68 of 2008.  
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South African Copyright Law is out-dated 
During an interview with a copyright lawyer (Lawyer C), the lawyer declared that copyright 
in South Africa is a major problem because it was passed in 1978 before the new democratic 
constitution, before the onset of the WWW (World Wide Web) and even before the Internet 
was used for commercial purposes.  South Africa is unfortunately one of the leading countries 
in terms of the level of illegal copying of digital material.  Copies of several movies may be 
found being sold in Johannesburg streets long before they come out on DVD.  A prominent 
film maker in South Africa, Leon Schuster, incurs significant losses due to piracy: 
“Interestingly, you’d have noted in the media that the South African law enforcement agencies 
were able to arrest and confiscated the property of Vedakumary. She was arrested under the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act in March 2007.”4  On 11 March 2009, the Pretoria 
Commercial Crimes Court ruled that the valuable property of Ms Vedakumary should be 
seized.  This was the first time in South Africa that private property of an alleged counterfeiter 
had been seized by the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU).  The luxury residential property was 
auctioned:  “According to the abovementioned Act, the proceeds of the sale should go to 
AFU’s Criminal Asset Recovery Fund to fund law enforcement activities.”5  The law 
enforcement agencies should be commended for this achievement. Other than the Prevention 
of Organised Crime Act, “other related pieces of legislation which are relevant to the digital 
copyright related problems are the Copyright Act of 1978, and the Intellectual Property Laws 
Amendment Act of 1997.  The problem with the Copyright Act of 1978 is that it is very old and 
was established long before the Internet was used for commercial purposes.  The Legislature 
should ensure that South African laws are regularly updated to meet the requirements of the 
changing business environment.”6 
 
The Implementation of the Privacy Bill was delayed 
Privacy is catered for in myriad laws – starting with the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa No. 108 of 1996.  Other pieces of legislation that deal with privacy include the PoPI 
Bill No. 9 of 2009, ECT Act of 2002, and the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 
of 2000.  The nature of a policy that deals with privacy will depend on a particular company.  
Every company is expected to include the principles of the above-mentioned pieces of 
                                                 
4
 Interview with Lawyer D. 
5
 Interview with Lawyer E. 
6
 Interview with Lawyer B. 
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legislation into their privacy policies.  “In actual effect, almost all of the IT security related 
policies in an organisation should inevitably address the privacy issue; but my observation is 
that this is not always the case in corporate South Africa.  When it comes to the protection of 
personal information, the government intended to introduce a piece of legislation specifically 
for this.  Unfortunately, this law has not yet been passed despite the fact that a Bill
7
  has been 
available since 2009.  This Bill contains all the right things in terms of the protection of 
personal information; for example, it agitates for the establishment of the Information 
Protection Commission
8”. This Bill was eventually signed into law on 27 November 2013, as 
the PoPI Act No. 4 of 2013.  It is expected that companies will be given at least 12 months in 
which to comply with this law.  Fieldwork pertaining to this study was already completed. 
 
The Patents Law is ineffective 
The legal protection of patents in South Africa is derived from the Patents Act No. 57 of 1978 
and the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997. “These are some of the 
laws which were passed long before the Internet was used for commercial purposes” Lawyer 
B stated that the Patents Act is one of the most controversial pieces of legislation in South 
Africa.  Chapter 5, Section 25 of the Act states that software patents cannot be patented in 
South Africa: “There are several intellectuals who support the Act in terms of forbidding 
software patents in South Africa.  I am against this provision; I feel very strongly that 
software inventions are part of one’s intellectual property and thus they should be patented.  
If we deny software producers the right to register their patents, it may lead to lower levels of 
inventions in the software arena. On the other hand, how do you attract foreign direct 
investment from the software industry if you are going to deny firms the right to register their 
patents?”9  This may have unintended consequences in terms of foreign investment by IT 
companies in South Africa.  There is some irony in that, although the Act says computer 
programmes cannot be patented, companies and individuals are actually registering patents in 
the software domain: “It may be because the law is toothless or officers in the government 
companies and patents registration agency, the Companies and Intellectual Property 
                                                 
7
 South Africa. An Act/[Bill] to promote the protection of personal  information processed by public and private 
bodies; to provide for the establishment of an Information Protection Commission; and to provide for matters 
incidental thereto. Pretoria: The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
8
 Interview with Lawyer E. 
9
 Interview with the Senior Lecturer. 
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Commission (CIPC) are not familiar with the provisions of the law.”10  Alternatively, there 
may be some loopholes that companies are manipulating to get their patents registered and 
this violates intellectual property requirements. 
 
The provisions regarding the prevention of hacking and malicious code are difficult to 
implement 
The provisions for the prevention of hacking are contained in Chapter 8 of the ECT Act, 
2002.  Hacking falls under the definition of cyber-crimes because it is characterised by 
unauthorised access to, interception of, or interference with data: “Industrial espionage, which 
is very rampant in South Africa, is also within the definition of the ECT Act.  Hacking, 
industrial espionage, spam emails, and other cyber-related crimes are supposed to be tackled 
by the cyber cops or rather cyber inspectors”11.  This provision is articulated in Chapter 12 of 
the ECT Act, 2002: “Whilst this provision has been highly praised by IT and information 
security professionals, it has unfortunately not yet been implemented”.12 
 
The prevention of viruses and other forms of malicious code is provided for in the ECT Act, 
2002 in Chapter 8, which deals with cyber-crime.  Viruses constitute unauthorised access to, 
interception of, or interference with data.  In other words, sending viruses is a crime since 
doing so constitutes unauthorised access, interception, and/or interference with data.  “The 
case law in South Africa does not yet have examples of cases that are related to viruses and 
other kinds of malicious code.  However, cases that relate to malicious code-related crimes 
are happening in South Africa, especially in Internet banking”.13  This is done through 
pharming.  This is where viruses are transmitted via infected emails or downloads: “The virus 
directs Internet banking users to a false website that looks like the genuine one in terms of 
design and the user’s identification details are captured”.14  It seems that the unavailability of 
the cyber inspectors in accordance with the provisions of the ECT Act, 2002 is also a major 
problem with regard to virus prevention: “The law enforcement agencies in South Africa 
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 Interview with Lawyer E. 
11
 Interview with Lawyer F. 
12
 Interview with the Senior Lecturer. 
13
 Interview with Lawyer F. 
14
 Interview with a Researcher in a Security Institute. 
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haven’t successfully prosecuted any person for this kind of criminal activities”.15  At 
organisational level, the policy that usually deals with spam emails and viruses is the ICT 
Acceptable Use Policy.  In reality, the name of the policy is not significant as long as there is 
a policy that addresses viruses and other types of malicious code. 
 
5.2.3 The level of users’ knowledge of information security policies 
 
Although technical professionals are expected to implement technical information security 
measures, procedures and standards are supposed to be implemented by all users in an 
organisation.  The word ‘user’ in this study refers to any information systems users such as 
employees, independent contractors, service providers, consultants, and all personnel 
affiliated with third parties who are based in the relevant company.  It is therefore imperative 
for all employees to be familiar with the information security policies and, by implication, the 
legal requirements.  It would be a futile exercise for any organisation to have policies that are 
not known and complied with by the targeted information systems users.   
 
Users have elementary knowledge of information security policies 
During an interview with an online florist general manager (services sector), it was revealed 
that some users perceive information security policies as an irritation because they curtail 
their freedom to do certain things in the information systems space.  This claim was supported 
by an online restaurant franchise webmaster (services sector) who observed that the problem 
is that such things have the potential of infringing on information security or violating 
acceptable electronic communication in the corporate environment.  On the other hand, other 
users feel that acquainting themselves with the policies is time-consuming and interferes with 
the actual work.  This finding was supported by the Information Security Officer of an airline 
company: “I think getting employees to be conversant with information security policies is 
always a problem because people always feel that security policies get in their way and it’s 
something that hinders them from doing their work.  It is generally difficult to get people to 
pay attention to policies and all that”.   
 
                                                 
15
 Interview with the Head of Virtual Channels in a bank. 
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The interest and level of users’ knowledge is also affected by the specific security issues: “In 
our organisation it [user’s knowledge levels] depends on which topics of the policy.  I think 
there’s a high degree of awareness around, for example, choosing strong passwords. You 
know how to use a strong password because of some awareness campaigns but also because 
we have mechanisms that actually force them to do that, so when they log into that domain, 
they have to have these eight characters, it can’t contain letters of their first names, it has to 
have at least one numeric, lower case, and upper case, so it’s forcing them to do that”.16    
 
This study found that users who are employees familiarise themselves better with policies 
than users who are customers.  This is highly prevalent in the banking environment where 
many Internet Banking holders have been victims of fraud despite the fact that banks have 
placed policies on their websites to assist the users: “Users who are professionals in their own 
right would be ignorant of basic information security requirements and they lose lots of 
money due to this.  When criminals plunder their accounts they plead ignorance and expect 
the bank to refund them”.17  This study established that whilst users are knowledgeable with 
policy aspects such as passwords, acceptable usage of e-mail and Internet, they have only a 
rudimentary knowledge of information security issues such as phishing e-mails, pharming 
websites, and spoofing scams.   
 
The organisation’s seriousness towards its policies affects users’ knowledge  
Two of the organisations that participated in this study have information security policies that 
are not formally approved by their relevant authorities.  One of the organisations is in the 
hotel industry and the other is an online retailer. In one of these organisations, the policies are 
relatively new, whilst in the other organisation, policies were introduced four years 
previously, but they are not yet approved. One should note that the non-approval applies to all 
organisational policies and not just ICT policies.  Although policies have been posted on the 
Intranets of the aforesaid organisations, employees do not take the time to study them because 
they will only become effective after approval.  A Supply Chain Manager in an online 
bookseller entity noted that: “This is a very problematic area because these policies have not 
yet been formally approved.  Although they are on the Intranet, I’m pretty sure that our staff 
doesn’t read this stuff because they are not yet approved”.   
                                                 
16
 Interview with the Manager: Applications Architecture in an airline company. 
17
 Interview with the Director of Self Service Banking.  
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During the interviews, the researcher learnt that the approval of policies is not an indication 
that the policies are accepted / implemented. Each employee has to sign that they accept each 
information security related policy and will adhere to it; unless the provisions of the policies 
were included in their employment contracts (see Appendix D for an example of Employee 
Interception Consent).  Signing of the policies by each employee should be preceded by 
extensive training.  Organisations can only do this if they are serious about information 
security.  Lack of seriousness on the part of the organisation will permeate to the level of 
individual employees and this does not bode well for the information security endeavours in 
the corporate environment. 
 
Information security policies awareness programmes are superficial 
It was found that although policies could have been properly established and approved, the 
adherence to them is not effective because the main form of awareness training is to post 
policies on the Intranet. A General Manager: Networks in a hotel defended the department in 
relation to the superficial awareness of information security policies: “It is not our 
responsibility to train employees; we’re IT people.  We coordinated the drafting of the 
policies, forwarded them to a law firm in Cape Town which specialises in IT law, and then 
got them approved.  You are barking up the wrong tree; the culprits in this matter are the HR 
(Human Resources) guys.  HR should do this as part of the training, induction, or orientation 
programmes.  The sooner they spend less time training people about dressing and eating 
etiquette the better”. i.e. – they are playing the blame game - a clear indication that they 
themselves are not really embracing the policies and ‘living’ by them!  
 
Even in organisations where the Human Resources Department wants to conduct awareness 
programmes, their efforts are usually met by stiff opposition from the ‘core-business’ 
departments which perceive an information security awareness campaign as a waste of time.  
The problem is that they cannot link information security and market competitiveness 
(billable work).  This is being disingenuous because a company cannot thrive and make 
profits because poor information security would lead to huge financial losses and reputational 
damage.  For example, if a bank decided to ignore information security measures, “It would 
become non-existent within a week.  Hackers will have easy access; depositors will march 
and demand their money because the institution would have suffered bad media publicity.  
The so-called core departments should get their act right and release their staff members for 
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information security awareness programmes; stakes are very high”.18 This view is supported 
by a Director of Self Service Banking: “Risk Management should be seen as an integral part 
of profit making and organisational sustainability”.  Companies should learn to incorporate 
information security policies awareness between competing priorities, since information 
security cannot be compromised.  Any profit generation at the expense of proper information 
security implementation cannot be sustained in the long term or even in the short term, 
depending on the nature of the organisation. 
 
A hotel group that participated in this study appeared to be a little more serious regarding 
information security awareness: “We run policy awareness.  It’s a two hour session and we 
basically preach four policies.  This is complemented by an online session which is called ‘O-
Camp’; basically the user goes through that – it’s an hour session.  It’s the four policies and 
at the end they get certification, but you have to pass.  The CEO has made it clear that it is 
compulsory, so if you don’t come for this session, we will invite you again and again, until 
you come”.19  Whilst this awareness programme is commendable, it remains artificial.  After 
going through the interviews and collecting documents, the researcher’s view is that each 
session of information security policy awareness should be preceded by pre-assessment to 
determine the level of participants’ knowledge; this should be followed by post-assessment 
after the actual awareness session.  The post-assessment activities will determine the level of 
new knowledge gained.  This recommendation is applicable to all organisations and not just 
the aforementioned hotel group (see Section 8.2.4). 
 
Users are suffering from compliance fatigue 
Mentioning the word “compliance” to a group of banking, mining or insurance employees 
may well result in a negative response, because they are expected to comply with a myriad 
laws, regulations, procedures and policies.  In the banking sector, executives indicated during 
the interviews that they are buckling under the weight of 150 non-banking laws and the 
requirements of Basel III regulations. Although information security is highly prioritised in 
the abovementioned sectors, information security awareness policies have to compete with 
other compliance requirements.  Problems emanate when the relationship between the 
employer and employee deteriorates and the employee becomes an information security risk; 
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 Interview with the CEO: Mobile and Transect Solutions 
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 Interview with the Chief Information Officer. 
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that is why in a corporate environment most information security crimes are committed 
internally, sometimes with external cooperation. A bitter IT employee may deliberately 
destroy information systems. When the matter is taken to the South African Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), the estranged employee usually pleads 
ignorance and the company is blamed for insufficient awareness programmes. Ordinary 
employees may sell information to the company’s competitors.  A Senior Channel Manager: 
Cellphone and Electronic Channels in one of the big four banks proclaimed: “You also have 
users who are honest and genuine employees; their main weakness is gullibility and lack of 
proper training in terms of security.  When such employees are confronted with a ‘social 
engineer’ they become naive and fall in the trap; this is very sad.  Whilst compliance fatigue 
is a genuine issue, information security policies awareness should remain on our radar 
screen”. 
 
Information security practitioners have to be creative to gain and keep the attention of the 
targeted audience.  However, one should hasten to add that information security policies 
awareness should not be done at the expense of other compliance requirements.   
 
5.3 SUMMARY  
 
This chapter presented the findings of this study which were obtained through interview data 
collection method.  It has already been mentioned in several sections of this chapter that these 
findings were derived from the data collected through interviews with information security 
practitioners and information security and legal experts.  The main findings of this study 
reflect that the participation of some Boards of Directors in the provision of the information 
security policies was minimal; some information security practitioners were not familiar with 
the legal and policy aspects that they were supposed to be integrating into the implementation 
of information security and thus most organisations were not complying with the law.   
 
Some of the laws which featured in Chapter 3 where the legal framework of this study was 
presented do not appear in the findings obtained from the interviews of this study.  These 
include the following laws: the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and the National Credit Act 
No. 34 of 2005.   
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The researcher chose to use the term ‘genre of design’ as stated in Chapters 1 and 4, and 
therefore both ontology and epistemology played an important role in the findings of this 
study that were obtained through interviews.  That is why the findings contained in this 
chapter are a product of interplay between the personal philosophical perspective of the 
researcher and the empirical findings of the study. The next chapter presents findings of this 
study that were obtained from document collection and websites analysis.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY: FINDINGS FROM DOCUMENT 
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, findings obtained through interviews were presented.  Apart from 
analysing the interview data, the policies and documents collected from the 45 organisations 
that participated in this study were also analysed; the findings thereof are presented in this 
chapter. These include, but are not limited to, the following policies: Information Security, 
Data Privacy, Access to Information, Interception and Surveillance, Records Management, 
Intellectual Property, Plagiarism, ICT Acceptable Use, and Electronic Communications 
policies.  Of the 45 organisations that participated in this study, none had a stand-alone policy 
on patents protection. The policies were evaluated against the requirements, as identified in 
the following legislation: 
 
i. Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000; 
ii. ECT Act, 2002;  
iii. RICA Act, 2002;  
iv. Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997;  
v. Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978;  
vi. Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941;  
vii. Films and Publications Act No. 65 of 1996;  
viii. National Archives and Records Service of South Africa Act No. 43 of 1996; and  
ix. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996.   
 
Section 6.2 provides a discussion of the policy analysis. Other documents collected, apart 
from the policy documents, included those that deal with ICT processes and procedures.  
Through the document analysis, it was found that some organisations in South Africa were 
not sufficiently integrating legal and policy aspects in the implementation of information 
security.   
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Categories and sub-categories of the findings obtained through website analysis were 
produced after the data collection and analysis of the websites that were designed for financial 
transactions in the 45 organisations.  Findings obtained through the analysis of websites’ 
analysis notes indicate that the websites of some South African organisations do not comply 
with the requirements of the legislation.  These are the websites through which financial 
transactions take place.  Section 6.3 provides more detailed information.  Table 6.1 below 
summarises the analysis and shows the relationship between categories and sub-categories. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of Analysis showing the Relationship between Categories and Sub-
categories  
Document 
collection 
and 
analysis  
Policies regarding hacking  Overview of policies 
 Information security policies 
 Interception and surveillance policies 
Policies regarding intellectual 
property 
 Overview of policies 
 Plagiarism policies 
 Document and record management policies 
Policies regarding the 
protection of trademarks 
 Overview of the intellectual trademark guidelines 
Policies regarding privacy  Overview of policies 
 Data privacy policies 
 Acceptable use policy 
 Electronic communication policy 
 Policies regarding patent right 
Websites 
analysis 
Financial transaction 
functionality of website 
 Enables consumers to make payments for products or 
services.    
 Lack of compliance may expose customers 
 The absence of a disclaimer as a hyperlink may expose 
the merchant to litigation 
A lack of familiarity with the 
requirements of the ECT Act 
No. 25 of 2002 regarding 
consumer protection 
 The elementary nature of legal notices  
 Limited attempts to comply with relevant policies 
 
In this chapter, the researcher offers his own interpretation and understanding of the data. This 
is accordance with the selection of the ‘genre of design’ as stated in Chapter 4 (section 4.1).  
The researcher also mentions in the Disclaimer, which appeared at the start of this thesis, the 
IANAL principle of, “I am not a lawyer”, illuminating that this study is not a legal research 
but rather an information systems research. 
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6.2 FINDINGS OBTAINED THROUGH DOCUMENT COLLECTION AND 
ANALYSIS,  
 
Information security related policies were collected from 30 of the 45 organisations that 
participated in this study. Other organisations could not provide the documents, either because 
they did not have them or there were concerns about confidentiality. The collected policies 
were analysed against information security-related legislation and the analysed interview 
content.  It is important to state that only 14 of the 30 companies, whose policies were 
analysed, have integrated legal aspects into their policies and the provision of information 
security.  Three of these 14 companies, that have integrated legislation in their policies, had 
only incorporated legislation requirements in their Records Retention Schedules; their other 
information security policies do not make any reference to any law.  It was found that the 
provisions of definitions of terms in some of the policies were essential because it enables 
people with no IT and/or legal background to understand the content of the policy.  Table 6.2 
below indicates policies that were collected from various organisations. 
 
Table 6.2: Policies collected from the organisations 
 
Table Key:  
 “Yes” means policy is available 
 “No” means policy is not available 
 - means the researcher could not ascertain the availability of policy 
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1 Banking Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Banking Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 Banking Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4 Banking Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 Banking Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6 
Telecommun
ications 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7 
Online 
Restaurant 
Franchise 
Chain 
- - - - - - - - 
8 
Flower 
Delivery 
Service 
- - - - - - - - 
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Organisation 
No: 
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9 Airline Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
10 Airline Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
11 Airline Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
12 Airline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
13 Airline Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
14 Airline Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
15 Online Shop - - - - - - - - 
16 online Shop - - - - - - - - 
17 
Online 
Retailer 
- - - - - - - - 
18 Airline Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 
19 Airline Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
20 Airline Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
21 Bookseller - - - - - - - - 
22 
Online 
Retailer 
- - - - - - - - 
23 
Online 
Retailer 
- - - - - - - - 
24 
Online 
Retailer 
- - - - - - - - 
25 Cinema - - - - - - - - 
26 Cinema - - - - - - - - 
27 Hotel Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes 
28 Hotel Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
29 Hotel Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No 
30 Hotel Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes 
31 Hotel Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
32 Hotel Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes 
33 Hotel Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
34 University Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
35 University Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
36 Hotel - - - - - - - - 
37 Broadcasting Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
38 Broadcasting Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
39 Online Shop - - - - - - - - 
40 Car hire Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
41 Car hire Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
42 Car hire - - - - - - - - 
43 
Telecommu-
nications 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
44 
Telecommu-
nications 
Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 
45 
Telecommu-
nications 
Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
 
 
It was stated in Section 6.1 that only 30 (out of 45) organisations that participated in this study 
provided their policies to the researcher.  The researcher could not ascertain if the other 15 
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organisations had these policies or not.  On the other hand, it is important to note that all the 
policies reflected in this chapter are information security policies; however, some 
organisations have a policy specifically named: “Information Security Policy”. 
 
Although 13 (out of 30) organisations that provided their policies did not have a policy called 
“Information Security”, some of the provisions of what would be contained in this policy 
could be found in other policies. 
 
Plagiarism Policy does not appear in the above table due to space constraints. Out of 30 
organisations whose policies were collected by the researcher, only two universities and two 
broadcasting companies had plagiarism policies. 
 
Interestingly, all the 30 organisations that provided their policies to the researcher have 
Access to Information Policy.  In some of the organisations it is referred to as Access to 
Information Policy and / or Promotion of Access to Information Manual.  This high 
compliance should be attributed to the fact that all companies in South Africa are required by 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000, to have access to information 
related policies or manuals.  
 
For the purpose of this study, policies have been grouped into five areas of information 
security: hacking, intellectual property and copyright, protection of trademarks, privacy, and 
patents protection. This means an organisation may not have a Data Privacy Policy, but its 
privacy-related matters may be catered for in the ICT Acceptable Use Policy and/or 
Electronic Communications Policy.  Table 6.3 below provides an overview of the findings in 
this section. 
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Table 6.3: Synopsis of the document collection and analysis findings 
AREA OF 
INFORMATION 
SECURITY 
RELEVANT POLICY RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
1) Hacking   Information Security Policy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Access to Information Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance 
Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 Promotion of Access to Information 
Act No. 2 of 2000 
 Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act No. 25 of 2002 
 Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Act No. 70 of 
2002 
2) Intellectual 
Property and 
Copyright 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
 Information Security Policy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Plagiarism Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 Intellectual Property Law Amendment 
Act No. 38 of 1997 
 Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
 Films and Publications Act No. 65 of 
1996 
 National Archives and Records 
Service of South Africa Act No. 43 of 
1996 
3) Protection of 
trademarks 
 Intellectual Property Policy  Intellectual Property Law Amendment 
Act  No. 38 of 1997 
 Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
4) Privacy  Data Privacy Policy 
 ICT Acceptable Use Policy 
 Electronic Communications 
Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance 
Policy 
 Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa No. 108 of 1996 
5) Patents 
protection 
 No company had a clearly 
distinguished policy on patents 
rights 
 Patents Act No. 57 of 1978 
 Notes: Only three organisations 
addressed the patents protection as 
part of the Intellectual Property Policy 
 
In comparing Table 6.3 above with Table 7.1 in Chapter 7, it will be noted that although none 
of the policy documents collected from the participants in the study link the ECT Act (2002) 
to copyright-related policy issues, Chapter XI of the aforesaid Act contains some copyright 
related issues (see Table 6.1).  Detailed findings of the document analysis are presented 
below. 
 
Hacking has much to do with access control.  Hacking was found to be addressed in several 
policies, including the Information Security Policy and Interception and Surveillance Policy.  
The relevant pieces of legislation are the Promotion of Access to Information Act, the ECT 
Act and the Interception Act.  An overview of the policies relevant to hacking has been 
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provided in the following paragraphs. This overview presents a snapshot of the information 
security policies and interception and surveillance policies collected from some of the 
companies that participated in this study.  The overview is biased towards the aspects that 
contain legal provisions. 
 
6.2.1 Policies regarding hacking 
 
This study found that although policies such as Data Privacy, Access to Information, and 
Records Management tentavely address issues related to hacking policies that are more 
applicable to hacking are Information Security, and Interception and Surveillance.  
Information Security and Interception and Surveillance policies are discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
Brief overview of information security policy 
Some of the policies provided definitions of the terms used in the policies.  Most of these 
terms are information security terminologies such as ‘access control, audit logs, 
authentication, centralised data, consumer, corporate data, decentralised data, dual control, 
encryption, equipment, error log, firewalls, information asset, information security officer, 
operating systems, service level agreement, transaction, users, user requirement specification, 
and viruses.  The provision of definitions is an essential step towards enhancement of 
information security in the corporate environment as it enables non-IT users to understand the 
policies with ease. 
 
Relevant legislation, policies, and other documents 
In this section, it is stated that ICT makes the organisation vulnerable to some legal risks and 
liabilities in a number of ways.  The information security policy details rules, guidelines and 
standards to ensure the security of the organisation’s information, data, records and 
documents.  This policy applies to all users using digital processing and communication 
equipment/infrastructure, including third parties that have temporary access to and/or use of 
the organisation’s communication facilities or equipment to create, access or use the 
organisation’s information. 
 
The relevant legislation in respect of the Information Security Policy is as follows:  
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 Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000;  
 ECT Act, 2002; and  
 RICA, 2002.   
 
The policy provides appropriate coverage of International Standards ISO 27002.  The 
Information Security Policy should be read in conjunction with the following policies: ICT 
Acceptable Use Policy; Data Privacy Policy; Access to Information Policy; Interception and 
Surveillance Policy; and Records Management Policy. 
 
Overview of the Interception and Surveillance Policies 
Some of the interception and surveillance policies contained definitions of the terms used in 
the policies.  These include the following terms: authorised persons, communication facilities, 
employees, intercept, Internet, monitor, and personal information. 
 
Relevant legislation, policies, and other documents 
It was interesting to learn that in two of the collected policies, it was stated from the onset, 
that the Interception and Surveillance Policy emanates from the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa No. 108 of 1996, which places the emphasis on privacy and dignity.  Whilst 
most of the information security-related policies are silent on the rights of the employees, in 
this particular policy there are provisions such as: “This organisation is committed to the 
provisions of the South African Constitution and the protection of employees’ privacy and 
dignity”. This policy aims to balance the privacy and rights of employees with the security 
and risk management obligations of the organisation by providing strict rules and limitations 
to the interception and monitoring of communications. 
 
In all the policies that the researcher collected, it was clearly stated that, in terms of the scope 
of application, the policy applied to all employees and any service provider employed to assist 
the organisation in the monitoring and surveillance of employees’ conduct and 
communications.  The relevant legislation for this policy is the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa No. 108 of 1996; RICA, 2002; ECT Act, 2002; and the Guidelines of the 
National Archives.  A careful scrutiny of the collected policies showed that most clauses of 
the interception and surveillance policies refer largely to the RICA, 2002.  It is also stated that 
this policy should be read in conjunction with the Data Privacy Policy. 
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6.2.2 Policies regarding intellectual property and copyright 
 
After studying the collected documents from the organisations that participated in this study, 
the researcher found that there is little differentiation between the concepts of intellectual 
property, copyright and trademarks.  In effect, organisations use these words synonymously 
and interchangeably.  However, this does not have any impact in terms of the quality of the 
intellectual property, copyright, and trademarks policies and their implementation.  Whilst 
most of the information security policies have been marked “Internal Only”, policies and 
guidelines are placed on the organisation’s website. Table 6.1 illustrated the relationship 
between the main-category and sub-categories pertaining to the findings regarding intellectual 
property and copyright that were obtained through document collection and analysis. 
 
As explained previously in Chapter 3, the inception of ICT, and the Internet specifically, has 
led to a copyright challenge.  Intellectual property and copyright is addressed in several 
policies, including the following:  Intellectual Property Policy, Information Security Policy, 
Data Privacy Policy, Plagiarism Policy, and Records Management Policy.  The relevant 
legislation includes the Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997; the 
Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978; the Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941; the Films and 
Publications Act No. 65 of 1996; and the National Archives and Records Service of South 
Africa Act No. 43 of 1996.  An overview of the policies relevant to Intellectual Property and 
Copyright are provided below. The overview presents the policies collected by the researcher 
from some of the companies that participated in this study.  The overview is biased towards 
the aspects that contain legal provisions. 
 
Brief overview of the intellectual property and copyright policies 
Intellectual Property is gradually becoming an important asset amongst South African 
companies.  According to the information contained in the collected policies, it includes assets 
such as, but not limited to, ‘website content, website source code, software developed within a 
particular company, software developed by employees, product packaging, trademarks, 
domain names, marketing information, and the like. Copyright is addressed by the Intellectual 
Property Policy. A few of the collected intellectual property and copyright policies include the 
definitions of terms, such as content providers, employees, external ICT IP (Intellectual 
Property), ICT IP, and responsible person. 
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Relevant legislation, policies, and other documents 
The objective of this policy is to formulate a framework for the establishment, protection, 
registration, maintenance, management and use of ICT Intellectual Property. This policy is 
applicable to all employees, third parties, external contractors, and ICT Intellectual Property-
related contracts entered into by employees acting on behalf of the organisation. The relevant 
legislation includes the Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997; the 
Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978; and the Merchandise Marks Act No. 17 of 1941.  The problem 
is that some of the aforementioned laws are very old and were introduced before the Internet 
was used for commercial purposes. Other relevant policies for intellectual property, copyright 
and trademarks are the Information Security Policy and the Data Privacy Policy. It is a matter 
of extreme concern to note that the majority of the organisations that participated in this study 
do not have policies that adequately address the protection of intellectual property, copyright 
and trademarks. 
 
Some of the copyright provisions placed on the websites of organisations that participated in 
this study contain the following paraphrased stipulations:  
Organisation “38” respects the intellectual property of other organisations, and thus we 
expect our competitors, users of our products and websites to do the same. Organisation 38 
may, in proper circumstances and at its discretion, cancel the access of users who violate the 
intellectual property rights of our company. We encourage you to exercise discretion while 
browsing our website.  The use of original texts, graphics, images, screen shots, and other 
materials from Organisation 38 sources must be approved by Organisation 38.  In addition, 
when using such materials, you must include a copyright notice – in an adjacent area or as a 
footnote – to show Organisation 38 copyright.  Please note that Organisation 38 photography 
is only licensed for Organisation 38 use and must not be used by other organisations in their 
communications. 
 
The above paragraph was extracted from an Intellectual Property and Copyright Policy of a 
South African based company which operates globally.  That is why the policy does not 
necessarily make reference to the law of any specific country.  Be that as it may, Lawyer F 
who was interviewed during the course of this study, indicated that the aforesaid policy is 
within the parameters of the South African and international legal framework.  The next 
section deals with trademarks-related policies. 
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The preamble of one of the two universities that participated in this study was considered to 
be of importance in the area of the protection of intellectual property: The University 
recognises that it is a society of scholars.  The University is devoted to providing a platform 
that supports the research and teaching activities of all its staff and students in the quest for 
excellence and for the public good.  The University wishes to encourage all members of its 
community to produce original works of authorship and to engage in free expression and 
exchange of ideas and to let them be compensated for their knowledge and originality. This 
Intellectual Property and Copyright Policy has been prepared in this spirit and for this intent 
and to protect the intellectual property rights of the University and all members of its 
community.   
 
The two universities that participated in this study also have dedicated policies on plagiarism.  
These differentiate them from the other 43 organisations that participated in this study.  A 
brief summary of plagiarism policies appears below. 
 
Plagiarism Policy 
The plagiarism policies have been approved by the Senates’ committees and Councils, and are 
applicable to all members of the university community – students, employees, employees 
visiting other institutions, independent contractors, other persons engaged under contracts of 
service by the university, visiting lecturers, and honorary, clinical, and other members of staff 
not in receipt of remuneration from the university. 
Effectively the plagiarism policies attempt to deal with the following broad questions and 
issues: 
 What is plagiarism and how is it different from copying/cheating? 
 How should the university deal with plagiarism? Should it be dealt with as an offence or a 
developmental issue or a mixture of these? 
 What approach should be employed for managing plagiarism at the university? 
 
The researcher observed that the plagiarism policies in the universities that participated in this 
study do not make reference to any particular law. Appendix E provides an example of 
possible wording of a declaration by authors.  The researcher has noted that whilst some 
companies in South Africa are attempting to address issues around intellectual property and 
copyright of their logos and trademarks, it appears they have no interest in plagiarism and that 
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is why the plagiarism policy will mainly be found in higher learning and research institutes.  
Other policies that were studied as part of this study are related to trademarks and are 
addressed below. 
 
Records Management Policies 
Regarding the rationale and scope of application, it is accepted that strong records 
management is fundamental to good governance and efficient business management.  The 
researcher found that only some organisations in South Africa were ensuring that processes 
and procedures were in place for the proper creation, maintenance, use, and disposal of 
records throughout their lifecycle to achieve efficient, transparent and accountable 
governance.  Further to the above, organisations should implement document and records 
management to enable the organisation to protect its intellectual property from theft, 
unauthorised use and destruction; support the business, legal, and accountability requirements 
of the organisation; support continuity in the event of fire or other disaster; comply with the 
records retention responsibilities specified in South African legislation; ensure the 
safeguarding of evidence for possible future legal action, mediation or disciplinary hearings; 
and processing public requests for information as outlined in the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act No. 2 of 2000.  
 
The Records Management Policies impact on all personnel who create paper-based and 
electronic documents and records; have access to records; have any other responsibility for 
personnel engaged in any of these activities; or manage, or have design input into IT 
infrastructure.  
 
Relevant legislation, policies, and other documents 
By managing their electronic and paper-based records effectively and efficiently, certain 
organisations in South Africa are striving to give effect to the accountability, transparency, 
and service delivery values contained in the legal framework established by, inter alia, the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996; National Archives and Records 
Service of South Africa Act No. 43 of 1996 (as amended); National Archives and Records 
Service of South Africa Regulations of 1997; the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 
2 of 2000; the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000; and the ECT Act, 
2002.  Further to the above, certain organisations endeavour to comply with the Records 
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Retention requirement as contained in their Records Retention Schedules.  It is significant to 
note that the most important role of the Records Management Policy in most organisations 
which have this policy is to ensure that the intellectual property of the organisation is secured. 
 
The protection of trademarks is mainly addressed in one policy called the Intellectual Property 
Policy.  The relevant legislation is the Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act No. 38 of 
1997, the Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978, and the Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941.  An 
overview of the policies relevant to trademarks has been provided below. This provided a 
snapshot of the trademarks related policies collected from some of the companies that 
participated in this study.  The overview is biased towards the aspects that contain legal 
provisions. 
 
Brief overview of the intellectual trademarks protection guidelines 
Trademarks guidelines: 
Trademarks have been catered for in the Intellectual Property Policy and thus this section will 
not pay much attention to this policy.  The purpose of this policy in relation to trademarks is 
to create a framework for the creation, protection, registration, maintenance, management and 
exploitation of the organisation’s trademarks.  Over and above the Intellectual Property 
Policy, organisations in South Africa have developed guidelines for the use of their 
trademarks.  Other than ensuring that their trademarks should not be stolen, some of the 
organisations have gone to great lengths to ensure that even people who have permission to 
use their logos should ensure that the quality of the logos is not compromised.  Some of the 
organisations have produced booklets or technical guides on the usage of their corporate 
identities.  The booklets are intended to set minimum standards to ensure consistency 
throughout a particular company.  Guidelines in the booklets deal with issues such as colour 
usage and logo usage.  Table 6.4 below provides an example of such logo usage guidelines. 
 
Table 6.4: Guidelines for corporate logo usage 
GUIDELINES ON COLOUR USAGE GUIDELINES ON LOGO USAGE 
 When printing in matt 
 When printing in gloss 
 Text colour matt or gloss 
 When using a colour background 
 Do not alternate colours within the logo 
 Do not alter proportions of logo or text 
 Always try and print half tone 
 Wherever possible, print the logo in full colour. If you need 
to use the logo in 2 colours, follow the guide in the booklet. 
 Do not use a different form or split the company name. 
 Do not remove the by-line. 
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Whilst issues related to the usage of the logo may appear to be irrelevant, it is the view of the 
researcher that they are an essential part of information security since fraudsters use 
trademarks to deceive the potential victims.  A Chief Information Officer whose airline 
company participated in this study, concurred with this claim.  Applicable legislation in this 
area includes the Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997; the Copyright 
Act No. 98 of 1978; and the Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941. The next sub-section will deal 
with policies regarding privacy. 
 
6.2.3 Policies regarding privacy  
 
Table 6.1 illustrated the relationship between the main-category and sub-categories pertaining 
to the findings regarding privacy that were yielded through document collection and analysis. 
This study has found that privacy as an information security issue has been addressed in many 
policies, including for example the Data Privacy Policy, the ICT Acceptable Use Policy, the 
Electronic Communications Policy, and the Interception and Surveillance Policy.  These 
policies are mainly based on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 
1996.  An overview of the policies relevant to privacy is provided below.  
 
Brief overview of the privacy policies 
Privacy is largely catered for in various information security-related policies such as Data 
Privacy Policy, ICT Acceptable Use Policy, and Electronic Communication Policy.   
 
Data Privacy Policy 
Rationale and scope of application: 
The organisation may be liable for the unauthorised use of personal information of 
employees, suppliers, consumers, and other third parties.  In terms of Section 14 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996, everyone has the right to 
privacy.  This right extends to the commercial domain and employees and others continue to 
enjoy the protection of their privacy even when they enter the workplace or take part in 
commercial activities.  Two of the Data Privacy Policies perused by the researcher went to the 
extent of referring to court cases and summarised the privacy right as follows: ‘an individual 
has the right to decide when, how and under which circumstances, personal facts of that 
individual may be disclosed. This policy applies to all users as well as third parties that have 
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temporary access to the organisation’s records, documents, agreements, e-mail, internet 
access or IT network. The terms defined in the policy include information, privacy subjects, 
and users.’ 
 
Relevant legislation, policies, and other documents 
With regard to legislation, the policy refers to the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa No. 108 of 1996.  The policy should be read in conjunction with other policies such as 
the ICT Acceptable Use Policy; the Electronic Communication Policy; and the Interception 
and Surveillance Policy.  After studying the Data Privacy Policies, the researcher concluded 
that there is information that the employer deems highly sensitive and information that the 
organisation may deem necessary to gather – sometimes without even necessarily gaining the 
consent of the employees/users of the information systems.  This has been catered for in the 
policy by a clause that allows an organisation to have access to, or to collect, certain 
information from the users.  Table 6.5 below distinguishes information that requires user 
consent and information that may be collected without user consent. This distinction was 
obtained from the fieldwork. 
 
Table 6.5: The collection of information with or without consent 
INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED WITH 
USER CONSENT 
INFORMATION COLLECTED WITHOUT USER 
CONSENT 
 Information relating to the race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, nationality, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
physical or mental health, well-being, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, 
and birth of the individual; 
 Information relating to the education or 
medical, criminal or employment history of the 
individual or information relating to financial 
transactions in which the individual has been 
involved; 
 The address, fingerprints or blood type of the 
individual; and 
 Correspondence sent by the individual that is 
implicitly or explicitly of a private nature or 
further correspondence that would reveal the 
contents of the original correspondence. 
 IP Addresses: The organisation will use the IP 
addresses to help diagnose problems, to administer 
the web site, the system administrator will only 
recognise the user domain name and not the user e-
mails; 
 The organisation may use cookies to deliver 
personalised content, to save the user from having to 
re-enter his/her email address repeatedly, to keep 
track of the shopping cart, and to tailor the 
information offerings to how users use the site; and 
 Personal information may be collected for non-
personal statistical purposes.  
 
An online retail based ICT Operations Manager interviewed in this study argued that the 
collection of any personal information without individual consent – especially in the working 
environment – may be illegal and a violation of the RICA Act, 2002.  The Employer may 
therefore have to request the employees to sign a detailed Employee Interception Consent (see 
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Appendix D for an Example of an Employee Interception Consent).  If the employee refuses 
to sign the consent or agree to the policy, the provisions of the labour law (Labour Relations 
Act No. 66 of 1995) and policies will become applicable.  
 
Acceptable Use Policy 
Rationale and scope of application: 
The organisation’s intention for establishing an Acceptable Use Policy is not to enforce 
restrictions that are imposed contrary to the organisation’s conventional culture of openness, 
trust and integrity.  The introduction of the policy shows the commitment of the organisation 
to protect its employees, partners and the organisation from illegal or damaging actions by 
any person.  This policy applies to employees and third parties who use and have access to the 
information systems.  The policy also applies to all equipment/infrastructure that is owned, 
rented or leased by the organisation. 
 
The purpose of the Acceptable Use Policy is to outline the acceptable use of ICT 
equipment/infrastructure at the organisation.  The policy also makes provisions that prevent 
the use of ICT equipment to infringe the privacy of the users and employees.  Inappropriate 
use of the ICT equipment exposes users’ privacy to violation and the organisation to risks 
including viruses, compromise of network systems and services, intellectual property and 
legal challenges.  The Acceptable Use Policy usually defines terms such as communication 
facilities, equipment, illegal content, intercept, offensiveness, privacy, personal information, 
pornography, spam, and users.   
 
Relevant legislation, policies, and other documents: 
The Acceptable Use Policies draw their mandate and legal framework from the following 
laws – the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 25 of 2000; the Films and 
Publications Act No. 65 of 1996; and the ECT Act, 2002. These Acts are mentioned in the 
policies that deal with acceptable use.  The policy should be read in conjunction with the Data 
Privacy and Electronic Communications Policies. 
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Electronic Communications Policy 
Rationale and scope of application: 
The purpose of the Electronic Communications Policy is to ensure that the organisation has 
the legal right to: secure and maintain its computer network, equipment and communication 
facilities; ensure the confidentiality of its trade secrets, client information, employee 
information, and confidential information generally; protect the privacy of its clients; identify 
and address the potential risks associated with the use of technology and communication 
facilities in the workplace; promote employee productivity; comply with the provisions of 
laws and regulations that govern the access, use and interception of communications; 
investigate and prosecute illegal or unauthorised use of its communication facilities and/or 
equipment; and respect and protect every employee’s right to privacy, free speech and the 
right to receive and impart with information as detailed, amongst others, in the South African 
Constitution of 1996. There is much emphasis regarding the adherence to the law and the 
respect of privacy.  The researcher took note of the reference to the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa in some of the electronic communications-related policies; this is 
highly commendable, since the essence of this study is to investigate how corporate South 
Africa is complying with information security legislation and to propose a model that will 
enhance compliance. 
 
In Organisation 18, legal briefs and privacy-related cases were attached to the policy.  This 
would allow users to have a broader view regarding privacy-related matters.  The scope of the 
Electronic Communications Policies applies to all users as well as to third parties that have 
temporary access to, and/or use of the organisation facilities or equipment.  Some of the 
policies contained definitions of the terms: discriminatory content, illegal content, intercept, 
and pornography.   
 
Relevant legislation, policies, and other documents: 
The Electronic Communications Policies are written within the parameters of the following 
pieces of legislation: the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000; the Films 
and Publications Act No. 65 of 1996; and the ECT Act, 2002.  Some of the collected policies 
also made reference to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996. 
These Acts are mentioned in the policies that deal with electronic communications.  The 
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Electronic Communications Policies should be read in conjunction with the Data Privacy and 
ICT Acceptable Use Polices. 
 
6.2.4 Policies regarding patents rights 
 
None of the companies that participated in this study had a separate policy on patents.  Only 
three organisations addressed patent protection as part of their intellectual property policy.  
The researcher concluded that this could be due to the fact that most companies that 
participated in this study perceive the South African patent laws to be ineffective.  According 
to the Patents Act No. 57 of 1978, computer programmes cannot be patented; however, 
companies are patenting these programmes regardless of the Act, in other words, CIPC 
(Companies and Intellectual Property Commission), an organ of the state responsible for 
patents registration, does not itself  respect the Act governing patents. The next section 
contains findings obtained through the analysis of websites functionality and content. 
 
6.3 FINDINGS OBTAINED THROUGH WEBSITE FUNCTIONALITY AND 
CONTENT ANALYSIS IN THE STUDY 
  
The researcher investigated the websites of the 45 organisations that participated in this study.  
The purpose of the website functionality and content analysis was to determine if the websites 
enable financial transactions and if they do, whether they complied with the following 
information security legal requirements: availability of a legal notice; terms and conditions 
available as hyperlinks; liability disclaimers available as hyperlinks; compliance with the 
provisions of Chapter 3, Part II and Chapter 7 of the ECT ACT, 2002; positioning and correct 
implementation legal notices; availability of a legal notice that is printable or saveable as 
required by section 11(3) of the abovementioned Act; and availability of policies that address 
legal compliance of websites.  Table 6.6 below reflects the findings of the website analysis. 
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Table 6.6: Number of organizations compliant with the legislation governing websites 
and e-commerce 
NO. ASPECT ANALYSED 
NUMBER OF 
ORGANISATIONS 
1. Websites with legal notices at all 29 
2. Websites with terms and conditions available as hyperlinks 18 
3. Websites with liability disclaimers available as hyperlinks 16 
4. 
Websites with legal notices that address the provisions of Chapter 3, Part 
II and Chapter 7 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
12 
5. Websites that position and implement legal notices correctly 9 
6. 
Websites legal notices that are printable or  saveable as required by 
Section 11(3) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
7 
7. Organizations that have policies that address websites’ legal compliance 13 
 
6.3.1 Financial transaction functionality of website 
 
The websites of all the organisations that were analysed had useful financial transaction 
functionality which enables consumers to make payments for the products or services using 
credit cards online.   From Table 6.6 above, one deduces that some companies in South Africa 
are not complying with the legal requirements for websites.  This may expose the consumers 
to cyber-crime during electronic transactions. In the absence of legal notices, terms and 
conditions and legal policies that address compliance, consumers will have very little recourse 
if they are defrauded or if their privacy is violated by using a website of a particular 
organisation to conduct financial transactions. On the other hand, the absence of a disclaimer 
as a hyperlink on the website may expose the merchant to litigation.   
 
6.3.2 A lack of familiarity with the requirements of the ECT Act No. 25 of 2002 
regarding consumer protection 
 
It appears that most IT and information security practitioners are not familiar with the 
requirements of the ECT Act, 2002 regarding consumer protection.  Although 29 out of 45 
websites that were analysed have legal notices, these are elementary in nature.  These legal 
notices, and/or ‘terms and conditions’ do not make provision for all or some of the following 
legal requirements: definitions and interpretation, allowed usage and license, intellectual 
property rights and domain name use, software and equipment, disclosures required by 
Section 43 of the ECT Act, 2002; changes and amendments, privacy, hyperlinks to third 
parties, security, disclaimer and limitation of liability, removal and correction of content, 
interception of communications, entire agreement and severability, agreement required in 
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terms of Section 21 of the abovementioned Act, applicable and governing law, and legal 
costs.  Table 6.6 indicated limited and partial compliance.  In the case of some websites, there 
is no attempt to comply with relevant policies at all.  
 
6.4 SUMMARY  
 
This chapter presented the findings of the study that were derived from documents collection 
and analysis, and website analysis.  
 
Some of the laws which featured in Chapter 3, where the legal framework of this study was 
presented, do not appear in the findings of the fieldwork of this study.  These include the 
following laws: the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and the National Credit Act No. 34 of 
2005.  On the other hand, some of the laws that were not interrogated in Chapter 3, emerged 
from the findings of this study; these include the Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941, the Films 
and Publications Act No. 65 of 1996.   
 
The researcher chose to use the term ‘genre of design’ as stated in Chapters 1 and 4, and 
therefore both ontology and epistemology played an important role in the findings presented 
in this chapter.  The findings contained in this chapter are the results of the interchange 
between the personal philosophical outlook of the researcher and the fieldwork findings of the 
research. The next chapter presents the contribution of the study to the existing body of 
knowledge regarding information security.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCEPT MODEL OF LEGAL COMPLIANCE FOR INFORMATION 
SECURITY IN THE CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapters, through the literature review and the findings of the fieldwork, 
depicted the operational necessity and legislation requirements for the integration of legal 
aspects into the implementation of information security. As articulated in the first chapter, it 
was found that no concept model exists to guide corporate South Africa in implementing 
information security within the broader framework of the law.  This chapter will, by 
proposing a concept model, synthesise legal requirements and operational information 
security necessities into a single model.  This chapter thus embodies the contribution of this 
study to the body of information security theory and knowledge.   
 
This chapter suggests a model whereby legal requirements are incorporated into the 
information security endeavours – policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation. This model is the intellectual property of the writer and can be viewed as a 
synthesis of theory, practice and cognitive perspectives gained over years of studying and 
practical experience. The model was necessitated by the findings of this study which reveal 
that both the government and corporate South Africa were not implementing some of the legal 
information security provisions. This model will be useful to policy formulators, directors of 
boards, ICT executives, and information security practitioners. 
 
In order to demonstrate how the proposed model can be implemented in a corporate 
environment, a hypothetical company (Aifheli (Pty) Ltd) in which the model would be 
implemented was constructed.  Consequently, aspects related to the model are genuine whilst 
the descriptions of the phantom company are fictitious, but of significance for illustration 
purposes. So as to illustrate how the concept model can be implemented, the study has dealt 
with both macro and micro aspects of the organisational implementation of the Concept 
Model of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the Corporate Environment.  The 
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macro organisational initiatives provide the foundation for the actual implementation of the 
concept model.  These include the establishment and implementation of the ICT Enterprise 
Architecture and the implementation of the ICT governance structures. At micro level, the 
study demonstrates components of the concept model and the standard roles played by, 
amongst others,  the Board of Directors, Group ICT Steering Committee, Group ICT 
Management Committee, Board of Directors’ Audit Committee and all employees in the 
formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of information security policies.  The 
proposed concept model will present a structured organization that is generic in its 
disposition, is product-independent and will cater for both sides of information security 
practice, namely governance and operations. 
 
7.2 AIFHELI GROUP OF COMPANIES 
 
The hypothetical/phantom company is fictitiously named Aifheli Group of Companies 
Limited (hereafter referred to as Aifheli or the Group).  Names of the people that appear in 
this section are also fictitious and any similarities to any real person are accidental.   
 
Aifheli was started in 1996 by a prominent politician, Duvhalashu Tshifularo (43 years old) in 
South Africa.  Tshifularo graduated with a BSc Computer Science degree from Reading 
University in the United Kingdom, and completed the Programme for Leadership 
Development from Harvard Business School in the United States of America.  Prior to 
establishing this company, Tshifularo was a member of the national parliament and held the 
position of Chief Whip of one of the leading political parties in South Africa.  He took 
advantage of the dawn of the new democratic dispensation and Black Economic 
Empowerment in South Africa and started a company.  The establishment of his company 
was not his first experience of the corporate sector.  Before 1994, he completed fellowships at 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  He also worked in a renowned 
technical services company which dealt with technical inspection services, technical staffing 
services, consulting and training as well as management system certification.   
 
When one of the platinum mining companies sold some of its mines, through his political 
connections, Tshifularo was able to raise money to buy them.  Seeing that he was not a miner, 
he recruited a very experienced mining operator who had 25 years practical experience in the 
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mining sector, Pieter van Tonder.  Although most of these mines were almost depleted, Van 
Tonder used advanced technology to extract large amount of value from them.  By 2002, 
Aifheli Mines was the third biggest platinum company in South Africa.  By 2007, Tshifularo 
had become the first black dollar billionaire.  He used the profit generated to buy other 
business ventures, especially those that were sold by the government as part of privatising and 
unbundling of State Owned Entities (SOEs).  Other than mining, Tshifularo added SHERQ 
(Quality, Safety, Health, and Environment), ICT and HRD (Human Resources Development) 
to his business portfolio and expanded the Group. Aifheli was listed on the Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange in February 2008, followed by a secondary listing on the Botswana Stock 
Exchange where it had obtained some mining rights, after entering into a joint venture with a 
local businessman from a prominent royal family.   
 
The Group has four entities (companies): Aifheli Mines, Aifheli SHERQ Solutions, Aifheli 
HRD Services, and Aifheli Autocatalytic Converter Solutions.  Figure 7.1 below illustrates 
the structure of the Group.  
 
  
Figure 7.1: Diagrammatical representation of the structures of Aifheli Group of companies 
(Source: Own 
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Each of the Aifheli Group entities is autonomous in the running of their core operations, but 
at the same time they are dependent on the Group with regard to shared services.   
 
The core business, where innovation and service production occurs, are mining, SHERQ, 
HRD, and manufacturing. Each core business is housed within an autonomous company 
(business entity) which has its own Chief Executive Officer and Executive Committee. 
However, the support (shared) services are managed centrally to save costs by eliminating 
unnecessary duplication.  These support services include ICT, human resources, marketing, 
finance, procurement, treasury, legal affairs and auditing.  For the purposes of this study, the 
presentation henceforth is confined to the ICT shared service, and specifically the relationship 
between corporate governance and information security.  
 
7.3 THE PROPOSED MODEL OF LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
 
This section comprises the macro and micro organisational implementation of the Concept 
Model of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the corporate environment.  A major 
difference between macro and micro model implementation is that the macro level deals with 
overall ICT governance issues whilst at the micro level the focus is specifically on the 
integration of legal aspects in information security policies and the actual implementation 
thereof.   
 
7.3.1 Macro-organisational model implementation 
 
The proposed model cannot be implemented in a vacuum and thus certain ICT macro-
organisational initiatives have to be in place before the actual implementation.  The aforesaid 
macro-organisational issues include establishment and implementation of the ICT Enterprise 
Architecture; and implementation of the ICT governance structures. 
 
Establishment and implementation of the ICT Enterprise Architecture 
A major concern emerging from the international environment, and South Africa in particular, 
is that Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has, in a number of different 
ways, become disconnected from the business and is thus losing touch with the core activities 
(Bakker, 2007; Bellovin, 2013).  While this can be attributed to various reasons, the major 
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causal factor is that when major institutions evolve and restructure, they tend to temporarily 
lose focus.  This may result in support functions like ICT assuming a corporate life of their 
own without necessarily being aligned to the core business of the organisation.  The 
disconnection between ICT and the business can be resolved by establishing an Enterprise 
Architecture as part of implementing the proposed Concept Model of Legal Compliance for 
Information Security within the Group. It is thus recommended that Aifheli should establish 
an ICT Enterprise Architecture. 
 
The ICT Enterprise Architecture will provide an organisational model for the deployment of 
ICT within the company.  This ICT Enterprise Architecture, which should be aligned to the 
company strategy, articulates the required ICT infrastructure and its role in business 
processes.  ICT, in this instance, should not just be seen as a support function, but should play 
a major role in the core business of the organisation.  The suggested Enterprise Architecture 
should, firstly, be positioned and aligned to the four fundamental characteristics of the Aifheli 
core business (business reality), namely mining, SHERQ, HRD, and autocatalytic converter 
manufacturing. Secondly, it should cater for operational effectiveness by defining the role of 
ICT in the Group shared services that includes human resources, marketing, finance, 
procurement, treasury, legal affairs and auditing; and thirdly, there should be alignment with 
the governing aspects that are contained in the organisational vision, mission and strategy.    
 
The ICT Enterprise Architecture should also be aligned to the ICT’s own vision, mission, 
ethos and the unique operational aspects of the four entities that constitute the Aifheli Group 
of Companies.  The ICT Enterprise Architecture should depart from the notion that “business 
dictates”.  Based on this, the ICT Enterprise Architecture should recognise the crucial role of 
the ICT user in the various entities within the Group in the implementation and overall 
management of the ICT infrastructure and applications, including information security.  
Critical operational expertise originates from the business entities and that is why entities 
within the Aifheli Group should be considered as the key drivers for ICT deployment and 
management.  The Group ICT Department should have Service Level Agreements with each 
of the four Aifheli entities and the shared services.  The mutually agreed business rules will 
strengthen the ICT Department’s understanding of the business and view this as a starting 
point for the implementation and testing of the ICT systems.  These should include the 
establishment and piloting of information security policies.  Through the accepted business 
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rules, the systems users understand how operational and business imperatives have been 
translated into platforms and processes without being concerned about the technical aspects of 
ICT.  This principle is also applicable to the information security policies.  Users should be 
able to comply with the legal aspects that are integrated into the policies without being legal 
experts.  
 
It was stated above that ICT should play a role in the core business of the company.  In other 
words, ICT should also be concerned about the sustainability of the organisation.  In reality, 
ICT can contribute significantly to either the sustainability of the enterprise or the demise of 
the company.  The ICT Enterprise Architecture should affirm the ICT mandate in terms of 
contributing to the balance sheet of the company.  The Aifheli Group ICT Department should 
not merely be held accountable for embarking on activities that are not correctly aligned to the 
company strategy.  However, ICT should be held accountable in respect of the extent of its 
contribution to the core business of the company. The Enterprise Architecture should give 
expression to the ICT mandate generally and the role of information security in the 
sustainability of the company.  Aifheli Group ICT Department can play a meaningful role in 
the core business of the company if it strives to deliver service excellence and operational 
integrity.  The ICT Enterprise Architecture should articulate how the performance of ICT as a 
service will be measured.  Amongst others, ICT service excellence and operational integrity 
can be achieved by ensuring that:  
 
 there are Service Level Agreements with the suppliers;  
 a documented Group ICT Department structure exists;  
 an ICT strategy is established and implemented;  
 formal documented change control policy exists;  
 ICT staff duties and processes are clarified and documented;  
 the user provisioning processes are established and implemented;  
 there are audit trails in the system;  
 the Disaster Recovery Plan is established and implemented; as well as  
 the establishment and implementation of the ICT policies.   
 
Information security policies that are integrated with legal aspects will be crucial in promoting 
service excellence and operational integrity in the ICT Department.  The provision of ICT 
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should be aligned to national and international best practices.  The Enterprise Architecture 
should be established within the parameters of the best-of-breed national and international 
standards. 
 
Establishment and implementation of the ICT governance structures 
As part of implementing the proposed Concept Model of Legal Compliance for Information 
Security in the corporate environment, it is suggested that the Aifheli Group should, at the 
macro-level, have a five-tier ICT governance structure.  Figure 7.2 below illustrates the 
components of the ICT governance structure. This ICT governance structure should include 
the Board of Directors and its independent Audit Committee, Group ICT Steering Committee, 
Group ICT Operations Committee, ICT Entity Committees, and the Group ICT Management 
Committee.  As indicated in the diagrammatical illustration in Figure 7.2 below, issues can 
emanate either top-down or bottom up.   
 
 
Figure 7.2: Diagrammatical representation of the ICT governance structures (Source: 
Own)
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Tier 1: Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors is the highest level of governance in any company.  The Board also 
has fiduciary responsibilities.  Between the shareholder’s Annual General Meetings (AGMs) 
of any organisation (Non-Profit Companies, Profit Companies and Private Companies) the 
Board of Directors is the uppermost governance structure.  This arrangement conforms to the 
provisions of the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and the King III Report (2009).  According 
to the Companies Act, the duties of directors cater for both fiduciary responsibility and the 
duty of reasonable care.  The implication of this is that the business and activities of an 
organisation should be conducted under the management or direction of the Board within the 
powers and authority provided by the aforesaid Act, common law, and other relevant pieces 
of legislation.  In line with the top-down approach, the Board of Directors will make certain 
broad ICT pronouncements or policy directives that should be established and implemented at 
an operational level.  In other words, the Board of Directors will depart from the concept of 
the ‘bigger picture’, the comprehensive position, and most of the time it will serve as a point 
of departure where ICT policy initiatives are formulated and governed.  In terms of the 
bottom-up approach, the Group ICT Steering Committee will, in line with the legislation 
and/or company policies, take certain matters to the Board of Directors for information or 
decision-making purposes.  The composition of the Board of Directors’ sub-committees will 
differ from one organisation to another.  For the purpose of this study, it is suggested that the 
Aifheli Group’s Board should have five sub-committees as follows: 1) audit; 2) nomination 
and compensation; 3) corporate governance; 4) investment; and 5) sustainable development.  
 
The Audit Committee (see Tier in Figure 7.2, and block 5 & 8 in Figure 7.5), amongst others, 
is responsible for identifying and mitigating the risks and this should include ICT-related 
risks.  The Audit Committee should approve information security policies and monitor 
compliance.  This committee, should, on behalf of the Board of Directors, determine whether 
legal aspects have been integrated into information security policies.  Historically, Audit 
Committees were also responsible for reviewing draft mid-year and annual financial 
statements, supervising the implementation of internal and external controls, and managing 
significant risks.  Due to its enabling capabilities in business processes, the failure of ICT can 
pose huge reputational and financial risks to the organisation.  Most divisions within the 
company will not function optimally in the absence of ICT services, and in the worst scenario, 
some of the divisions will not operate if the ICT infrastructure and systems fail.  ICT also 
145 
 
provides business intelligence to various people within an organisation.  The Audit 
Committee should ensure that there are measures to determine data quality and integrity.  The 
ICT services should always be available when users require access.  The uptime of the 
network should always be reliable.  A network that is constantly disrupted leads to poor user 
experience and negative financial implications in a profit-making organisation.  The network 
should provide quality transmission to carry the traffic.  If the transmission is poor, the 
service will be compromised and this may lead to negative customer experience.  Insufficient 
transmission yields slower or degraded connections which can pose both reputational and 
financial risk to the company.  It is not within the remit of the Audit Committee to become 
involved in the technical detail, but rather the committee should supervise the establishment 
and implementation of the information security-related policies.  
 
The Nomination and Compensation Committee is responsible for advising the Board of 
Directors regarding people who can serve as either non-executive or executive directors.  Due 
to the pervasiveness of the ICT role within the organisation and the lack of clarity regarding 
the boundaries between the typical ‘business of Aifheli’ and the ‘business of ICT within 
Aifheli’, it is advisable for the Nomination and Compensation Committee to ensure that, 
amongst the Non-Executive Directors, there is someone with a broad knowledge of ICT-
related risks.  This director does not have to possess technical skills, but should provide 
‘bigger picture’ advice and supervision.  The committee should also be involved in the 
appointment of the Group CIO.  Traditionally, and in many organisations, the Group CIO 
reports to the Chief Financial Officer.  This is problematic because the Group CIO will then 
not sit on the Group Executive Committee (Exco) and on the Board of Directors as one of the 
Executive Directors. Although the Chief Financial Officer will serve in the aforementioned 
organisational structures, he or she may not be well acquainted with ICT and this will 
inevitably disadvantage the Board, Exco and the ICT Department.  Ultimately, the greatest 
disadvantage will be felt by the whole company.  At the same time, the Group CIO should not 
just be technical; s/he should have a broad understanding of business imperatives.  Figure 7.3 
below reflects a typical skills set of the Group CIO. 
  
146 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Diagrammatical Representation of the Group CIO disposition regarding Strategic 
Business and Technical Imperatives 
 
The Nomination and Compensation Committee should appoint a Group CIO who will serve 
as a conduit between the business and ICT.  At this level, the organisation needs a business 
leader rather than an ICT technical expert.  The Group CIO should be more concerned with, 
firstly, how ICT strategy aligns with the overall organisational strategy; secondly, how ICT 
will add value to the competitiveness of the company; and thirdly, how ICT will contribute to 
the profitability and sustainability of the company.  The Group CIO should be sensitive and 
conversant with the fact that ICT risks can damage the sustainability of the organisation.  
He/she should comprehend the significance of policies, procedures, and protocols in 
mitigating ICT risks.  During the Board of Directors and Exco meetings he/she should be in a 
position to understand and articulate the ‘business language’.  The Group CIO should also be 
able to translate ICT technical jargon into ‘business language’ and champion the role of ICT 
in the execution of the business strategy.   
 
The Nomination and Compensation Committee should also appoint the Advisor to the Board 
and make recommendations for the succession of the Chairperson of the Board of Directors 
and some senior executives.  This committee should also make recommendations regarding 
the compensation and benefits of the Board of Directors and senior executives, including, in 
relation to share options, stock subscription, and stock purchase mechanisms.   
 
The Corporate Governance Committee should be responsible for the overall oversight of 
corporate governance by ensuring that the company’s operations are aligned to best corporate 
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governance practice, overseeing the company’s governance pronouncements, assessing the 
independence of the Non-Executive Directors, and establishing the ethical guidelines for 
directors and measures to deal with conflicts of interest.  The Corporate Governance 
Committee may work in conjunction with the Audit Committee in determining ICT 
governance issues. 
 
The Investment Committee should advise the company regarding its main strategic thrust.  
This committee will make recommendations on dealing with organic and/or acquisition 
growth, disposals, and strategic partnerships.  In a situation where a majority shareholding is 
acquired, it will be essential for the Investment Committee to work with the Audit Committee 
in ensuring that ICT infrastructure and systems are connected to the newly acquired entity and 
that the legacy systems of the acquired entity do not pose information security threats to the 
Group.   
 
The Sustainable Development Committee should ensure that the company approaches 
sustainability in an integrated manner by embedding economic, environmental and social 
aspects into the woven fabric of the Group.  This committee should also ensure that its ICT 
operations do not contribute to environmental decay. 
 
Almost all aspects of the ICT risk management responsibility have historically been placed 
under the ambit of the Audit Committee, although it is very clear that each of the Board of 
Directors’ committees has either direct or indirect linkages with ICT risk management.    
 
Tier 2: Group ICT Steering Committee 
The Group ICT Steering Committee is illustrated as Tier 2 in Figure 7.2. This committee 
should be constituted by all the Executive Directors of the organisation.  In the context of the 
Aifheli Group, members of the Group ICT Steering Committee will be the Group CEO, Chief 
Operations Officer, Chief Finance Officer, Chief Information Officer, HR (Human Resources) 
Executive, Legal Executive, Marketing Executive, Treasury Executive, Audit Executive, and 
the CEOs of the Group’s four entities.  (see Figure 7.1) The Group ICT Steering Committee 
should be chaired by the Group CEO and an independent advisor should be appointed to 
advise the committee.   
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The purpose of this committee is to: 
 ensure that the ICT systems and infrastructure are in place to support the Board in the 
execution of its responsibilities with regard to good corporate governance, 
accountability, and business performance;  
 ensure that the ICT strategy and all major ICT initiatives are aligned to the company’s 
business goals and success metrics;  
 deal with ICT-related matters in accordance with the Board of Directors’ directives;  
 identify ICT priorities in relation to the broad goals of the Group and with advice from 
CEOs of the four entities within Aifheli;   
 pay attention to the ICT-related risks and governance issues;  
 consider the reports from the Group CIO regarding the performance of the ICT 
function and budgets;  
 determine the impact of ICT systems and infrastructure on business processes and 
performance;  
 assume the highest level governance role over projects and consider reports of all 
projects and ICT initiatives in the Group;  
 identify major strategic directions and matters with regard to the company’s needs in 
terms of ICT;  
 determine, based on proposals presented by the Group CIO, the ICT policy framework 
and formulate and review the Group ICT programme in relation to all rolling capital 
projects underpinning the shared services and the core business of the company.  
 The ICT Steering Committee should meet bi-monthly.   
 
It is recommended that the Steering Committee should meet bi-monthly. 
   
Tier 3: Group ICT Operations Committee (ICT OpsCom) 
The ICT OpsCom appears as Tier 3 in Figure 7.2 and its members should be CEOs and two 
General Managers from each of the four entities of the Aifheli Group, the Group CIO, and the 
Group Chief Operations Officer.  The ICT OpsCom should be chaired by the Group Chief 
Operations Officer and should meet monthly.  The main purpose of the ICT OpsCom is to 
determine the ICT needs of the Group entities, identify gridlocks in business processes and 
ensure the effective co-ordination of the ICT rollout across the entire Group.  The ICT 
OpsCom should also establish action plans to enhance the role of ICT in improving operations 
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and to pay attention to ICT risks.  Appropriate attention should be given to the deployment of 
ICT systems and infrastructure and the determination of proper controls to be maintained by 
each entity over the decentralised ICT systems.  As part of exercising this responsibility, the 
ICT OpsCom should ensure that all the information security related issues are satisfactorily 
resolved. The ICT OpsCom should take into account and authorise various requests for minor 
changes to the ICT systems.  It may consider some matters that have been forwarded to it by 
the Group ICT Steering Committee and ICT Entity Committees.  On the other hand, it may 
also forward certain issues for consideration to the abovementioned governance structures.  
The ICT OpsCom should, where necessary, establish working groups and ad hoc sub-
committees to deal with specific ICT operational matters.  It should make recommendations 
to the Group ICT Steering Committee with regard to the ICT investments and operational 
matters with high impact in business performance.   
 
Tier 4: ICT Entity Committees 
Each of the four entities should have its own ICT committee chaired by the CEO.  The 
Chairperson (entity CEO) should serve on the ICT OpsCom.  Each ICT Entity Committee 
should be the main platform where the voices of users are heard regarding ICT issues within 
the entity. The ICT Entity Committee should submit ICT reports to the ICT OpsCom 
reflecting each entity’s needs and concerns.   
 
Other responsibilities of the ICT Entity Committees could be to:  
 serve as a platform for the departments within the entity to share information about 
operational issues and how ICT can be an enabler;  
 align the entity ICT activities to optimise ICT and determine the alignment with the 
Group Enterprise Architecture;  
 assess the quality of ICT services on a quarterly basis and recommend service levels to 
the ICT OpsCom;  
 provide input to the ICT OpsCom with regard to the crafting and implementation of 
the ICT plans and policies;  
 monitor the ICT-related risks within the entity;  
 serve as a safety vehicle to ensure there is a watch over ICT-related operations and 
that interventions can be made before crises arise; and  
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 co-ordinate the entity’s activities regarding ICT and forward issues of interest and 
concern to the OpsCom.   
 
The ICT Entity Committees will, where necessary, bring matters of concern and interest to the 
attention of the Group ICT Management Committee.   
 
Tier 5: Group ICT Management Committee 
The Group ICT Management Committee should be chaired by the Group CIO.  Figure 7.4 
below depicts a possible organisational structure of Aifheli’s Group ICT Management.   
 
Figure 7.4: Diagrammatical representation of the Group ICT Management Structure 
(Source: Own) 
 
As depicted in Figure 7.4 above, the Group ICT Management Committee should be 
constituted by the Group CIO and senior members of that office (Finance Manager, 
Programmes Manager, Project Manager, and an Independent Advisor), and Heads of Strategy 
and Governance, User Support, Infrastructure and Systems Solutions, and Enterprise 
Information Architecture.  The remit of the Group ICT Management Committee is to:  
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 align the ICT strategy with the overall Group strategy; implement enterprise-wide best 
practices and monitor trends globally, nationally, and within the Group;  
 ensure that ICT initiatives are linked with business priorities; assume overall 
responsibility for the selection, procurement, deployment, support, and maintenance of 
infrastructure and systems;  
 ensure that all ICT initiatives have clear business objectives and success metrics;  
 conduct regular monitoring of the ICT skills of employees on behalf of the entities and 
the Group; 
 make recommendations to the Group ICT Steering Committee regarding the alignment 
of ICT investments and strategic initiatives and operational needs of the entities and 
shared services;  
 make recommendations to the Group ICT Steering Committee to approve the 
implementation of large-scale ICT programmes and projects;  
 establish and deploy a consolidated ICT Service Delivery Model;  
 establish and maintain an ICT Disaster Recovery and  Business Continuation Plan and 
Procedure; 
 establish and implement a draft ICT standards portfolio;  
 establish and implement a draft ICT Risk Management Framework; and  
 operationalise and implement decisions taken through approved recommendations and 
directives from other governance structures. 
 
The next sub-section deals with the micro-organisational model implementation. 
 
7.3.2 Micro-organisational model implementation 
 
According to the King III Report (2009), enterprise strategic planning, risk management and 
information security are the primary responsibilities of the Board of Directors. It is not 
expected that the Board of Directors should be involved in a detailed process regarding the 
formulation of the information security policies, but they should make broader 
pronouncements within the business strategic direction and sustainability, corporate 
governance, standards, and legislation framework.  Other role-players (components of the 
model) in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation are, Group ICT 
Steering Committee, Group ICT Management Committee, Board of Directors’ Audit 
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Committee, and Whole Organisation.  Figure 7.5 below illustrates the concept model 
regarding the placement of each governance structure in the process of integrating the legal 
aspects into information security policies and their implementation, and the interface between 
the governance structures. 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Diagrammatical representation of Concept Model of Legal Compliance for 
Information Security at Corporate Environment (Source: Own) 
 
The King III Report (2009) and the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 require that a public 
company like the Aifheli Group should have a Board of Directors as the highest governance 
structure in the company (see block 1 in Figure 7.5). As discussed earlier, the Board of 
Directors may have committees that serve as working groups focusing on specific governance 
areas, such as the Group ICT Steering Committee (see block 2). Relevant information security 
and related compliance duties should be identified at this level. Once this has been done, the 
next governance structure is the Group ICT Management Committee (see block 3). The 
Group CIO, as the chairperson of this committee, should serve on both the Group ICT 
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Steering Committee and the Board of Directors as one of the Executive Directors.  This would 
enable the Group CIO to take the identified information security legal provisions, 
requirements and related compliance duties and translate them into information security 
policies. The drafted information security policies will then be taken by the Group ICT 
Management Committee to the Group ICT Steering Committee for consideration and 
comment (see block 4). The Group ICT Steering Committee will allocate duties to the 
business units and/or individual positions. The policies will then be taken to the Board’s 
Audit Committee (see block 5) for their approval. All employees will be trained regarding the 
information security policies (see block 6). They will also be asked to sign an Employee 
Acceptance Form, and the Employee Interception Consent (see block 7 and Paragraph VIII in 
this chapter). The Audit Committee will assess compliance and identify gaps (see block 8). 
Thus the overall intention of this model is the integration of legal aspects in the information 
security policies’ formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, to elevate the 
benefits of business security, and ultimately address corporate security lapses.   
 
Arrows named A, B, C, D and E in Figure 7.5 represent: 
 When the Audit Committee (No. 5) approves policies and risk management 
framework, it should liaise with the Board of Directors (No. 1) for information 
purposes (see Paragraph VI).  That is why there is an arrow named A connecting block 
number 5 and 1. 
 The Audit Committe (No. 5) should also liase with the Group ICT Steering Committee 
(No. 2) to seek clarity and feedback and that is why these two blocks are connected by 
arrow named B) (See Paragraph VI). 
 The Audit Committee (No. 8) audits the adherence to the security policies.  The Audit 
Committee should work with the Group ICT Steering (No. 2) which is responsible for 
monitoring information information security compliance with the legal aspects (see 
Paragraph IX). The aforementioned blocks are linked by the arrow named D. 
 If the Group ICT Steering Committee (No. 2) does not approve of policies portfolio 
and risk management framework, they should be taken back to the Group ICT 
Management Committee for improvement (No. 3) (see Paragraph VI).  That is why 
there is an arrow (named E) connecting these two blocks. 
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Details of each component of the model 
In this section, each component of the legal compliance model model is fully described.  It 
has already been indicated in a previous section that these components are the Board of 
Directors, the Group ICT Steering Committee, the Group ICT Management Committee, the 
Board of Directors’ Audit Committee, and the whole organisation. 
 
a) Board of Directors (No. 1 in Figure 7.5) gives directives regarding ICT policies 
It has already been mentioned that, as part of performing its duties, the Board of Directors 
should give directives for the establishment of organisational policies, including information 
security related policies, in line with the Group strategic direction.  ICT plays an important 
role in the functioning of a company; its failure can threaten the sustainability of the 
organisation and therefore the Board of Directors should articulate broad ICT policy 
directives.  The Board of Directors does not have to become involved in the technical details 
of such pronouncements.   
 
In its endeavours to conform with legislation, the Board of Directors should be familiar with 
ICT risks as outlined in the literature, King III Report (2009) and Buys attorneys (2006): 
liability, risk or harm resulting from employees’ abuse of electronic communication; risk 
resulting from a website and/or e-commerce; risk resulting from theft of ICT equipment; risk 
resulting from software; and risk presented by the failure of the Board of Directors and/or 
company executives to deal with information security breaches.  The King III Report (2009) 
and the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 explicitly identify risk management as part of the 
Board of Directors’ responsibilities.  Company management is accountable to the Board of 
Directors for crafting, implementing and monitoring ICT policies in general and specifically 
information security policies. Due to the pervasiveness and the critical role of ICT in the 
running of the company, one of the responsibilities of the Board of Directors is to educate and 
acquaint themselves with the ICT risks and how they can be mitigated through the integration 
of legal aspects in information security policies.  Should the Board of Directors fail to educate 
themselves and the company consequently experiences major ICT breaches, the directors 
could, in their individual capacities, be held liable and the governance-related provisions of 
the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 will become applicable.  Some of the provisions in the 
aforesaid Act require a high level of compliance and personal responsibility on the part of a 
prospective non-conformance non-executive or executive director.  There are many provisions 
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in the Act detailing directors’ liabilities.  Prevailing concerns are exacerbated by the fact that 
directors can face litigation in their own personal capacity for almost any information security 
breach resulting from the negligence to educate themselves and ensure that the company is 
complying with the law.  Given the liabilities placed on directors, any Board of Directors 
would be negligent in omitting to acquaint themselves with the requirements of the law 
regarding information security.  The Board of Directors should conduct workshop(s) dealing 
with ICT-related risks and policies.  
 
It is also the responsibility of the Board of Directors and its various committees to ensure that 
the Group complies with the legislation of the Republic.  As discussed in previous chapters, 
there are several pieces of legislation that have a direct impact on the manner in which 
information security policies should be crafted and implemented (see Table 7.1).  The Board 
of Directors should not necessarily mention each policy and the legislation aspects that should 
be integrated into it, but rather the Board of Directors may require the Group CEO to ensure 
that the following areas of information security are addressed in terms of policy 
implementation: hacking, intellectual property, copyright, protection of trademarks, privacy, 
and patents protection.  The reason for the Board of Directors to delegate this responsibility to 
the Group CEO is because, in essence, the Board has only one employee – the Group CEO. 
That is why, if a significant information security incident occurs, the Board of Directors will 
require the Group CEO to account rather than the Group CIO.  At the same time the Group 
CEO depends on other executives to carry out his/her responsibilities and thus there is a 
Group ICT Steering Committee. 
 
b) Group ICT Steering Committee (No. 2 and 4 in Figure 7.5)  identifies security areas 
and instructs the ICT Management Committee to establish an ICT Governance 
Portfolio 
Almost all members of the Group ICT Steering Committee serve on the Board of Directors as 
executive directors and thus the provisions of the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and the 
King III Report (2009) related to directors’ responsibilities and liabilities are applicable to 
them.  The new responsibilities and liabilities placed on directors by the Companies Act have 
rendered the responsibilities of South Africa’s executives similar to those of their counterparts 
in the United States, where they have been subject to the governance and reporting 
responsibilities contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.   
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As discussed in a previous section, this committee, in essence, is actually the Group 
Executive; it is merely that, in this instance, the agenda of the meetings only focuses on ICT-
related matters.  Once the Board of Directors pronounces certain policy directives, it is the 
responsibility of the Group ICT Steering Committee to delegate the actualisation of these 
directives to individuals and/or structures.  In this case, the Group ICT Steering Committee 
will delegate the responsibility of crafting information security policies to the Group CIO and 
the Group ICT Management Committee.   
 
The Group ICT Steering Committee should require the Group ICT Management Committee 
to address information security areas (hacking, intellectual property, copyright, protection of 
trademarks, privacy, and patents protection) by establishing the ICT Governance Portfolio 
which is in line with the legislation of the Republic of South Africa and the best-of-breed 
national and international standards.   
 
c) Group ICT Management Committee establishes an ICT Governance Portfolio (No. 3 
in Figure 7.5)   
The composition of this committee was outlined in Section 7.3.1.  This committee has to put 
details regarding the mandate from the Group ICT Steering Committee in place by 
establishing the ICT Governance Portfolio.  The committee should be sensitive to the fact that 
ICT Governance is a critical component for an effective ICT strategy and function.  It is on 
this basis that ICT Governance should be documented and communicated to the Group to 
enable full implementation and compliance.  A critical element of ICT Governance is the 
accountability in terms of information security.  On the other hand, the Group ICT 
Management Committee should ensure that ICT functions are within a framework of policies 
and legal aspects. The lack of policies which integrate legal aspects disadvantages a structured 
growth of the ICT function within a Group and threatens its sustainability.  This should be 
attributed to the fact that the organisation would not be operating in a normalised operating 
environment.  With the exception of policies which integrate policy aspects, ICT Governance 
should be constituted by the establishment of operating standards, identifying the operational 
risks, and comprehending the whole notion of quality management and alignment with the 
critical success factors for ICT initiatives (vision, people, process, and technology).  However, 
for the purposes of this study, the focus will be on the establishment and implementation of 
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the ICT Governance Portfolio (Information Security Policies Portfolio and the Risk 
Management Framework). 
 
d) Establishment of an ICT Policies Portfolio (No. 3 in Figure 7.5)  
As illustrated in chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this thesis, the Group ICT Management Committee 
should acknowledge that there is a range of legislation in place that compels all organisations 
in South Africa, regardless of the method and form of their incorporation or founding, to 
comply with the provisions of the legislation in the implementation of information security.  
This requirement is applicable to all companies as defined by the Companies Act No. 71 of 
2008, whether for profit companies (state-owned company, a private company, a personal 
liability company, or a public company) as well as not-for-profit companies.   
 
The King III Report (2009) furthermore argues that information security is a critical 
component of the overall business and sustainability and thus companies should address 
information security by addressing confidentiality, integrity and availability.  The Managing 
Director (Legal Firm 3) emphatically stated that the lack of awareness of the law cannot be 
used as a justification for corporate inefficiency pertaining to ICT risk and non-compliance 
with legislation.   
 
The Group ICT Management Committee should take cognisance of the fact that, comprising a 
predominant part of corporate ICT governance, ICT policies which integrate legal aspects in 
terms of information security will guide the Group position on matters pertaining to ICT 
operations and others.  This is because ICT permeates the company at all levels and enables 
the flow of the business processes. Due to ICT’s pervasive nature, employees’ work tends to 
revolve around ICT and in most instances information security and its relevant pieces of 
legislation are neglected and this leads to corporate non-compliance. To avoid this, the Group 
ICT Management Committee must establish an ICT Policies Portfolio by aligning information 
aspects with the relevant policies and legislation.  Table 7.1 below illustrates this 
recommendation. 
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Table 7.1: Synopsis of ICT Policies Portfolio 
AREA OF 
INFORMATION 
SECURITY 
RELEVANT POLICY RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
1) Hacking   Information security Policy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Access to Information Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act 
No. 2 of 2000 
 Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act No. 25 of 2005 
 Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of 
Communication related Act No. 70 2002 
 Common law 
2) Intellectual 
Property and 
Copyright 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
 Information Security Policy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Plagiarism Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act 
No. 38 of 1997 
 Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
 Films and Publications Act No. 65 of 1996 
 National Archives and Records Service of 
South Africa Act No. 43 of 1996 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act 
No. 2 of 2000 
 Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act No. 25 of 2002 
3) Protection of 
trademarks 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act  
No. 38 of 1997 
 Copyright Act of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
4) Privacy  Data Privacy Policy 
 ICT Acceptable Use Policy 
 Electronic Communications Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance Policy 
 Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 
 Protection of Personal Information Bill 
No. 9 of 2009 
5) Patents 
protection 
 No company had a distinguished 
policy on patents rights 
 Patents Act No. 57 of 1978 
 Note: Only three organisations addressed 
patents protection as part of their 
Intellectual Property Policy 
 Common law 
 Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly 
Financed Research and Development Act 
No. 52 of 2008. 
 
The proposed ICT Policies Portfolio in Table 7.1 above adequately addresses the findings of 
this study as presented in Chapter 5 and 6.  It also addresses ICT risks as described by Buys 
Attorneys (2006) as follows: liability, risk or harm resulting from employees’ abuse of 
electronic communication; risk resulting from a website and/or e-commerce; risk resulting 
from theft of the ICT equipment; risk resulting from software; and risk presented by the 
failure of the Board of Directors and/or company executives to deal with information security 
breaches.  Table 7.2 below demonstrates how risks identified by Buys Attorneys (2006) are 
addressed in the ICT Policies Portfolio. 
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Buys Attorneys (2006) also mentioned the risk associated with the failure of the Board of 
Directors and/or the company’s management; this has not strictly been addressed in Tables 
7.1 and 7.2.  However, measures to deal with the negligence of both non-executive and 
executive directors are adequately provided for in the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and the 
provisions of this Act should not necessarily form part of any information security policies.  
Other than integrating legal aspects into the information security policies, ICT standards 
should also be integrated into some policies.   
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Table 7.2: Accommodation of ICT risks in the ICT Policies Portfolio 
ICT RISKS RELEVANT POLICY RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
1) Hacking (Buys 
Attorneys: 
employees risk, 
e-commerce 
risk, risk, & 
theft) 
 Information security Policy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Access to Information Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 Information Security Standards 
Management Policy 
 Procedures Development and 
Management Policy 
  Quality Management Policy 
 Promotion of Access to Information 
Act No. 2 of 2000 
 Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act No. 25 of 2005 
 Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of 
Communication related Act No. 70 
2002 
 Common law 
2) Intellectual 
Property and 
Copyright (Buys 
Attorneys: 
employees risk, 
E-Commerce 
risk, risk & 
theft) 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
 Information Security Policy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Plagiarism Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 Intellectual Property Law 
Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997 
 Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
 Films and Publications Act No. 65 
of 1996 
 National Archives and Records 
Service of South Africa Act No. 43 
of 1996 
 Promotion of Access to Information 
Act No. 2 of 2000 
 Common law 
3) Protection of 
trademarks 
(Buys 
Attorneys: 
employees risk, 
e-commerce 
risk, risk & 
theft) 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 Intellectual Property Law 
Amendment Act  No. 38 of 19997 
 Copyright Act of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
 Common law 
4) Privacy ((Buys 
Attorneys: 
employees risk, 
E-Commerce 
risk, risk & 
theft) 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 ICT Acceptable Use Policy 
 Electronic Communications Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 Information Security Standards 
Management Policy 
 Procedure Development and 
Management Policy 
 Quality Management Policy 
 Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 
 Protection of Personal Information 
Bill No. 9 of 2009 
 Common law 
5) Patents 
protection (Buys 
Attorneys: 
employees risk, 
E-Commerce 
risk, risk & 
theft) 
 No company had a distinguished 
policy on patents rights 
 Patents Act No. 57 of 1978 
 Notes: Only three organisations 
addressed the patents protection as 
part of the Intellectual Property 
Policy 
 Common law 
 Intellectual Property Rights from 
Publicly Financed Research and 
Development Act No. 52 of 2008. 
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e) Establishment of an ICT Risk Management Framework (No. 3 in Figure 7.5)  
Since ICT is pervasive throughout Group entities and is an enabler to the business processes 
and connected to suppliers and customers, the Group ICT Management Committee should 
establish measures to mitigate information security threats.  These measures should be 
implemented in line with the established ICT Portfolio.  In essence, the best mechanism to 
counteract ICT threats is to actually implement the approved policies.  At face value, the point 
being made sounds obvious, but practically it is not so apparent.  During the fieldwork of this 
study, it was found some companies that had well-crafted policies, but which were never 
implemented, and these companies experienced a serious disjuncture between the policy and 
the actual implementation of information security.  The proposed ICT Risk Management 
Framework should comprise the standards, procedures and quality management. 
 
Standards can bring stability in the ICT environment and give assurance to the company that 
their information security implementation has been implemented within the framework of best 
practice.  Due to the fixed nature of the standards, it is advisable that they should be 
customised to the particular operational environment.  However, customisation should not 
lead to a major departure from the core framework of the standard.  Standards should form 
part of the ICT Risk Framework and consequently ICT Governance, and thus they should be 
managed centrally as a portfolio. Apart from integrating aspects of standards into various 
information security policies, the Group ICT Management Committee should develop an 
Information Security Standards Management Policy which should deal with the following 
aspects: information security areas to be standardised, typical deviation from standards, 
motivation and process for customisation, deployment of the standards portfolio, review of 
standards, Group ICT Management Committee remit and answerability, and non-
acquiescence management.  The following standards could form part of the ICT Risk 
Management Framework: ISO 9000/20000 (which relates to quality assurance in project 
implementation), ISO 38500 (which deals with the corporate governance of ICT), and ISO 
27000 Family of standards (Information Security Management Standards). 
   
Standard Operating Procedures should form part of the ICT Risk Management Framework.  
In the absence of operational procedures, it would become difficult to monitor information 
security performance and compliance with the relevant legislation aspects and standards. It is 
therefore proposed that a Procedures Development and Management Policy be established.   
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Over and above this, the Group ICT Management Committee should ensure that quality 
management is an integral part of information security implementation.  The fact that 
information security deployment conforms to legislation, best-of-breed standards, procedures 
and quality management, gives certain assurances to the Group Executive and the Board of 
Directors.  A Quality Management Policy should be established and become an integral part 
of the ICT Management Framework.  Once the ICT Policies Portfolio and ICT Risk 
Management Framework have been established, the Group CIO should, on behalf of the 
Group ICT Management Committee, submit these to the Group ICT Steering Committee. It is 
advisable for the Group ICT Management Committee to seek the advice of the Group ICT 
Operations Committee and the ICT Entity Committee before they are passed to the Group 
ICT Steering Committee.   
 
f) Group ICT Steering Committee endorsement of policies portfolio and risk 
management framework (No. 4 in Figure 7.5)  
If the Group ICT Steering Committee, for whatever reason, does not endorse the Policies 
Portfolio and Risk Management Framework, they should be taken back to the Group ICT 
Management Committee (No. 3) for refinement (see arrow named E).  However, once the ICT 
Policies Portfolio and ICT Risk Management Framework have been endorsed by the Group 
ICT Steering Committee, the Group CEO should, on behalf of the Group ICT Steering 
Committee, submit them to the Audit Committee for approval.  
 
g) Board of Directors’ Audit Committee (No. 5 in Figure 7.5) approves policies and risk 
management framework 
The Audit Committee should ensure that the ICT Policies Portfolio and ICT Risk 
Management Framework that have been endorsed by the Group ICT Steering Committee did 
not leave loopholes that could compromise the performance and sustainability of the 
organisation.  The Audit Committee should satisfy itself that measures to deal with ICT 
security risks are integrated into the overall company strategy and that various information 
security policies are aligned to this strategy. See arrow B Furthermore, information security 
policies should have integrated all relevant legislative provisions.  The Audit Committee 
should also ensure that ICT-related risks and security threats are identified and mitigated.  The 
Audit Committee should obtain the services and advice of an independent ICT Law Firm or 
auditing company in executing the assessment of information security policies.   
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The Audit Committee should check whether information security policies have been 
formulated to deal with risks and potential threats in a way that is commensurate with the 
organisation’s vision, business priorities, and goals.  In line with the recommendations of the 
King III Report (2009), the Audit Committee should also determine how information security 
policies address the following three areas: confidentiality (protecting sensitive information 
from unauthorised disclosure); integrity (safeguarding the accuracy of data, information and 
software); and availability (ensuring that information and vital services are available when 
needed). During this period of evaluating the policies, the Audit Committee should liaise with 
the overall Board of Directors for information purposes and the Group ICT Steering 
Committee to seek clarity and give feedback. That is why, in Figure 7.5, there is an arrow 
numbered A between the Audit Committee (block 5) and the Board of Directors (block 1), 
and another arrow numbered B between the Audit Committee (block 5)and Group ICT 
Steering Committee (block 2). 
 
h) Group Human Resources (No. 6 in Figure 7.5) conducts employee training 
If the Audit Committee is satisfied with the submitted policies, they will be approved, dated 
and signed by the board of directors, and the Group CEO will be informed and the policies 
will then be implemented in the whole organisation.  The Group ICT Operations Committee 
and ICT Entity Committee should be involved when it comes to the technical aspects of the 
policies’ implementation. The Group CEO will, on behalf of the Group Steering Committee, 
give a directive to Group Human Resources to conduct training with all staff members in all 
the Group entities.   
 
When formulating a corporate Information Security Training Programme, Group Human 
Resources should take into consideration that ICT systems are dependent on employees.  This 
is in line with Schneier’s (2003) argument, in which he asserts that information security is 
more about people’s behaviour than anything else.  In other words, in a corporate 
environment, information security is about countering employees’ intentional and 
unintentional actions and the harmful implications thereof.  In spite of the propaganda from 
ICT suppliers about the necessity of information security technology, many essential 
information security actions cannot be automated and thus they rely on the correct usage by 
the employees.  This means that companies are reliant on employees to attain a secure ICT 
environment.  Due to the fact that humans are regarded by several authors (Stephanou, 2008; 
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van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004; Stephanou & Dagada, 2009; Schneier, 2003) as the 
“weakest link” in the information security chain, there is an apparent need for Group Human 
Resources to make sure that staff members are properly trained regarding the correct 
implementation of, and compliance with, information security policies and IT systems.  The 
objective should be for Group Human Resources to ensure that, firstly, employees are 
equipped with the necessary information security skills and knowledge, secondly, that they 
apply the skills and knowledge, and lastly, that they are not easily misled, and thereby 
conform to the information security policies.  
 
As part of establishing or procuring a corporate Information Security Training Programme, 
Group Human Resources should take into account that a real threat in terms of ICT systems is 
that of insiders, employees and consultants.  This is so because these people are permitted to 
have privileged access to the ICT systems, are familiar with internal processes of the Group, 
and possess some technical knowledge.  Together, these factors present a considerable risk to 
the company.  It is on this premise that information security awareness and training must be 
conducted to enable employees to understand the rationale of information security policies 
what they must do to adhere to them.  This view is supported by Sood and Enbody (2013).  
Security awareness and information security policies compliance should be done on an 
ongoing basis, not just once off and for new employees 
 
Group Human Resources should also ensure that the corporate Information Security Training 
Programme enables employees to understand that information security policies contain legal 
provisions and that violating them do not just mean violating the organisational rules, but may 
also constitute a crime since one would be disregarding legal provisions.  In other words, over 
and above facing disciplinary action, the employee can be convicted of a crime in a court of 
law. The corporate Information Security Training Programme should include measures to 
assess the usefulness of the information security awareness and training efforts.   
 
i) All employees accept security policies by signing Consent Forms (No. 6, 7 in Fig 7.5) 
Once the awareness and training programmes have been implemented, each staff member 
should sign the Consent Form and Employee Interception Consent (see Appendix D) which 
will enforce employees’ adherence to the principles of good corporate governance; 
conformance to safety and information security of the organisations’ network; and ensure a 
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secure and healthy working environment.  The Consent Form will enable the company to 
monitor employees’ activities related to the use of Group ICT systems when required.  The 
company should take into consideration the fact that in South Africa, employees have the 
constitutional right to privacy and thus the Consent Form is a correct mechanism to balance 
information security objectives and also compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa No. 108 of 1996.   
 
The Consent Form enables the employees to agree to the necessary undertakings.  The 
Consent Forms should be signed by employees who are already within the organisation when 
information security policies are approved by the Board of Directors and also when they are 
amended.  Provisions contained in the Consent Form should be part of the employment 
agreement for new employees.  Group Human Resources, with the guidance of Group Legal 
Corporate Affairs, should determine steps to be taken when employees refuse to sign the 
Consent Forms.  Such steps should be taken within the framework of acceptable human 
resources practices and the labour laws of the Republic of South Africa.  Once employees 
have signed the Consent Forms and the policies have been implemented, the next step in the 
legal compliance chain will be the audit conducted by the Board of Directors’ Audit 
Committee.   
 
j) The Audit Committee audits adherence to the security policies (No. 8 in Figure 7.5) 
Once policies have been implemented, the Group ICT Committee should constantly monitor 
information security legal compliance.  However, the actual audit of compliance should be 
done by the Audit Committee on behalf of the Board of Directors because whilst monitoring 
is a management issue, auditing is a governance matter (see D in Figure 7.5).  It is advisable 
for the Audit Committee to obtain external independent assistance when carrying out the 
audit.  The audit should look at both the compliance by the employees, and the ICT 
infrastructure and systems.   
 
It is a well-accepted corporate practice to measure policy compliance.  Other than that, it is 
part of the Board of Directors’ fiduciary duties to conduct various audits as part of governance 
responsibilities.  Regarding human resources’ compliance with the information security 
policies, it may be advisable to take guidance from Haar et al. (2014) who reasoned that 
employees’ policies compliance can be determined by observing their behaviours and 
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attitudes through conducting password cracking; doing interviews with employees at pause 
areas in order to obtain anecdotal evidence; tracking the number and nature of incidents 
reported before and after information security policies were implemented; conducting clean 
desk audits and distributing surveys or questionnaires in order to obtain input from 
employees.  This may include following up to determine what employees remember and what 
worked.   
 
ICT infrastructure and systems are devised as intrinsic units, but are actually prone to 
disappoint due to their digital nature, vulnerability to attacks, and their dependence on 
resources outside the ICT sphere of influence.  It is on this premise that the Audit Committee 
should also audit the ICT infrastructure and systems to ascertain whether they satisfy the 
requirements of the information security policies and the established Risk Management 
Framework.  As a starting point, the Audit Committee should assess to what extent the ICT 
security infrastructure is linked to the enterprise-wide risk management efforts, while 
simultaneously considering that ICT risks cannot always be defined based on the parameters 
articulated on a corporate level.  Back-ups are very important in terms of mitigating ICT risks 
and information security threats and thus the audit team should test their performance and 
whether there is adequate off-site back-up and alignment with the business expectations for 
data recovery capabilities.  As part of the audit, an assessment of the Information Technology 
General Controls (ITGCs) of the Group should be conducted.  
 
There are several templates of the ITGCs on the Internet and in the literature (for example, the 
Institute of Internal Auditors, 2008); however the information presented in Table 7.3 (below) 
has been modified to suit the proposed Concept Model of Legal Compliance for Information 
Security in the Corporate Environment. 
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Table 7.3 Possible scope of the ITGCs (Information Technology General Controls) in the Management Framework 
Objective Overview of procedures 
ITGCs Components: Those mechanisms that management has implemented, and uses, to manage the day-to-day activities of the ICT environment 
1. Adequate policies & procedures exist 
for governing the day-to-day 
operations of the ICT domain. 
Inspection of policies and understanding of procedures governing: 
 Information security administration; 
 incident monitoring; 
 change management; 
 backups; 
 batch/job processing; etc. 
2. A defined structure exists under 
which ICT operates. 
 confirmation of organisational structure with a focus on understanding reporting structures, responsibilities and on 
ensuring key functions are segregated; 
 understanding and validation of key management meetings (including core audit) with a focus on understanding 
items discussed, and on the nature and format of documentation produced. 
3. An ICT strategy exists governing the 
short and long term goals, and the 
steps needed to achieve the goals. 
Inspection of ICT strategy with a focus on understanding: 
 short term goals; 
 long term goals; 
 alignment with business; and 
 steps to be taken to achieve goals 
Program Change Control: The process whereby changes are made to data, application functionality & reports 
4. Only authorised individuals who have 
access to migrate changes into 
production, and these persons are 
segregated from those responsible for 
development activities. 
 comparison of list of developers to those who are responsible for, and with access to, migrate changes into 
production; 
 validation of program listing to ensure all access is authorised, and that adequate segregation of duties exists 
between system developers and those responsible for migrating changes. 
Access to Programs & Data: the process around ensuring application & data access is restricted to authorised individuals 
5. User provisioning processes ensure 
that only authorised users have access 
to the applications and databases. 
Validation of user provisioning processes with a focus on ensuring that: 
 all new users are approved; 
 accounts for terminated users are removed in a timely manner; 
 adequate segregation of duties exists between critical functions; and 
 regular reviews are performed on users with access to the shared applications and databases. 
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Objective Overview of procedures 
6. Production servers are appropriately 
configured to reduce the risk of 
unauthorised access to the databases 
and shared applications. 
Review of information security configuration for production servers.  Review will be performed using proprietary 
scripts and will include the validation of high risk security configuration.  This will include the review of: 
 audit logging configuration & associated monitoring procedures; 
 password parameters; 
 trusts & servers; and 
 accounts with administrative privileges. 
7. Administrative privileges are 
restricted to authorised personnel 
only and all activities performed with 
these accounts are authorised. 
 Validation of persons with administrative access to application, and associated technical platforms; 
 Review of audit logging/monitoring procedures for users with administrative access. 
Computer Operations: The process around ensuring adequate monitoring of the application environment is performed 
8. Adequate procedures have been 
implemented to ensure adequate 
recovery in the event of the disaster. 
 Review and validation of back-up schedule and associated monitoring; 
 Inspection of ICT environmental controls, with a focus on understanding mechanisms implementation to control 
the server environment; 
 Inspection of Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP), and review of procedures performed by management to ensure that 
DRP functions effectively.  
9. Production issues are monitored and 
resolved in a real time manner. 
 Review and validation of job schedule and associated monitoring; 
 Validation of Help Desk monitoring/tracking procedures. 
 
Adapted from Bytes Technology Group’s ITGCs Framework 
 
169 
 
The purpose of the ITGCs is to appraise key controls with the ICT general computerised 
control environment that supports reliable and continuous processing of computerised 
information systems, and secondly, to report to the Board of Directors the areas of perceived 
weakness or areas for improvement in procedure or control.  The Board of Directors will 
delegate audited matters that need attention to the Group ICT Steering Committee for 
ratification and implementation.   
 
7.4 SUMMARY  
 
There is a general trend in organisations to place a low probability on ICT risks and data 
disaster occurrences.  The reality is that ICT infrastructure is a high risk in itself, and thus a 
domino effect applies here, as the failure of infrastructure will, without doubt, also lead to the 
loss of data, information and business intelligence.  Organisations should not perceive the 
establishment of information security policies, the ICT Risk Management Framework and the 
implementation thereof as a costly overhead which needs to be downgraded.  This chapter 
recognises the critical significance of integrating legal aspects into information security 
policies and thus a Concept Model of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the 
Corporate Environment was presented in this chapter.  It has been argued that the governance 
aspect of ICTs should be taken seriously by the Board of Directors and other governance 
structures and it should not be given a lower priority due to its technical nature.  The 
alignment of the ICT strategy to the overall business strategy and the impact of ICT in the 
sustainability of the organisation should be interrogated.  
 
Inasmuch as this chapter has been constructed around a hypothetical organisation in which the 
proposed Concept Model (of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the Corporate 
Environment) can be implemented, it is the researcher’s view that this model can be 
implemented in actual companies, irrespective of their governance and management 
structures.  
 
It was stated at the beginning of this chapter that the proposed Concept Model combined 
theory, the experience of the researcher as an academic and ICT Manager as well as cognitive 
perspectives gained over many years (see Section 7.1).  It had also been indicated in Chapter 
4 that this study was a product of the interplay between the philosophical outlook 
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(researcher’s ontological position) and the empirical findings of the study (see Section 4.1).  
The researcher’s ontological perspective has influenced the research methodology used, and 
by implication, the findings of the study and the Concept Model.  
 
The following chapter concludes the thesis, highlighting some limitations and giving possible 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
OVERVIEW, CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
8.1 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY  
 
This chapter contains the summary and conclusion of the research as well as further 
recommendations for practitioners and researchers. 
 
This study has attained the objectives that were articulated in Chapter 1 as follows:  
 
i. A literature review was undertaken to determine the nature of information security-
related problems specifically pertaining to e-commmerce viz hacking, viruses, 
privacy, ethical issues and industrial espionage and the relevant South African laws 
pertaining to these mentioned information security issues (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
ii. Fieldwork was conducted to determine firstly, the way in which South African 
companies are employing legislative imperatives in providing information security; 
secondly, the extent to which the South African legal framework impacts the 
formulation of information security policies at organisational level; thirdly, the extent 
to which South African companies are complying with the commercial websites’ legal 
requirements, and lastly, to determine, by means of studying documents collected 
from the participating companies (policies, procedures and strategies) how they are 
incorporating legislation and policies into their information security measures (see 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  
iii. A Concept Model of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the Corporate 
Environment was proposed in Chapter 7.  This Concept Model embodies the 
contribution of the study (see Chapter 7). 
 
As previously explained, many organisations and consumers are using the Internet for 
commercial purposes (e-commerce, financial transactions and the like).  However, both the 
merchants and customers are vulnerable to information security risks.  Through a brief 
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literature review, the researcher argues that policy and legal aspects should be employed to 
enhance information security implementation in South Africa.  The information security legal 
framework, specifically within the context of South Africa, was articulated.   
 
The following statutory instruments were identified as dominant elements of the South 
African legal framework regarding e-commerce and information security in particular: the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996 (specifically the right to 
privacy); the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, No. 25 of 2005 (which 
provides the framework behind electronic communications and also addresses cyber-crime - 
see Chapter 13, Sections 85-89); Promotion of Access to Information Act, No. 2 of 2000 
(which deals with records management, disclosure, confidentiality and access); Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Act, No. 70 of 
2002 (this Act prohibits the interception and monitoring of information without permission 
from a court of law); the Protection of Personal Information Bill, No. 9 of 2009 (which deals 
with the right to privacy); as well as the King Reports on Governance for South Africa (King 
II of 2002 and King III of 2009). 
 
Based on the findings of this study, it was argued that most South African companies did not 
appear to be integrating legal and policy aspects as part of implementing information security, 
and this formed the basis of the research problem which required further investigation.  The 
research question and two sub-questions emanated from the literature review and the research 
problem.  The aim of the study was to assess how companies in South Africa were integrating 
legal and policy aspects when they deal with information security related issues.  In order to 
achieve the aforementioned aim, the researcher undertook to embark on a literature review 
and field study. During the field study, data were collected and the data analyses thereafter 
were conducted within the parameters of qualitative research methodology.   
 
The research question and its sub-questions have been answered in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.  The 
findings of this study revealed that most companies in South Africa were not integrating legal 
aspects into the implementation of information security.  It is on this basis that the researcher 
developed the proposed Concept Model of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the 
Corporate Environment.  The Concept Model embodies the contribution of the study. 
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8.2. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
As a result of this study, theory has been generated in several ways.  This is deemed essential 
for future work in the field of information security.  
 
8.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
 
Firstly, Chapters 2 and 3 have, by means of the literature study and legal framework, provided 
a typology for interlinking legislation requirements and policy formulation in the provision of 
information security in the South African context (see section 1.6).  This typology can 
henceforth be used by Boards of Directors, ICT executives, information security practitioners, 
e-commerce participants, and policy formulators to enhance the provision of information 
security.  A search of electronic databases and e-journal portals revealed no results pertaining 
to such a typology and thus one may claim that no such typology currently exists that has 
mapped, matched, and linked a specific information security problem with the applicable 
South African legislation, as in this study.  
 
Secondly, the findings of this study, as contained in Chapter 5 and 6, extended information 
security theory in a number of ways which may lay a foundation regarding work being done 
towards the integration of legislation requirements and policies.  The theory generated in 
these chapters revealed the importance of the following – the necessity of ensuring that the 
Board of Directors has the appropriate attitude towards information security-related 
governance; the role of policy formulators and government in providing a regulatory 
environment which enables companies to implement information security properly; the effects 
of regulatory compliance fatigue on users; and the importance of the applicable pieces of 
legislation in policy formulation and the implementation of information security.   
 
Thirdly, the originality of the contribution of this study to the academic and industry 
knowledge base of information security benefited from additional contextualised corporate 
description that can augment the understanding of the complexities of employing legislation 
to enhance information security in the South African corporate environment.   
 
174 
 
8.2.2 Methodological contributions 
 
This study has made a methodological contribution in the form of the Concept Model of 
Legal Compliance for Information Security in the Corporate Environment.  Although the 
literature review and the findings of this study illustrated the operational and governance 
necessities for the integration of legal aspects into information security policy formulations, 
the abovementioned Concept Model did not exist prior to this research and thus it is a direct 
result of this study.  The importance of the proposed Concept Model can be seen in its role of 
guiding South African organisations to implement information security within the broader 
framework of the applicable law.   
 
The proposed Concept Model integrates legal requirements and information security 
operational needs into a single model. It was also demonstrated how the Concept Model can 
be operationalised by implementing it in a hypothetical organisation in South Africa.  It is 
therefore the researcher’s view that this model can be implemented in real organisations and 
thus it is transferrable.  By crafting and demonstrating the implementation of this Concept 
Model which synthesises theory, the practical and philosophical outlook of the researcher 
gained over years of studying and practical experience, contributes to the information security 
methodological interventions.  International organisations and foreign governments may find 
the proposed Concept Model useful.  For example, multi-nationals can start with the South 
African laws and draw on the applicable laws of other countries where they operate. 
 
This thesis has achieved something not previously undertaken by integrating two traditionally 
foreign concepts – information security and legislation requirements - into a single 
information systems methodological approach.  This model was operationalised in Chapter 7.  
Before the two concepts were integrated in Chapter 7, the literature review and the findings 
chapters had presented detailed referencing to equip the reader with the theoretical and real-
life grounding of legislation requirements pertaining to information security. The Concept 
Model thus embodies the main contribution of this study to information security knowledge.   
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8.2.3 Practical contribution to Boards of Directors in corporate South Africa 
 
The study encourages corporate South Africa to take ICT governance and risk management 
seriously.  It was found that the attitude of corporate South Africa towards the integration of 
relevant legislation into information security policies was generally negative (see Section 
5.2.1).  This thesis provided a literature review, empirical findings, and a Concept Model, all 
of which provide evidence and reasons as to why the Board of Directors should be involved in 
the formulation of ICT policies and execution oversight regarding the implementation thereof.  
This study makes it very clear that the involvement of the Board of Directors in this matter is 
not voluntary but rather compulsory since it is a legal and corporate governance requirement.  
Other than the Board of Directors, at an operational level, ICT governance cannot be 
relegated to an ICT manager or information security specialist, but should rather be dealt with 
at the level of the Group CEO, Group Executive Committee and the CIO.  The ICT manager 
or information security specialist will handle the technical aspects of information security. 
 
The integration of legal aspects into the formulation and implementation of information 
security is a relatively new concept in South Africa and this study found that organisations did 
not always know how to go about it; that is why a Concept Model has been proposed to serve 
as a reference point and guideline.  As part of demonstrating how corporate South Africa can 
incorporate legal aspects into information security policies, this thesis dealt with the macro 
and micro facets of the organisational implementation of the Concept Model.  At macro level, 
these would include the development and execution of the ICT Enterprise Architecture.   
 
On the other hand, at micro level, this study illustrated aspects of the Concept Model and 
roles that should be played by the Board of Directors, Group ICT Steering Committee, Group 
ICT Management Committee, Board of Directors’ Audit Committee, and all employees in the 
establishment, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of information security policies.   
 
Corporate South Africa will find it easy to implement or use the Concept Model as a reference 
point because it is generic in its disposition, product-independent and caters for both aspects 
of information security i.e. governance and operations.  Depending on the nature of their 
information security legislation, this Concept Model can also be useful in other countries. 
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8.2.4 Practical contribution to executive management in corporate South Africa and 
worldwide 
 
Through the findings contained in Chapter 5 and 6, this thesis reveals and advises executive 
management in companies to ensure that information systems users (employees, consultants 
and customers) are sufficiently aware and trained when it comes to implementing information 
security policies.  In most companies that participated in this study, users had only an 
elementary knowledge of information security policies.  The executive management team 
should be seen to take information security policies seriously so that all the other employees 
and users emulate them.  On the other hand, the awareness programmes should not be done 
superficially merely to satisfy the audit requirements. The executive management should 
assist the Board of Directors by implementing and monitoring compliance with information 
security policies on a day-to-day basis.   
 
8.2.5 Practical contribution to policy formulators 
 
South Africa is a constitutional state and thus the Constitution of the Republic is the supreme 
law of the country.  All laws in South Africa should derive from this legal construct and be 
aligned with the constitutional framework.  In South Africa, there are three major organs of 
state – Executive, Parliament and Judiciary.  The Executive (Cabinet) is responsible for 
articulating policies, co-ordinating them into laws and overseeing implementation thereof 
once the legislature has approved them. Other than approving the Executive’s policies, 
Parliament (legislature) also represents the public, approves laws, and monitors the work of 
the Executive.  The judiciary’s authority is predetermined in the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa.  The role of the judiciary is to exercise judicial authority over the Republic.  
Based on the aforementioned background, ‘policy formulators’ in this study refers specifically 
to both the government and parliament.  Through the findings of this study, policy 
formulators were advised: 
 To ensure that legal provisions to fight cyber-crime are not redundant.  These include 
provisions contained in Chapter 8 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act, No. 25 of 2002.  These provisions deal with unauthorised access to, interception of or 
interference with data and thus they are supposed to be tackled by the cyber inspectors.  
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At the time of writing this document, the appointment of the cyber cops has not yet been 
implemented and this study urges policy formulators to effect the appointments.   
 To implement the establishment of the cryptography service providers in line with 
Chapter 10 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, No. 25 of 2002.   
 To implement the provisions of the Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act, No. 38 of 
1997 by arresting people responsible for extensive music and video pirating. 
 To speed up the implementation of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, No. 9 of 
2009. 
 To amend the Patents Act, No. 57 of 1978.  This Act was passed many years ago before 
the Internet was used for commercial purposes and thus there is a need to update the law 
through amendment.  This Act states that software patents cannot be patented in South 
Africa.  It is on this premise that policy formulators are urged to amend this position 
because it has led to the unintended consequence of discouraging ICT multinationals from 
directly investing in South Africa because they fear their patents will not be protected.  
However, before the Patents Act, No. 57 of 1978 is amended, government should ensure 
that the law is enforced.  So far this Act has been ineffectual because, although it 
stipulates that computer programmes cannot be patented, companies and individuals have 
been registering software-related patents with CIPRO, now CIPC (the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission). 
 
8.3 IDEAS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Several ideas emerged for future studies.  Firstly, future research can build and extend on the 
findings of this study using objective measures to gauge the effectiveness of information 
security policies. Further research could also investigate additional or alternate contextual 
factors and could employ a longitudinal approach to examine the integration of legal aspects 
into information security policies.  Information security governance and the implementation 
of the Concept Model that has been suggested in this study require a reasonable time period to 
implement and consequently to test the application of the model; for that reason longitudinal 
case studies may prove to be effective.  Further longitudinal studies may provide important 
insights into the effectiveness of statutory instruments that predominantly regulate the South 
African legal framework regarding e-commerce and information security, and in particular the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996 (specifically the right to 
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privacy); Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, No. 25 of 2005 (which provides 
the framework behind electronic communications and also addresses cyber-crime – chapter 
13, sections 85-89); Promotion of Access to Information Act, No. 2 of 2000 (which deals with 
records management, disclosure, confidentiality and access); the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-related Act, No. 70 2002 (which prohibits 
interception and monitoring without judicial permission); the Protection of Personal 
Information Bill, No. 9 of 2009 (which deals with the right to privacy); and the King Reports 
on Governance for South Africa (King II and III). 
 
Secondly, certain laws which have an impact on information security policies were not yet 
passed when this study was finalised or were only passed just before this study was 
concluded.  Therefore further research should examine their impact on the implementation of 
information security.  These include the Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008 (which only became 
effective on 1 May 2011) and the Protection of Personal Information Bill, No. 9 of 2009, 
which was signed into law (PoPI Act No. 4 of 2013) on 27 November 2013.   
 
Thirdly, further research could also focus on the role that the National Consumer Commission 
(NCC) plays regarding consumers’ infringements in respect of complaints that emanate from 
the merchants’ failures to integrate legal aspects into their information security 
implementation.  The NCC was established in terms of section 85 of the Consumer Protection 
Act, No. 68 of 2008 as an organ of the state, but carries out its mandate outside of the public 
service.  It is the researcher’s view that there will be cases against companies for 
infringements that violate the act as follows: failure by the merchant to provide a fair, 
accessible and sustainable marketplace, and unfair online marketing and business practices. 
 
Fourthly, further research should investigate the impact of legal aspects and information 
security policies in promoting responsible consumer behaviour. Lastly, future research should 
focus on the potential obstacles (such as the cost, or the politics) of implementing the 
proposed concept model in the corporate environment (see Paragraph 8.4). 
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8.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
Firstly, it was difficult to conduct a study within the parameters of the information systems 
terrain without encroaching into the legal field.  It was not the intention of this study to 
interpret the law, but rather to investigate the integration of legal aspects into information 
security policies.  The researcher has, however, at the beginning of this thesis stated the 
IANAL principle of, “I am not a lawyer”, emphasising that this research is not a legal study 
but rather an information systems study. In some instances, it became very difficult to 
undertake the aforesaid investigation without providing some legal context and appearing to 
be interpreting the law, especially in Chapter 3.  The danger of this action is that the 
possibility of interpreting the law incorrectly is very high because the author is not a lawyer.  
This study was scrutinised by lawyers but despite this, the responsibility to ensure the validity 
of the study remains with the researcher, and where a certain clause of the law could have 
been misinterpreted, this remains the responsibility of the researcher.  
 
Secondly, it was difficult to conduct focus group interviews as part of qualitative data 
collection methods in this study.  During the proposal stage of this study it was envisaged that 
at least six focus interviews would be conducted.  However, it was not possible to have 
groups of 12 information security practitioners in the same room at the same time. Attempts 
to piggy-back on conferences and seminars did not yield any fruitful results because 
organisers could not accommodate requests due to various reasons.   
 
Thirdly, to a certain extent, the depth of the study would have been enhanced with more than 
one interviewee from each organisation.  It was, however, difficult to obtain permission from 
the organisations. Moreover, the researcher would have been overwhelmed by the 
requirements in both time and cost of conducting more than one hundred interviews.  
 
Lastly, although this study proposed a concept model which will address the legal 
requirements of organisations in the corporate environment with respect to information 
security, how this would be implemented in the corporate environment does not include 
potential obstacles, for example cost, politics, or similar.  It would, however, not have been 
possible to do this without the concept model actually being implemented and thus one of the 
recommendations for future research addresses this aspect (see § 8.3). 
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8.5 CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY 
 
The findings of this study indicate that most organisations in South Africa are not integrating 
legal aspects into information security policies.  Such integration of legal aspects into 
information security policies is an important element regarding the adherence to the law and 
to tightening information security in the corporate environment.  One of the most important 
outcomes of this study is the proposed Concept Model of Legal Compliance in the Corporate 
Environment.  This Concept Model embodies the contribution of this study and demonstrates 
how legal requirements are incorporated into information security endeavours.  The fact that 
the proposed Concept Model is technology-independent and that it can be implemented in a 
real corporate environment, irrespective of the organisation’s governance and management 
structure, holds great promise for the future of information security both in South Africa and 
abroad.  Furthermore, this thesis has generated a typology for incorporating legislation related 
to the provision of information security which can be used by any academic or practitioner 
who intends to implement information security measures in line with the provisions of the 
South African law. If this study proves that legal aspects are significant in the provision of 
information security, practitioners can to some extent construe that the integration of 
legislation into information security policies can be done in other South African organisations 
that did not participate in this study.  In reality, however, there is still much research work to 
be done in this area.   
 
In concluding this study, the author is, like Coetzee (1999), humbled by the consciousness 
that what has been achieved in this small project is but a very small drop in the ocean of 
scholarship and that the following applies: 
 
The learning journey:  
Although finalising the study, the learning journey has only just commenced.  Appreciating 
the enormity of what has been proposed in this thesis enforces the belief that much must still 
be written, much requires further study and that the final word will lie in the collaborative 
effort of scholars. During the production of the thesis, ideas and processes were subjected to 
peer review and discussions to establish credibility in the study. This was achieved by 
publishing the following papers: 
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 Dagada, R., Eloff, M.M. & Venter, L.M. 2009. Too many laws but very little progress! 
Is South African highly acclaimed information security legislation redundant? ISSA 
2009 Conference. University of Johannesburg, 6 to 8 July 2009. 
 Dagada, R. & Eloff, M.M. (2013).  Integration of policy aspects into information 
security issues in South African organisations. African Journal of Business 
Management, 7(31), 3069-3077. 
 
In 2009, the researcher presented a paper entitled “Legal and policy aspects to consider when 
providing information security in the corporate environment”, at the School of Computing 
2009 Post-Graduate Symposium, held at the University of South Africa, 14 September 2009. 
This paper was rated as the best doctoral study presentation. 
 
Ideas, the seeds of innovation:   
Thoughts and ideas expressed in this thesis will make a difference if shared, tested, refined, 
implemented and reviewed.  Within the boundaries of this academic contribution lie many 
seeds, which over time can be taken up by others so as to ensure that they materialise into 
more than just a Concept Model.  It is the view of the researcher that this study will contribute 
to an increased understanding on the part of scholars and practitioners, with the possibilities 
of expanding on the study topic.    
 
Conceptualisation, the basis for realisation:  
Reality is today, concepts are the future.  Influencing the future will be impacted by current 
knowledge; the extent to which dreams and ideas are integrated into future realities will 
determine the extent to which people are able to survive as knowledge workers.   
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APPENDIX A1 
 
REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY 
 
 
<<Company>> 
<<Respondent>> 
 
Dear <<Surname>> 
 
I am a Lecturer of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) at the Wits Business School of 
the University of the Witwatersrand and I am currently completing PhD - Information Systems in the 
University of South Africa’s School of Computing.  The title of my research report is: 
 
“Legal and policy aspects to consider when providing information security in the corporate 
environment” 
 
As part of this study, I should interact with at least 40 South African companies and other 
organisations that are using their websites to conduct financial transactions between themselves and 
their customers as part of trading.  It is on this ground that I hereby request a meeting with you during 
the day and time convenient to you.  You may also be asked to consent to being interviewed and 
having this interview tape-recorded for data analysis.  These tape recorded interviews will be coded 
(using pseudonyms) and be stored in a locked facility.   
 
Please note that if you agree to be part of this study you are at liberty to withdraw from the study at 
any time, without any pressure to provide reasons.  I also undertake all possible means to ensure that 
your career and/or organisation is not caused any detriment by partaking in this study and I will 
accordingly allocate a pseudonym to all participants to protect their identity and to guarantee that any 
information revealed, either personal or professional, will be regarded as absolutely confidential. 
 
In addition, it is my belief that there are number of possible benefits for you and/or your organisation 
as a participant in this study.  On the completion of the study I shall supply you with a bound copy of 
the final, approved research report.  I may also provide a short presentation on the findings to you and 
some of your colleagues.  You will also receive conference papers and published articles with regard 
to this research. The study will also expose you to a host of literature from a variety of sources and 
reflecting on your own growth as an information security practitioner could be beneficial in your 
professional development.   
 
I am doing this study under the supervision of Professor Mariki Eloff.  Please feel free to contact them 
regarding this study if you deem it necessary.  Their contact details as follows: 
 
Supervisor:   Prof Mariki Eloff 
Institution:   University of South Africa 
Division:   School of Computing 
Tel:    012 429 6336 
Email:    eloffmm@unisa.ac.za 
 
196 
 
I would very much appreciate your assistance. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
[By email] 
Rabelani Dagada 
 
Tel: 073 2140 174 or 011 717 7162 
Email: Rabelani.Dagada@wits.ac.za 
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APPENDIX A2 
 
 
PROFILES OF THE ORGANISATIONS THAT PARTICIPATED IN THIS STUDY 
 
Organisation 1 
This organisation, listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, is one of the largest banks in South 
Africa.  The Group offers a complete suite of financial services and products, including banking, 
assurance and wealth management.  Organisation 1 mainly operates in South Africa, but has equity 
holdings in other banks in Mozambique and Tanzania.  This bank has representative offices in 
Namibia and Nigeria.  It had, by 31 December 2010, assets of R716,5 billion, 118 million customers, 
and 36 770 permanent employees.  This bank was established in 1991 after the amalgamation of four 
South African banks.  The Group was the first bank in South Africa to offer access to personal 
banking details online in October 1996 and by 1997 it made the first SET (Secure Electronic 
Transaction)-compliant transaction in South Africa with a customer buying a music album from the 
South African online music store, CDM. In February 1997, it became the first South African bank to 
conduct a trial project piloting Visa and MasterCard’s Secure Electronic Transmissions standard. In 
August 2000, Organisation 1 announced the first mobile banking service in South Africa, in 
conjunction with a mobile network operator.  In July 2003
20
 this bank was the first in South Africa 
whose customers’ online bank accounts were hacked and defrauded. 
 
Organisation 2 
Organisation 2 is a bank holding company with its main subsidiary being one of the South African big 
four banks.  The bank is listed both in Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Namibian Stock Exchange.  
This bank offers a variety of wholesale and retail banking services, insurance, asset management, and 
wealth management.  This is one of the oldest banks in South Africa having been established in 1831.  
It currently focuses on Southern Africa and was the first South African Bank to allow online 
transactions in February 1997.
21
  The other three big banks only enabled its customers to access 
banking services online between March and July 1997.   
 
Organisation 3 
It was established in South Africa approximately 150 years ago. Organisation 3 is now one of the big 
four banks in South Africa and has become a considerable global player which operates in 17 African 
countries.  It also has operations in 13 countries outside of the African continent, especially in 
emerging markets.  This bank is listed in two Stock Exchanges and its assets are valued over R1 341 
billion.  By December 2010 it had 53 000 employees worldwide and its market capitalisation was 
R170 billion.  ICT plays an important role in terms of communications, integration and operations in 
Organisation 3 since it has operations in various branches, towns, cities, provinces, and countries.  
Organisation 3 became the first bank in July 2003 to offer customers free anti-virus and personal 
firewall software.  This bank has a dedicated team of information security specialists which operates 
24 hours a day to combat cyber crimes.  This team
22
 removes spoofing websites within 48 hours after 
its creation and block some of the phishing emails before they reach the customer. 
 
Organisation 4 
Listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Organisation 4 is one of the biggest financial institutions 
in South Africa.  The Group offers an assortment of financial services and products in South Africa, 
                                                 
20
 This information was obtained from the World Wide Worx’s 2006 Online Banking In South Africa Report.  The Report was 
compiled by Arthur Goldstuck. 
21
 This information was obtained from the World Wide Worx’s 2006 Online Banking In South Africa Report.  The Report was 
compiled by Arthur Goldstuck. 
22
 This information was obtained from the Draft Digital banking Report in South Africa authored by Arthur Goldstuck of the World 
Wide Worx and Rabelani Dagada of the Wits Business School. 
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Africa, and other international markets.  There are three banks within the Group.  The Group was 
originally founded in the 1970’s as a specialist investment bank by three entrepreneurs.  It was 
established in its current form in 1998 through the merger of some financial entities.  Since then 
Organisation 4 has been growing through organic, acquisition and green fields approach.  One of the 
banks within the Group was the first to provide online car finance in July 1997. 
 
Organisation 5 
The Group has approximately 6 716 employees in its operations in South Africa, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia.  Since Organisation 5 was founded in 1974 in South Africa, it has grown substantially 
through both strategic organic and acquisitions.  It has distinctive private bank and asset managers 
whose customers are a select middle and upper class client base.  In July 2002, it became the first 
South African company to list in London and Johannesburg.  This bank does not have branches and 
Automated Teller Machines and thus most of the banking transactions are conducted through the 
mobile and online delivery channels. 
 
Organisation 6 
This company was the first mobile telecommunications operator to function in South Africa.  It is an 
international cellular network which operates in African countries such as Tanzania, Lesotho, 
Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo.   In or about August 2008, Organisation 6 
acquired a certain network and satellite services company.  The acquired company is a pan-African 
company and as such this transaction allowed Organisation 6 to operate in about 40 African countries.  
This would include being able to operate in Nigeria, which is arguably the biggest cellular phone 
market. This mobile operator’s equity is largely owned by a British telecommunication behemoth, and 
minority shareholders in South Africa. The Group is the dominant mobile network in South Africa 
with an estimated market share of 58%.  South Africa is the most profitable market in Africa.   
Organisation 6 was listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange on 17 May 2009. In August 2010, this 
mobile operator teamed up with one of the South African banking group to launch M-PESA money 
transfer service in South Africa.  M-PESA enables consumers to transfer money via call phones. 
 
Organisation 7 
This is a South African-based online restaurant franchise chain where orders and financial transactions 
are done in the restaurant’s website. Information security is very critical in this online restaurant 
franchise because there are three payment methods that can expose the customers to criminal elements 
if security is not tight – Credit Card, Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), and EarthBucks.  Credit Card 
payments are facilitated securely through Virtual Card Services.  EFT payments enable the customer 
to place his/her order online and make transfer to the restaurant’s bank account.  EarthBucks is a 
saving account scheme – every time the customer place an order online, he/she earn EarthBucks.  
Once the order and payment are done, food is delivered to the customer’s preferred delivery address. 
 
Organisation 8 
This franchise is possibly the world’s biggest flower delivery service.  It has a presence in 150 
countries, including South Africa.  Organisation 8 was founded in South Africa in 1950 and has more 
than 400 franchisees in South Africa and the rest of the African continent.  Orders can be placed and 
paid online via a Credit Card.  Customers are encouraged to buy online by giving them credits for 
conducting business in the website.  The franchise’ website also provides online gift vouchers and 
Virtual cards.  Organisation 8 takes information security seriously and that is why its website is 
certified by Thawte.  Once a payment has been made, delivery is done on a specified date and time.  
Contact details for conveying customer complaints are published on the website. 
 
Organisation 9 
Organisation 9 is the first low cost airline to operate in South Africa and is modelled as a “no frills” 
airline like those that operating other parts of the world such as Ryanair, Southwest and EasyJet.  It 
was established in 2001 with the first flight between Johannesburg and Cape Town.  Now it has 
several routes within South Africa and between South Africa and a few other countries in Southern 
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Africa.  Other than enabling its customers to buy air tickets online, the website of Organisation 8 
allows customers to browse, build, and procure cell phone packages online from the three cell phone 
network operators.  Organisation 8 has won several awards based on independent surveys.  ICT plays 
a fundamental role in this airline since most of its trading is done online and thousands of online 
financial transactions happen every day.   
 
Organisation 10 
This organisation is a low-cost airline headquartered in Kempton Park, South Africa.  It started to 
operate in 2004 with three daily flights between OR Tambo and Cape Town Airports.  It now operates 
in several South African airports and has flights between South Africa and Mozambique, Tanzania, 
and Zambia.  Most air tickets are bought online and the airline has a “ticketless” boarding method 
where you only have to produce a proof of identity and reference number to check-in for the flight.  
Organisation 3 also has the “eCheck-In” which enables passengers to choose their seats before arriving 
at the airport.  That is why ICT is very critical in this organisation. 
 
Organisation 11 
Organisation 11 was the latest Low Cost Airline to operate in South Africa.  The airline was launched 
in October 2006.  This low cost carrier enables its customers to buy the air tickets online.  The airline 
encourages passengers to buy their air tickets online by giving them incentives (specials) which are 
only available in the website. Organisation 11 takes information security very seriously and thus its 
website is VeriSign Secured.  This gives the customers who use Credits Cards some comfort.  The 
airline has won several awards from independent organisations.  It was the first low cost carrier to 
provide self service check-in in airports and to ensure that passengers were able to pre-check 
themselves online. 
 
Organisation 12 
This company is a national carrier and the largest airline in Africa in terms of the number of route 
networks both in Africa and overseas, and flies to more destinations than any other African airline.  
This airline was established 1 February 1934.  The carrier has evolved over the years and most of the 
business is done online.  In fact, the cheapest air tickets are only available online.  Organisation 11 
was the only carrier in South Africa that was given permission by the South African Civil Aviation 
Authority to allow its passengers to use cell phones on flights as part of a pilot to determine the 
feasibility. 
 
Organisation 13 
This airline was founded in April 1994 specifically for South Africa and the Southern Africa market 
generally.  It operates as both a passenger and cargo carrier and its route network is growing steadily.  
Organisation 13 is headquartered in OR Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg.  The airline 
conduct most of its business online – including buying and issuing tickets, checking one’s trip and 
online check-in. 
 
Organisation 14 
This privately owned airline was established in 1967 and restyled in 1995.  In January 2006, the 
company changed its name and corporate identity.  It created its own niche market by targeting its 
operations to smaller regional hubs and towns in Southern Africa. The airline is in crucial strategic 
partnership with other two prominent airlines in South Africa.  It flies to more local destinations than 
any other carrier, operating more than 3000 flights in a month.  These flights service more than 25 
destinations in Southern Africa.  Tickets purchasing, bookings, online check-in, changing reservation 
and paying can be done online. 
 
Organisation 15 
This online shop is a subsidiary of a renowned “traditional” supermarket chain which was established 
in the 1930’s in South Africa.  Nowadays, the supermarket chain’s footprint has expanded 
substantially through franchising partnerships, and it now operates in several African countries, 
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Middle East, and Australia.  Groceries sold via the online shop include food, wine, and homeware.  
The online shop also provides cell phone airtime, clothes, gifts, and financial services (credit card, 
insurance, and personal loans).  ICT is an important enabler and delivery chain of this supermarket. 
The Holding Company of this supermarket is listed as one of the top 100 listed companies in 
companies in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
 
Organisation 16 
Organisation 16 is an online shop which is a division of a prominent supermarket franchise Group. 
The Group employs 38 000 people and yields a yearly turnover of around USD6.76 billion.  The 
Group was founded in 1967 as a family business and it was listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
the following year.  It has now grown into a prominent retail chain.  As part of the growth the online 
shop (Organisation 16) was established.  The website of the online shop enables customers to view 
and buy groceries, general merchandise, school stationary, wine and liquor, gifts and flowers, and 
entertainment devices.  The online shop also offer services such as finance (Go Banking), recipe 
centre, and catalogues.   
 
Organisation 17 
Organisation 17 is one of the most successful online retailers in South Africa, providing books, CDs, 
DVDs, games, electronic products, etc. The company is owned by South African based and 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange multinational media companies.  The Group that owns 
Organisation 17 is the biggest media company in the emerging markets and has attained a significant 
proficiency in e-commerce.  Other than selling its own products and services, the website of 
Organisation 17 also serves as a marketplace for the sellers and buyers.  In real essence, this enables 
the customers of Organisation 17 to sell and buy from each other.  The website of this online shop 
provides guidelines on how customers can place and sell their products in its website. These products 
are viewed by thousands of fellow Organisation 17 shoppers.  When a customer wants to buy a 
product placed on the website of the online shop by another customer, Organisation 17 processes the 
order on behalf of the seller and advises the seller to ship the product to the buyer.  Once the product 
has been delivered, Organisation 17 passes the money to the seller. 
 
Organisation 18 
This organisation is an airline based in the Middle East, but with operations in South Africa.  Its 
operations in South Africa must, inevitably, comply with the South African legal requirements, 
including those that deal with information security.  The airline has a dedicated South African website.  
As part of this study, I analysed and studied this website to determine compliance with the legal and 
policy aspects pertaining to information security.  Organisation 18 was started in October 1985.  The 
airline has grown steadily with a fleet of 153 aircraft, 100 destinations, and operates in 66 countries.  
Over and above allowing online services, this airline is also mobile-enabled.  This means that you can 
use your cell phone to do the following: do your booking; check-in and select or alter your seat on the 
move; receive your boarding pass on your cell phone; see your itinerary, request a meal and book a 
chauffeur-driven service; check when your guests arrive or when your flight is due to leave; view for 
the type of aircraft, its cabin features and in-flight entertainment before you depart. 
  
Organisation 19 
This airline is owned by a government of a certain country situated in Southern Africa.  Like 
Organisation 18, this carrier should comply with the relevant South African legislation since it has 
operations in the OR Tambo International Airport, Johannesburg, South Africa.  The airline was 
established in the 1980’s and started making some profit after it went through a corporatisation 
process.  This led to the operations of this national carrier being housed under a parastatal entity.  
Organisation 19 allows customers to buy tickets and book flights online. 
 
Organisation 20 
The company was established in 1977 as a national carrier in one of the East African countries.  It was 
100% owned by the government until it was privatised in 1996.  This made it the first national carrier 
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to be successfully privatised.  The airline is considered one of the leading operations in the Sub-
Saharan.  The company is listed in the Kenyan and Tanzanian Stock Exchanges.  It has routes and 
destinations in Africa, America, Europe, Middle East, and Asia.  Similarly to Organisations 18 and 19 
in the above paragraphs, this organisation has an obligation to comply with the South Africa laws 
since it also operates in South Africa.  Passengers can procure tickets and book flights online.  Other 
than Credit Cards, payments can also be made via the mobile money facility, MPesa. 
 
Organisation 21 
This organisation is a division of one of the leading booksellers in South Africa.  The bookselling 
company was founded in Johannesburg, South Africa.  In 1999, the company added another element 
on its bookselling business by providing a sophisticated lifestyle experience to its customers (book 
readers) in its bookstores by introducing coffee shops inside.  Later on the bookseller introduced an 
online bookshop.  As time progressed, it became more than just an online bookselling entity since 
there are many other products and services that can be bought in its website. These include music, 
films, games, vouchers, and electronic devices. 
 
Organisation 22 
This company is a South African based independent online retailer which started trading in November 
2003.  Initially, it operated solely as a bookseller, but later on added music, DVDs, and games in 2005.  
This online shop sells commercial, professional, and academic books.  There are more than a million 
different titles and thousands of games, CDs, and DVDs in its catalogue.  The website of this company 
has a detailed Credit card security policy; something which I find to be highly commendable.   
 
Organisation 23 
Just like Organisations 21 and 22 in the above paragraphs, this entity was initially established to sell 
books, but has later added other products in its websites.  These include games, movies, multimedia, 
music, stationery, and toys.  The company in which this division (Organisation 23) belong to is one of 
the oldest retail chain which started trading in 1896, making this retail brand to be a century old.  This 
South African based company has operations in the Southern Africa. 
 
Organisation 24 
This online retailer is based in South Africa and specialises in selling computing products and services 
such as computers, accessories, networking, hardware, modding, games, and some services. 
 
Organisation 25 
This group of companies is a South African cinema company.  Its head office is in Johannesburg. 
During the course of doing the fieldwork of this study, this company operated cinemas in 22 locations 
in South Africa.  It is the second-largest cinema operator in South Africa. In December 2001, this 
company launched Africa’s first all-digital cinema complex in Johannesburg.  Customers are able to 
book movies and to purchase tickets online. 
 
Organisation 26  
This is the largest cinema operating company in South Africa.  It is owned by one of the biggest media 
groups and it operates 54 movie complexes in South Africa.  Customers are able to book movies and 
to purchase tickets online (eTickets). 
 
Organisation 27 
This opulently stylish hotel (5 stars) is located in Johannesburg upmarket northern suburbs.  Guests are 
able to make room reservations online. 
 
Organisation 28 
This four star hotel is situated in Parktown, Johannesburg.  Guests are able to make room reservations 
online. 
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Organisation 29 
This four star hotel is situated in Rustenburg.  The land around this hotel has been game fenced and 
there are various types of animals. Guests are able to make room reservations online. 
 
Organisation 30 
This five star hotel is situated in Rustenburg. It was designed to cater for the camping and training of 
local and international sports teams.  It has advanced conference, sports and medical facilities. 
Customers are able to make room reservations online. 
 
Organisation 31 
This hotel group operates several four and five star hotels, resorts and bush lodges. 
 
Organisation 32 
This South African hotel group has 45 years experience and its portfolio has about 90 hotels 
worldwide. 
 
Organisation 33 
This hotel group was established in South Africa in 1985.  The group operates hotels in five distinct 
brands – one to five stars.  It operates 54 hotels in southern and eastern Africa. 
 
Organisation 34 
This organisation is the biggest distance learning university in Africa and the longest standing 
dedicated distance higher education provider in the world. Its head office is in Pretoria and it was 
established in 1873.  It enrols approximately one-third of all the South African university students. At 
the time of doing the fieldwork of this study, this university had more than 300 000 students. 
 
Organisation 35 
This university is situated in Johannesburg and it was granted full university status in 1922. It is one of 
the only universities in Africa that have been ranked by two international rankings as leading higher 
education institutions in the world.  
 
Organisation 36 
This hotel group was established in Johannesburg in 2001.  It operates several hotels, lodges and 
country houses. 
 
Organisation 37 
This broadcasting and media group was established in 1994 and its listing in the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange was terminated in 2007 after a successful private equity transaction.  It operates four 
popular radio stations and an independent news service. 
 
Orgnaisation 38 
This broadcasting and media group has major shareholding in five radio stations and a TV channel in 
South Africa.  
 
Organisation 39 
This online retailer was established in 1999 in Johannesburg.  Before the establishment of Kalahari.net 
in 2009, it was the largest online marketplace in South Africa.  The user base of this marketplace are 
buyers and sellers.  During the course of the fieldwork of this study, this company had about 30 000 
registered sellers and 380 000 buyers.  The number of unique visitors to this online marketplace was 
more than one million per month.   
 
Organisation 40 
This global car renting company is owned by a group of companies.  Most of the vehicles in its pool 
are less than a year old.  This company was the first company to link car rental with airline travel in 
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the America’s Willow Run Airport in December 1946.  The company started operating in South Africa 
in 1967 by opening its head-office in Bloemfontein.  By the mid 1980s, the South African operation 
became the biggest car rental service provider outside of the United States of America.  The South 
African business started to expand to other countries in the Southern Africa region.  In 1993 the 
company received SABS 150 9002 quality management system.  In the 1990’s the company enabled 
its customers to book cars and make payments online. 
 
Organisation 41 
This car rental company was established more than 40 years ago.  It is the second biggest car rental 
company in South Africa and offers a fleet of just over 20 000 vehicles at 85 locations in different 
parts of Southern Africa.  This company is listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and operates in 
150 countries in Africa, Europe and Australia.  It employs more than 40 000 employees and provides 
online renting and payment web facility for its customers. 
 
Organisation 42 
This organisation is one of the small car renting companies in South Africa.  It was established in 1986 
in Johannesburg and has a fleet of just over 3000 renting vehicles.  Outside of South Africa, this car 
rental operates in some countries in Southern Africa.  Ckients are enabled to book and make payments 
online. 
 
Organisation 43 
This is a provider of communication services, mobile telephony, and business solutions.  The company 
is listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange under the Industrial – Telecommunications sector as a 
South African-based multinational mobile telecommunications operator, functioning in several 
African and Middle Eastern countries. The operator was launched in 1994 in South Africa and it is 
now operating in 21 countries in Africa and Middle East.  It is estimated that by 2012 the combined 
market share of all its operations will register more than 300 million.  In August 2005, this operator 
entered into a venture with Organisation 2 and launched an online bank.     
 
Organisation 44 
Organisation 44 is a public telecoms operator listed in New York and Johannesburg Stock Exchanges.  
The company is a fixed and wireless telecommunications service provider in South Africa.  It is a 
semi-privatised company and the South African government owns 39% equity.  The company has 
approximately 24,879 employees.  For many years this company was the only operator handling 
international connections to and from South Africa on the South Atlantic 3 (SAT3) and South Africa-
Far East (SAFE) backbone lines, which constituted the majority of international bandwidth in South 
Africa, and fixed-line communications. However, its market dominance was neutralised by the arrival 
of another fixed line operator which started to provide services in 2008. Organisation 44’s 
infrastructure consists of local copper loops, microwave, fibre optic loops, and wireless connections.  
It deploys Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) over Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) 
mainly in the inner-city and suburban areas in cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria, Port 
Elizabeth, and Durban. It is on this premise that Organisation 44 is the biggest provider of fixed-line 
broadband in the Republic. 
  
Organisation 45 
This fixed line telecommunications operator was launched in South Africa on 31 August 2006 in 
Kyalami, Johannesburg.  It is the first direct competitor to the incumbent telecoms operator.  Various 
licences were issued to Organisation 45, including the PSTS License; they enable the operator to offer 
an assortment of telecommunications services, except a fully-fledged mobile telephony.  In other 
words, the company can deploy mobile services moderately.  Organisation 44 is in fact the first 
legitimately converged network providing voice and data on one network.  The operator delivers its 
services through various technologies.  Corporate customers are serviced by fibre cable or Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access connections while consumers are served by Code Division 
Multiple Access.  It has entered into a partnership with SEACOM to build an undersea cable that will 
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connect South Africa to India and Europe.  Through this relationship, this operator will own the cable 
landing station and all facilities within the South African territory. The reason for much anticipation 
for Organisation 44’s launch was driven by the desire of consumers to see the decrease in 
telecommunications prices.  For many years, the incumbent’s monopoly was seen as a big factor 
contributing to excessive telecommunications and broadband related costs.   
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APPENDIX B1 
 
PROTOCOL FOR THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS:  INFORMATION 
SECURITY PRACTITIONERS WITHIN PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS 
 
o How are information security related policies developed in your company? 
o In what extent does the legislation influence your information security policies? 
o How were the regulatory aspects, like those contained in the King III Report, incorporated in 
your information security policies? 
o How are the following aspects of information security problems provided for in your policies? 
- Malicious Code 
- Hacking 
- Copyright 
- Privacy 
- Patents 
- Trademark 
o To what extent are computer system users familiar with the information security policies? 
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APPENDIX B2 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF A TRANSCRIPTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW 
(TRANSCRIBED FROM VOICE RECORDING): INFORMATION SECURITY 
PRACTITIONER WITHIN THE PARTICIPATING ORGANISATION 
 
 
Interviewer:  “How is information related policies developed in your company”?     
 
Interviewee:   “That’s an interesting question, I think the first step is identifying what policies are 
required and like many organizations, you look at the risks I organization and the statuary 
requirements of the organization and what we do is , we try to identify what type of policy would be 
most applicable so we also try and consolidate topics under one type of policy for example electronic 
communication would include internet usage, email usage, insert messaging usage in one policy 
document instead of having three separate policy document. So, the high level we try and identify 
what type of policy we need. We try and see structure and then what we also do is , we try and break it 
up into different levels of policy because we have what we call the information security road map, 
information security strategy, which is strategic document on one level and then you’ll have 
something like this (he draws the structure on paper) . It’s not necessarily a triangle. You’d have 
strategy here, like a road map document and a strategic document and here, it would be high level 
policies, so you would identify say on a principle level inflow policy and in our case you identify 
acceptable usage policy which apply o all users then on the next level you would have something 
called Standards, which would be more technically orientated to detailed instructions on how to be 
specific technologies. So you’d have windows, climax, standard and etc. and then the next level would 
be procedures which would be detailed instructions on a step by step guide of how to secure 
documents and then what we also have is something called Guidelines. Guidelines sections which was 
for an example a booklet that summarizes acceptable usage because what typically happens is that in 
the high level policies, legal policies has to review them because it has to be tied from a legal point of 
view. It would be very difficult for the end-user to read it and actually read it because if you want to 
read it you’ll make sense of it. 
 
So that’s why we interpret it and put it to user-friendly guidelines document. So this would be 
guideline, document where you’d be having guidelines where you’ll be choosing strong passwords. So 
coming back to your question , we first take a view of what type of documents we want and then we 
just break it up into manageable chunks and what we do is for an example policies, what we do is 
create a working group, so these people will essentially have preventatives from the business, someone 
from the HR department, someone from the legal department if possible, someone from the IT 
department and then we had someone from the customer care side, so there was approximately about 
five to six people and we also used an external consultant just to provide input in terms of what the 
industry chains are, just to put right guidance around that and we workshop the policy and once we 
were reasonably happy with the content, then what we did was we took it up to the higher level co-
operate body information  
 
Steering committee. We sent the policy to them with reading all these documents. Essentially what we 
did is, we took the policy documents and distilled them into bullet points and into a presentation and 
highlighted contextual point to them, for example it might be something around no unauthorized 
software allowed on workstations so the debate comes as to what is unauthorized software. There are a 
lot of people who want to download software so that they can test on a net word point of view like 
your engineers and so on. So all the contentious point and the sirloin point are highlighted presented to 
the steer-come and if they are happy with them we get the chairman of the steer-come to sign off the 
policies. 
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Interviewer: “Who is the chairman of the steer-come in terms of position”? 
 
Interviewee: “So, at that stage when we sign off the policy was chaired by the CIO of the 
organization but it has subsequently changed”. 
 
Interviewer: “In what extend does the legislation influence your information security policies”? 
 
Interviewee:  “I am not a 100% sure but what we do is we rely a lot on legal and regulation 
department to review the document and make sure that there’s no violation of the current legislation 
and so when we develop policies ourselves, we don’t consciously look at the legislation and try and 
mend that scientifically against for an example, the promotional access information act or any of those 
type of act. Information security and then mend that to the policy, we relied on the legal department to 
do that and I think to some extend they did review that and made sure that it was compliant to 
legislation. 
 
Interviewer:  “How were the regulatory aspects like those contained in the King II Report 
incorporated in your information security policies”? 
 
Interviewee:  “For an example in the King II that influenced heavily the composition of the 
information security steering committee and as I said before that is the body that formally approves 
policies, it did but just taking King II into account, we didn’t directly observe, it was more around the 
government structure that we looked at”. 
 
Interviewer:  “How are the following aspects off information security problems provided for in your 
policies”? 
 
 Malicious Code 
 Hacking  
 Copyright 
 Privacy 
 Patents 
 Trademark 
 
Interviewee:  “For Malicious Code, what we do is we split that in two sections policy section and 
standard section. Policy section was more of a high level policy section around Malicious Code for 
example the principle section would be that there need to be mechanisms to ensure that Malicious 
Code is check on for workstations on very frequent basis. That would be on a principle statement that 
would be in a policy. In the standard we’d have specific guidelines around checking for Malicious 
Code, so there must be anti-virus installed, there must be anti-spyware installed. When you open a file, 
it must check for Malicious Code before. The uploading system needs to cater for that and also the 
anti-virus software, so essentially it will split into two sections just a policy and then a Malicious Code 
standard because its around how anti-virus technology must be set up, how anti-sperm technology 
must be set up and so on, so that’s how we address that how we address that in our policies”. 
 
Interviewer: “So, which server addresses Malicious Code”? 
 
Interviewee:  “We have a policy called Protection against Malicious Code policy and standard”. 
 
Interviewer:  “How do your policies make provision regarding hacking”? 
 
Interviewee:  “From a hacking perspective, we address this up to the users and the organization. 
There was a number of statements around general users and ownership and around the fact that users 
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acknowledge that the system that they are using belong to the organization and the software that they 
are using belong to an organization and therefore they have obligation on their side to make sure that 
they don’t interfere in their systems and do not try and sub verb to mechanisms or any controls, so 
that’s on one hand and we also made it very explicit in the usage policy that because the assets belong 
to the organization, the organization has a right to monitor and intersect any communication via end-
users, if they feel that there is a bridge of security promises. So that was actually specified in the usage 
policy”. 
 
Interviewer:  “And copyright”? 
 
Interviewee:  “Copyright, we also mentioned that in the accepted usage policy that there shouldn’t be 
any type of illegal software, downloads or installations and so on. That was by the explicit in the 
policy, the copyright and regarding all staff in the accepted usage policies, what we did is we provided 
guidelines and submitted it to the end-users so that they can read it, and then we also created a movie 
where it demonstrated good and bad behavior around copying of software, installing unauthorized 
software”. 
 
Interviewer:  “And, privacy”? 
 
Interviewee:  “Privacy, we didn’t specifically address that. The only time we did refer to privacy is 
when we did what I mentioned before, that the organization has a right to do monitoring, if it feels that 
it has been misused, so we didn’t go into a detailed privacy statement”. 
 
Interviewer:  “The technical guys, did you have some policies that say to them, ‘we respect user’s 
privacy’? For example you know that technicals for example can read some emails”. 
 
Interviewee:  “What we did have is there was a number of system administrators and they had 
privileged access to user-id, a generic account that was used by systems to log into each other, they 
also knew the password into that, so the risk is that they could have logged in with a generic 
application account and viewed someone’s confidential information and the only things that would 
come up on the log, would be an exchange account, so that we did with the system administrators is 
we got a document that that regarded them in to sign about acceptance of the usage policy but we 
wanted them to physically sign it to say that they acknowledge that they have been given privileged 
access to user information and there was a number of clauses in there, it was a one or two page where 
we say that they will safe guard the policy, report if there’s specific incident or suspected bridge and 
that they will not use any of the privileged information themselves. We got all the end-users to sign it 
and we kept that file and it was more than deterrent than anything else so they know that they have 
signed a document to say that they are conscious of the fact that they will not abuse it”. 
 
Interviewer:  “Patents” 
 
Interviewee:  “Patents, we didn’t address directly in our policies, same with trademark. What was the 
interesting about that is that we found that some organizations in different countries were trying to use 
the company brand to scam people, so they would send an email to someone with a brand and say 
‘congratulations you’ve won such amount of money, trying to be an organization so that they could 
scam them. The same with, a job interview where they were offering jobs for people and they had to 
pay a registration fee so they are pretending to be a company and run-off with the money”. 
 
Interviewer:  “But, technically people can go onto a website and cut and paste and so on, there isn’t 
much that the organization can do”. 
 
Interviewee:  “Yes, also because it’s cross border, that becomes very complicated, so other 
organizations investigate these issues, try and shut down these fake websites and so on”. 
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Interviewer:  “Talking about the cross border because your organization is multinational, the policies 
that you have in South Africa, are they applicable in other countries”? 
 
Interviewee:  “I think in theory yes, they are because we made sure that we had someone in HR that 
does not represent South Africa but was representing the HR. We have the HR department for South 
Africa and accrued HR department looking after all twenty countries based in South Africa, with a 
clue that they will be translated all the other organizations and so it was those policies written with 
those organizations in mind”. 
 
Interviewer:  “To what extent are computer system users familiar with the information security 
policies in South African companies”? 
 
Interviewee:  “I think generally that’s always the problem because people always feel that 
information security policies get in the way and it’s something that hinders them from their work, and 
generally it’s very difficult to get people to pay attention to policies and all that. In our organization it 
depends on which topics of the policy, I think there’s high degree of awareness around for an example, 
choosing strong passwords, so for example, you know how to use a strong password because of some 
of the awareness campaigns but also because we have mechanisms that actually forces them to do that, 
so when they log into that domain, they have to have these eight characters, it cant contain letters of 
their first names, it has to have at least a numeric, lower case and upper case, so its forcing them to do 
that. In other areas something that’s not as well-known for example fishing scams, the familiarity 
around that is less, same with other things around internet usage, email usage and so on, people are 
reasonably aware and familiar with information security.  
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APPENDIX B3 
 
PROTOCOL FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW: INFORMATION SECURITY 
OR CYBER LAW EXPERT 
 
 
o At what extent does the legislation in South Africa influence the composition of the business 
continuity and disaster recovery related policies at company level? 
o To what extent are the regulatory aspects like those contained in the King III Report 
incorporated in companies’ business continuity and disaster recovery policies? 
o How are the aspects of business continuity and disaster recovery provided for in legislation 
and companies’ policies? 
o To what extent are employees in companies familiar with the information business continuity 
and disaster recovery policies? 
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APPENDIX B4 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF A TRANSCRIPTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW 
(TRANSCRIBED FROM VOICE RECORDING): INFORMATION SECURITY OR 
CYBER LAW EXPERT 
 
 
Interviewer:  “At what extent does the legislation in South Africa influence the composition of the 
information security related policies at company level”? 
 
Interviewee:  “It’s not the only legislation that influences but it’s also things like KING II code and 
those people want to limit the exposure to legal risk. They will try and mitigate it in terms of what 
employers do with information within the organization and the best way to achieve that is through 
company policies.  So, typical policies would be things that relate to electronic communications, email 
and internet usage, that would say’ you need to keep company information confidential and cant 
disclose trade secrets’ and so they try to limit the legal risks through that.  Specific legislation that 
impacts policies, electronic communications and transactions act, according to that legislation, the way 
that communications is defined includes SMS, voice, it includes transactions that are done through 
websites and what companies actually do, they use those definitions in their company policies so that 
the legal risks on that edge in accordance with the terms that are used by the legislation”. 
 
Interviewer:  “Would you say companies are cautious about the legal requirements or their policy 
will be mobile”? 
 
Interviewee:  “One of the observations that I have is that people buy batches of policies and they do 
ISO compliance for instance 27001 and they will immediately implement those policies rather than 
drafting the policies based on the legislation and lead of requirements, they would just use those 
policies. The awareness is that they should have a policy but they don’t have the awareness to actually 
make the policy relevant to them, they’d rather purchase just broad generated policies and apply those, 
although they have a policy it’s not implemented”. 
 
Interviewer:  “Regarding the KING II, to what extent does that also influence the information 
security policies”? 
 
Interviewee:  “Well, in the KING II code it speaks about an awareness of the implications of 
technology on a business and the KING II code says that an organization that implements the KING II 
code must also be aware of risks that emanate from technology and they must also put in place 
measures to reduce those risks and based on that, people who are implementing the KING II code look 
at information security practices because of the technology risks that I mentioned earlier”. 
 
Interviewer:  “Let’s take this one by one; does the legislation address viruses”? 
 
Interviewer: Hacking? 
 
Interviewee:  “The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act has provisions that relate to 
Cyber Crime and it speaks about unauthorized, access and interceptions and so while its not using the 
word hacking or something like that, it is actually referring to that, and the main thing that comes out 
is that if anybody deals with information in an unauthorized way, it can be criminalized and will result 
in a criminal offence”. 
 
Interviewer:  “And copyright”? 
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Interviewee:  “There’s the copyright legislation in South Africa and the copyright legislation however 
is not updated in terms of the new digital environment so its quiet outdated and doesn’t speak directly 
to information security. It speaks about computer programmes but doesn’t deal directly with how 
people access information online and what they can do with it and how they can prevent those risks”. 
 
Interviewer:  “And privacy issues”? 
 
Interviewee:  “There’s a bill that’s about to come into forces, its called the Protection of Private 
Information Bill and that deal with personal information of consumers and all organizations can do 
with that information and it lists principles on how to do their information, it says how to keep it 
secure, you must not disclose it to anyone whose not authorized, it has specific principles but 
unfortunately that legislation is not yet enforced”. 
 
Interviewer:  “In terms of patents and trademarks that relates to IT do you think they are addressed by 
the legislation? 
 
Interviewee:  “So the Patent’s Act has a real problem in terms of software programmes in that it says 
that it’s not in the software programmes and business methods that you can patent, but the problem is 
that they are actually being patented by software programmers.  So there’s a loop in the system and 
companies are taking advantage of it because the state doesn’t exactly examine something if it is 
patentable. It may not deal directly with the information security but it clears someway with 
technology. The problem with this loophole is that it may discourage investors and innovation.  How 
would a software investor or programmer invest on something that may not be patent anyway?  It 
means the software source code can be used by one’s competitors. Trademarks, it speaks about what 
you can do with a logo and what cant do, and the way that it is, is quite broad, so it can actually deal 
with the using a logo online in an unauthorized way in the way the act is structured, it does kind of 
deal with that although it doesn’t say’ specifically online’. Its broadly interpreted saying you may use 
a logo in an unauthorized way so it does deal with it indirectly”. 
 
Interviewer:  “But do you think with information security, the manager is for example concerned with 
trademark or some other department’s problem”? 
 
Interviewee:  “I think within the departments they often shift the blame, so the legal would say that 
it’s on IT problem if it relates from a website and then if it’s a trademark issue IT would say that it’s a 
legal problem and they generally shift blame for these things. So think that within the organization 
what they must do is that when they are saying that this policy is going to be implemented, they must 
actually say who is going to implemented it, which department is responsible for it, because at the 
moment, I do think that they do shift blame on departments and organizations is not well defined, who 
should be managing information security and sometimes what happens is that they just have an IT 
department and they will got to legal and say ‘now you will also do information security’, but there 
isn’t somebody specifically designated to do. 
 
Interviewer:  “What’s your view regarding contradictory provisions in the law; for example, privacy 
versus access to information”? 
 
Interviewee:  “The trends has been that the new legislation introduces some terms that are in conflict 
with the other legislation, so I think that what needs to happen is that when people are drafting a new 
legislation like the protection of personal information bill, they must also look at other legislation that 
impacts that and make sure that the terminology match because very often you find that  they are 
speaking about same thing but they are calling it different things and so, otherwise developing to have 
two terms for the same thing or it’s a bit in conflict with each other or its more than the new legislation 
is in conflict with the old legislation from the terminology perspective or that it hasn’t been thought 
through. So, in the implementation of it one legislation says that you cannot do this, and the other 
legislation says that you can”.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF A DOCUMENT OBTAINED FROM AN ORGANISATION 
 
 
BUYS INC. ATTORNEYS 
E-MAIL LEGAL NOTICE 
 
 
1. This email legal notice is enforceable and binding on the recipient / addressee in terms of sections 
11(1) to 11(3) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions (“ECT”) Act 25 of 2002. 
 
2. This e-mail transmission contains confidential information, which is the property of Buys Inc. 
Attorneys (“Buys Inc.”). No person, other than the recipient (so indicated by the sender) may use 
or disclose the contents of this message, links or attachments hereto, to any person whatsoever. 
Unauthorised disclosure and/or use may result in civil and criminal liability. 
 
3. The information in this e-mail, links or attachments thereto is intended for the attention of the 
addressee only – if you are not the intended addressee/recipient, you are hereby notified that any 
disclosure, copying or distribution of the contents of this e-mail transmission or the taking of any 
action in reliance thereon or pursuant thereto, is strictly prohibited. Should you have received this 
e-mail in error, please delete and destroy it immediately and notify the sender. 
 
4. The e-mail address of the sender may not be used, copied, sold, disclosed, shared or incorporated 
into any database or mailing list for spamming and/or other online marketing practices without the 
prior consent of the sender and/or Buys Inc. 
 
5. Under no circumstances shall Buys Inc. Or sender of this e-mail be liable to any party for any 
direct, indirect, special or consequential damages, including, without limitation, any loss of 
profits, business interruption, loss of programs or other data on information handling systems or 
otherwise, even if Buys Inc. or sender of this e-mail have been expressly advised of the possibility 
of such damages. 
 
6. Any agreements concluded with Buys Inc. by using electronic correspondence shall only come 
into effect once Buys Inc. indicated such contract formation in a follow up or return 
communication and always subject to the requirements of the ECT Act and contract law in 
general. 
 
7. No email correspondence sent to Buys Inc. shall be deemed to have been received until Buys Inc. 
has responded thereto. An auto-reply shall not constitute such “response” for purpose of this 
clause. Return e-mail messages blocked by Buys Inc.’s virus detection and/or filtering applications 
shall not be deemed to have been received by Buys Inc. and/or the addressee. 
 
8. No warranties are made or implied that any employee and/or contractor of Buys Inc. is or was 
authorised to create and send this communication. 
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9. Buys Inc. reserves the right to intercept, filter, view, block, delete, access, copy, read and act upon 
this e-mail message and all e-mail messages send as reply messages to this e-mail message or the 
address of the sender. 
 
10. Buys Inc. retains the copyright in all e-mail messages and attachments sent from its 
communications systems insofar as such content is original and subject to copyright. The recipient 
/ addressee is hereby licensed to open and read the messages and/or attachments only – all other 
rights are reserved unless so indicated by the sender and/or Buys Inc. 
 
11. The views and opinions expressed in this e-mail message do not necessarily reflect the views 
and/or opinions of Buys Inc. if this e-mail message is used for purposes unrelated to the official 
business of Buys Inc., Buys Inc. shall not be liable for any damage, liability, infringement or loss 
caused by the contents of this message and the sender shall take full responsibility therefore in 
his/her sole and personal capacity. 
 
12. Subject to urgent and interim relief, all disputes and/or disagreements and/or liabilities, in any 
manner related to the:  
12.1. Interpretation, validity, access to and enforceability of this e-mail legal notice; 
12.2. Content (including message headers, links and/or attachments) of this e-mail; 
12.3. The time and place this email was sent and/or delivered; and/or 
12.4. The identity of the sender, 
shall be referred to urgent and confidential arbitration in terms of the expedited arbitration rules of 
the Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa and such arbitration shall be conducted in Cape 
Town in English. 
13. The law of South Africa shall govern this e-mail message and legal notice. 
 
14. Information disclosures required by law: 
14.1. Full name: Buys Inc. Attorneys; 
14.2. Registration number: 2001/013344/21 
14.3. Vat Registration number: 4280197882 
14.4. Directors: Reinhardt Buys, SA 
14.5. Postal address: P O Box 12215, Mill Street, Gardens, 8010; 
14.6. Street address: 24 Dunkley Square, Gardens, 8010; 
14.7. Web site: http://www.buys.co.za; 
14.8. Blog: http://blog.buys.co.za/; and 
14.9. Forum: http://forum.buys.co.za/ 
  
15.  This e-mail legal notice shall at all times take precedence over any other e-mail disclaimer(s) 
attached to return e-mails addressed to any person with an Buys Inc. e-mail account. 
 
16. Please contact the following person should you have any questions regarding this e-mail legal 
notice: reinhardt@buys.co.za. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF THE EMPLOYEE INTERCEPTION CONSENT 
 
 
RATIONALE  
[COMPANY NAME] of [COMPANY STREET ADDRESS] has a legal obligation and duty to:  
• Identify, manage and mitigate the risks and dangers associated with the use of electronic 
communication facilities by employees;  
• Practice good corporate governance;  
• Ensure the safety and security of its technology network; and  
• Provide a safe and healthy working environment.  
 
[COMPANY NAME] employees have a constitutional right to privacy, dignity and free speech that 
extends, although subject to certain limitations, to the workplace.  
The proper manner through which [COMPANY NAME] can balance its abovementioned duties and 
obligations with the constitutional rights of employees is by way of:  
• [COMPANY NAME] monitoring employee’s electronic communications if so required; and  
• Employees providing the necessary undertakings and consent detailed herein.  
 
UNDERTAKING AND CONSENT  
1.  I, the undersigned Employee records, acknowledges and agrees that:  
1.1  during the course of my appointment by [COMPANY NAME] (Pty) Ltd reg. no. 
1998/022574/07 (“[COMPANY NAME]”), I shall become acquainted with, gain personal and 
indepth knowledge of and have direct access and use to:  
1.1.1  strategic, sensitive and confidential information of [COMPANY NAME];  
1.1.2  [COMPANY NAME]’s Equipment; and  
1.1.3  [COMPANY NAME]’s Communication Facilities;  
1.2  the security of the Equipment, Communication Facilities and the protection of confidential 
information are of crucial importance to the business of [COMPANY NAME], who has a 
legitimate proprietary and commercial interest therein which it is entitled to protect;  
1.3  should the security of the Equipment or Communication Facilities be breached and/or 
confidential information be disclosed, it may cause [COMPANY NAME] considerable 
financial loss and legal liability;  
1.4  [COMPANY NAME] may also be liable for the actions of persons who use [COMPANY 
NAME]’s Equipment or Communication Facilities for unauthorised or illegal purposes; and  
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1.5  the only effective and reasonable manner in which [COMPANY NAME]’s legitimate 
proprietary and commercial interests may be protected so as to avoid financial loss or liability, 
is by way of the furnishing of the written undertakings detailed below by myself.  
2.  In return for the right to access and use [COMPANY NAME]’s Equipment and 
Communication Facilities and in the interest of the protection and maintenance of 
[COMPANY NAME]’s security and nondisclosure responsibilities, I agree and acknowledge 
that [COMPANY NAME] has the right to:  
2.1  Intercept any Communications;  
2.2  Intercept any Records; and  
2.3  Intercept any information directly associated with Communication.  
3.  The rights detailed above shall only apply to Communications initiated, received or conducted 
through or on the Equipment or Communication Facilities of [COMPANY NAME] and will 
only be relied upon when reasonably required with due regard to the constitutional freedoms 
and privacy of those concerned;  
4.  I agree and acknowledge that I read and understood the provisions of the new [COMPANY 
NAME] Electronic Communications Policy, available at [PLEASE INCLUDE WEB SITE 
ADDRESS WHERE THE POLICY WILL BE PUBLISHED]; and  
5.  For purposes of this undertaking, the following words shall have the following meanings:  
 
5.1  “Intercept” includes filter, scan, block, redirect, access, disrupt, copy, print, disclose, retain, 
use, collect, delete and/or record, in any format and in any manner;  
 
5.2  “Equipment” means computers, desktops, servers, routers, laptops, telephones, cell phones, 
electronic handheld devices, facsimile machines, pagers, software, hardware and/or similar 
Equipment owned by, licensed to or rented by [COMPANY NAME];  
 
5.3  “Communication Facilities” include Internet access, email access, instant messaging, sms 
and/or use of any Equipment for purposes of:  
5.3.1  initiating, receiving or storing of Communications; or  
5.3.2  accessing, creating, copying, distributing, sharing and deleting Records.  
 
5.4  “Communications” mean and include:  
5.4.1  oral and verbal utterances of an employee in or during a formal meeting 
where the business of [COMPANY NAME] or related matters are discussed;  
5.4.2  the transfer of any information whether speech, data, text, images in any 
format through Communication Facilities; and  
5.4.3  access to or use of the services available on the Internet, including email, web 
sites, file transfer, video conferencing, voice over IP, chat rooms and bulletin 
boards; and  
 
5.5  “Records” means any content, document, record, file, data, information, picture, download, 
graphic, depiction, representation or software that is created, used, accessed, disclosed, copied, 
stored, received or delivered by an employee, regardless of the format thereof.  
 
[name of employee]  
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APPENDIX E 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF OWN WORK DECLARATION 
 
 
I ___________________________ (Student number: _________________) am a student registered 
for ______________________ in the year __________.  I hereby declare the following: 
 I am aware that plagiarism (the use of someone else’s work without their permission and/or 
without acknowledging the original source) is wrong. 
 I confirm that the work submitted for assessment for the above course is my own unaided 
work except where I have explicitly indicated otherwise. 
 I have followed the required conventions in referencing the thoughts and ideas of others. 
 I understand that the University of the Witwatersrand may take disciplinary action against me 
if there is a belief that this in not my own unaided work or that I have failed to acknowledge 
the source of the ideas or words in my writing. 
 
Signature: _________________________  Date: ________________________ 
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ABSTRACT 
South Africa has myriad laws that address information security related issues.  One such law is the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002 (ECTA), which is highly regarded 
internationally.  A study, which forms the basis of this paper, found that not all provisions of this 
legislation that deal with information security are implemented by both the government and 
information security practitioners in corporate South Africa. The study found that the South African 
government has a relaxed approach to implementing some of the legal provisions regarding 
information security. The ECT Act agitates for the appointment of cyber inspectors who have powers 
to inspect, search and seize.  A magistrate or a judge may issue a warrant requested by the cyber 
inspector.  Although the legislation had good intentions, the government has not yet appointed the 
cyber inspectors.  Although the ECT Act was in part intended to curb the spam emails, the effect of 
the Act is practically very little.  The study also found that some of the information security laws are 
ambiguous, for example, the Patent Act. Some of the laws pertaining to information security are very 
old; they were in effect introduced before the Internet was used for commercial purposes.  These 
include the Merchandise Marks Act of 1941 and Copyright Act of 1978.   
 The findings of this study reflect that information security practitioners were not really familiar 
with the avalanche of information security related legislation.  Be that as it may, the contents of the IT 
policies from some of the organisations that participated in this study contain the provisions of 
legislation were catered for in the policies.  This should be attributed to the fact that although 
information security practitioners were not consciously trying to comply with legislation, they relied 
heavily on the international standards.  Most of these standards are in line with the requirements of the 
South African information security related legislation.  In other words, corporate information security 
policies are within the framework of the Constitution of the Republic and the applicable legislation by 
default.  They are not consistent with constitutional and legislative provisions by conscious effort on 
the part of the information security practitioners.  It is in this premise that this study contains a concept 
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model for legal compliance for information security at the corporate environment.  This model 
embodies the contribution of the study. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Information Security, Legislative Compliance, Information Security Policies, Model for Legal 
Compliance 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most organisations around the world as well as in South Africa have developed web sites for 
information and business related purposes.  Some of these Websites merely display information about 
the organisation, whilst others offer some interactivity with customers.  The Internet revolution is 
developing rapidly due to electronic commerce (e-commerce) (Mattord, 2007; Plotkin & Fagan, 
2003). It is on this premise that most organisations are striving to catch up.  De Kare-Silver (2001) and 
(Irwin, Yu, & Winsborough, 2008) noted that it is a daunting task for organisations to master the new 
environment.  He puts it this way: “There is a new game in town and it is now about learning and 
embracing the new factors for success.” However, ‘the new game in town’ has brought with it a 
number of challenges.  According to Chorafas (2001), the challenges brought by the Internet to the 
corporate environment include information security risks, threats and crime.  The bottom line is that 
rapid development of technology has an impact on business systems.  Negative forces of technology 
on businesses should be managed. 
 
 Negative challenges brought on by technology do not affect corporate actors only.  Other 
constituencies of business, particularly clients, are affected by the growth and diffusion of technology 
in business.  Increasingly, clients have to conduct transactions on the Internet, receive advice from 
Websites, and interact with business online.  The new culture, e-market, raises questions of security 
and trust. Chorafas (2001) claims that security is e-commerce’s Achilles heel.  Dugan, Egan, Kraus & 
Hancock (2003) report that the business-to-consumer component of e-commerce may be affected by 
reservations regarding security breaches.  On the other hand, the credit card is the most common 
online payment option and thus both e-commerce customers and merchants are vulnerable to 
potentially high levels of fraud due to stolen cards and illegally acquired card numbers (Boynton, 
2007; Chorafas, 2001:250).  Although new technical measures are being established to deal with 
online fraud, these techniques are not necessarily infallible; a perfect method of encrypting has not yet 
been developed (Bond, 2002:189).  It is on this premise that information security measures cannot be 
left to technical methods only (Bond, 2002:188).   
 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows – literature review, the research problem, the 
research methodology, findings of the study, concept model of legal compliance for information 
security at the corporate environment, and conclusion. For the purpose of this paper, the words 
Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), and Information Technology (IT) will be used 
synonymously.   
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
The literature review a brief overview of the issues that are related to e-commerce, information 
security threats, risks and crime, and legal and policy aspects of information security.  It also provides 
a brief legal framework of cyberlaw in the South African context. 
 
2.1 Information security risks, threats and crime 
The introduction mentioned the importance of using information resources.  Whilst information 
resources are essential in participating in e-commerce and the information economy, they are not 
exempt from risks, threats and crime (Vorster & Labuschagne, 2005; Targowski, 2003).  It is therefore 
advisable for any organisation that uses information resources to have the necessary information 
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security (Gupta, Chandrashekhar, Sabnis & Bastry, 2007; Collin, 1997). Information security provides 
e-commerce merchants and consumers with the safety and the sense of freedom from risks, threats and 
crime.  Feiler (2000) observes that in e-commerce four different places are involved, that is - the 
location of the user, the location of the Web server, the location of the Web owner and the virtual 
location of the site, and thus information security is an essential concern. Privacy is one of the 
challenges regarding information security (Tondel, Jaatun & Meland, 2008; Lobree, 2001).  This, 
according to Chorafas (2001), is a major problem to any financial transaction in the e-commerce 
environment.   
 
 The processing of e-commerce transactions raises the issue of information security.  Windham 
(1999) reports that during the early era of e-commerce, the Internet was generally regarded to be an 
unprotected medium.  This perception, rightfully so, continues to persist.  News of hackers and online 
fraudsters made headlines and led to fear amongst millions of potential electronic shoppers.  They 
thought the Internet was not a secure environment to provide confidential information.  This, 
according to Windham (1999), held the information economy back from even earlier advancement. 
Viruses and other forms of hostile code (malware) are universally experienced as an information 
security problem.  The infection rate continues to grow and this affects the e-commerce participants 
negatively (Champlain, 1998; Tirado, 2008).  Heiser (2001) reports that malware has the ability to 
penetrate firewalls, hijack Virtual Private Networks and also defeat digital signatures.  Aggressive 
code is the most well known source of security lapse.  Heiser (2001) lists several examples of 
malware.  These include worms, Trojan horses and macro viruses.  In view of these concerns 
information security is crucial in the business environment.  Below is a discussion on policy aspects to 
be considered for information security. 
 
2.2 Policy aspects to consider when providing information security 
It was mentioned in the previous section that some organisations post their information security 
policies on their Websites.  This demonstrates corporate diligence in explaining their commitment to 
online business security.  It was also stated that these policies deal with issues such as the usage of 
credit cards and other personal data.  Windham (1999) provides an example of how America Online 
posts a privacy policy on its Website regarding the kind of information it collects about people who 
visit its Website.  America Online also explains what it does or does not do with the collected personal 
data. Tudor (2001) reports that information security policy is formulated to inform all individuals who 
operate within an organisation regarding how they should conduct themselves when it comes to ICT 
information security issues.  In some instances policies are formulated because of regulatory 
requirements (Turner, 2000; Irwin, Yu & Winsborough, 2008).  Developing information security 
policies just for the sake of satisfying regulatory obligation is not good enough (Myers & Riela, 2008; 
Tudor, 2001).  Information security policy is used as a communication tool amongst the information 
system stakeholders (Champlain, 1998). Turner (2000:191) declared that the advancement of the 
information economy in terms of the e-commerce rapid growth puts an obligation on government and 
organisations to develop information security policies and regulatory solutions.  During this era of the 
information economy, information security policies will assist in providing users with security and 
privacy certainty (Champlain, 1998; Bhilare, Ramani & Tanwani, 2009).  Turner (2001) notes that the 
differences in policy approaches amongst key role players and countries make it difficult to provide a 
better information security policy and regulatory framework.  Although this difficulty takes place at 
macro level, it manifests itself at micro (organisational) level.  Whilst these can be regarded as generic 
policy aspects, below is a South African legal framework on e-commerce and information security. 
 
2.3 Legal framework of e-commerce and information security in South Africa 
There has been rapid use of e-commerce in South Africa; hence the need to develop legislation that 
would provide security to Internet consumers and merchants (Dunlop, 2005).  South African common 
law was not sufficiently addressing issues related to the security of electronic transactions (Goodburn 
& Ngoye, 2004).  According to Dunlop (2005), the South African government did not confine its 
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concern just to information security, but intended to provide a legal framework that would address 
security, transparency and infrastructural commercial development (Hofman et al. 1999).  The e-
commerce initiatives that are based on a sound legal framework would enable South Africa to become 
a leading technology power in the African continent (Dunlop, 2005).  It is on this basis that the South 
African Department of Communications established an ICT investment cluster in May 1998 to create a 
legislative framework on issues relating to e-commerce and information security (Groenewald, 2000).   
For focus purposes, the following is the research problem.  
 
3. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Legal and policy aspects are important in the provision of information security.  Although several 
authors have written about legal and policy aspects regarding information security in the South 
African context, none of them has explained how these aspects are used in the provision of 
information security in the South African corporate environment. The question arises as to whether the 
Constitution of the Republic (1996), the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002 
(2002), the King 2 Report (2002) and other information security related legislation at macro level and 
the organisations’ policies are used by South African organisations in their endeavours to protect their 
information resources.  
 
 Both the 2002 and 2004 website compliance surveys in South Africa “painted a bleak picture of 
non-compliance and general indifference towards laws and regulations governing websites and the 
online sale of goods and services in South Africa” (Buys Incorporated Attorneys, 2004).  In 2002 26% 
of South African website operators claimed that they were not aware of the compliance requirements.  
It is astonishing to note that this number increased in 2004 by 5% to 31% (Buys Incorporated 
Attorneys, 2004).   
 
 The failure to comply with the law, according to Buys Incorporated Attorneys (2004), has led to 
an increase in website crime: “During March 2002, a defamatory statement posted to the website of 
Kick-Off magazine, ended in the High Court.  A month later the Department of Health investigated an 
illegal online pharmacy in Table View and in June of the same year, the Gauteng Metro Police 
attempted to close down a website that warned motorists of speed traps around Johannesburg.”  The 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that most South African companies do not comply with the 
requirements of Chapter 7 and Part III of Chapter 3 of the ECT Act.  They do not seem to realise that 
failure to comply with the provisions of the law exposes their websites to huge risk and liability.  Of 
the 1 550 websites surveyed by Buys Incorporated Attorneys (2004), the Telkom website 
(www.telkom.co.za) was the only one to score a full 100% compliance rate.   
 
 Other than the aforesaid website compliance survey conducted by the Buys Incorporated 
Attorneys in 2002 and 2004, it appears there had never been any substantial study that focuses on the 
compliance of information security related legislation by organisations in South Africa. Moreover, it 
remains to be established whether the existing company policies are in line with the national and 
international legal regime.  The lack of results with regard to consideration of legal and policy aspects 
in the South African corporate environment seems to indicate the need for research in this field.  There 
is a gap in the literature as to how information security legal policy and legislation add value to the 
corporate environment within the South African corporate context.  The literature does not show if 
South African organisations are complying with the national legal and policy framework regarding 
information security. 
 
Within this context, following questions are posed: 
 How are South African companies employing legal and policy prescriptions to enhance 
information security? 
 To what extent do the South African legislation impacts on the endeavours to curb information 
security related problems? and 
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 To what extent are organisations in the South African integrating information security legal 
requirements into their policy formulation and implementation? 
  
3.1 Sampling and profile of the organisations 
Twenty-two organisations participated in this study. These organisations are from different industrial 
sectors.  These include IT, telecommunications, mining, services, academia and research, regulatory 
authorities, public administration, construction, insurance, and banking sectors. It is important to 
mention that the banking sector dominated all other industrial sectors.  This is because the four biggest 
banks in South Africa – namely Standard bank, First National Bank, Amalgamated Banks of South 
Africa, participated in this study. In addition to the aforesaid organisations, three organisations (IT 
governance consultancy and two law firms) were involved. Purpose sampling was employed since the 
participating organisations were purposefully selected due to the contribution they would add to the 
study. 
 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
This study used the generic techniques for qualitative data collection and analysis.  This study satisfied 
the principle if triangulation by employing multiple data-gathering methods and sources.  Data 
gathering methods include individual interviews, key informant interviews, observation, and policy 
documents analysis.  Interview protocols for both the individual and key informant interviews were 
semi-structured. Interviews were analysed by using open coding.  A frequent comparative method was 
applied to analyse data within and between interviews.  Content analysis was applied to analyse the 
content of interviews.  The process involved the instantaneous coding of raw data and the construction 
of categories. Data collected through document analysis was analysed by comparing it with the South 
African legal framework pertaining to information security.  
4. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
This section addresses findings that were obtained through interviews, documents analysis, and 
observation. 
 
4.1 Findings obtained through interview 
4.1.1 The Board of Directors are not involved in the formulation of information security 
policies 
This study found that the involvement of the Board of Directors in the establishment of the 
information security policies is very minimal or non-existence.  This is in conflict with the spirit of 
good cooperate governance as espoused by the King II and Draft King Reports.  This was confirmed 
by a Senior Lecturer at a South African university, an expert in information security law: “King III will 
have more IT governance provisions.  IT governance and security will become the responsibility of the 
Board of Directors.  According to the Draft King III, IT security is an important element of the overall 
business efficiency and sustainability.”  This study found that policies in all 22 organisations that 
participated in this study are actually approved at the Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) level.  The 
CIO would convene an ICT Steering Committee which is constituted by representatives from various 
departments.  The problem is that most of these representatives are actually not really senior.  This 
shows that most organisations do not take information security seriously.  However in the Draft King 
III Report, information security policies should be approved by the Board and that the IT Steering 
Committee should be chaired by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and “all Group Executives are 
expected to serve in the IT Steering Committee.”   Therefore, flouting this provision demonstrates 
deviance from compliance requirement. 
 
4.1.2  Very few organisations in South Africa incorporates legislation requirements in the 
information security policies 
Legislation in South Africa has a lot of impact in policy formulation.  A certain information security 
legal expert had observed that: “The problem is that very few IT security experts and practitioners are 
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conscious about this.  Technology people are more familiar with the standards; unfortunately there is 
myriad of legislation and governance internationally and in South Africa.”  In South Africa, one of the 
crucial pieces of legislation is the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002.  This Act 
deals with the removal of legal barriers to electronic transactions and provides security framework for 
both the merchants and buyers. The legal expert continued: “You would expect most information 
security practitioners to be familiar with sections that deal with security related aspects in this Act, 
but unfortunately very few security experts and practitioners incorporate the Act’s security 
requirements in the IT policies.  I really think this is highly irregular because it exposes consumers 
who use websites of the companies that are not integrating the requirements of the Act for e-commerce 
purposes.”  A Johannesburg-based Managing Director of the IT legal firm concurred: “One of the 
observations that I have made is that people buy batches of the policies and they do ISO compliance, 
for instance ‘2700’ and they will immediately implement those policies rather than drafting the 
policies based on legislation.”  Most IT departments are aware that they should have information 
security policies but they do not have the awareness to actually make the policies relevant to them, 
“they’d rather purchase just broad generated policies and apply those.”  This means that corporate 
security executives are not diligent in the execution of security mandate.  In addition, they are lax, lack 
commitment and are characterised by unprofessional demeanour.  This account of security 
professionals and approach to their vocation permeated overwhelmingly during the data collection 
stage. 
 
 During an interview with the Information Security Officer of an agency which provides IT 
services to the whole provincial government, she indicated that legal department or outside lawyers 
were not involved in four of their information security related policies and there was no effort to 
ensure that these policies integrate the legislation requirements.  However, she emphasised that the 
drafting of their Records Management Policy and Data Retention Schedule is guided by the legal 
requirements.  An Information Security Manager in one of the biggest mobile telecommunications 
network in South Africa and the African continent, confirmed that when the IT department drafts the 
security policies they “don’t consciously look at the legislation and try and mend that scientifically 
against, for example, the Promotion of Access to Information Act.”  However, interestingly they 
“relied on the legal department to do that and I think to some extent they did review that and made 
sure that it was compliant to legislation.” 
 
4.1.3 Legal provisions to fight cyber crime are redundant 
Some of the South African information legal information security provisions were highly acclaimed 
when they were introduced, but unfortunately they are not yet implemented.  These include provisions 
to prevent viruses, hacking, and industrial espionage.  Provisions to fight against the aforesaid IT 
related crimes are contained in Chapter 8 of the ECT Act of 2002.  Hacking, industrial espionage, 
viruses, spam emails and other cyber related crimes are characterised by an unauthorised access to, 
interception of or interference with data and thus they are supposed to be tackled by cyber inspectors.  
A Senior Lecturer who specialises in information security law said the provision for the cyber cops is: 
“Articulated in Chapter 12 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act.”  It is unfortunate 
that this provision has not yet been implemented even though the Act was passed more seven years 
ago. 
 
 After realising that cell phones were contributing to the commission of criminal activities, law 
makers in South Africa established the ‘Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision 
of Communication-related Information Act, 2002’.  Amongst other things, this Act stipulates that the 
buyers of the pre-paid SIM cards should be registered by cell phones network operators so that the law 
enforcement agencies could identify them if and when their cell numbers are used to plan or to commit 
crime.  A legal expert indicated that: “the Department of Justice will announce a date in which the 
registration of the people who buy SIM cards commences.  The delay in implementing this requirement 
is not justifiable, especially when you consider the fact that the Act was passed in 2002.” 
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 Chapter 10 of the ECT Act agitates for the establishment of the Cryptography Providers.  This is 
one the legal measures to prevent IT related crimes.  Cryptography concerns itself with the hiding of 
information.  In an email communication the message would get encrypted and impossible to read by 
an intruder.  The whole message will be gibberish. “To date the Director General of Communications 
has not yet established a register of Cryptography Providers.” 
 
4.1.4 Legal provision that deal with unsolicited communication has serious loophole 
Unsolicited emails, famously known as spam emails, are addressed in Chapter 7 of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act of 2002.  This Chapter of the aforesaid Act deals with 
consumer protection.  The spam emails are dealt with in Clause 45 which prohibits unsolicited 
commercial communications to the consumers.  However, during the interviews, interviewees 
indicated that this prohibition is not effective.  Sellers of the goods, products and services are using a 
loophole in the Act to send chains of unsolicited messages to the consumers: “The Act says the sender 
should give the recipient an option to cancel the subscription.  However, consumers are ignorant and 
thus they are flooded with spam emails.  In real essence, the first email that is sent is unsolicited, but it 
is legal because it gives the recipient an option to opt out.  Usually, recipients don’t opt out and thus 
the subsequent emails cannot be defined as unsolicited because the consumer is deemed to have opted 
to receive the adverts since he did not opt out.  This is entirely within the law.” The problem is that 
most banking clients in South have received unsolicited emails which were attached with viruses and 
spyware.  
 
4.2 FINDINGS OBTAINED THROUGH DOCUMENT COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Information security related policies were collected from 16 of the 22 organisations that participated in 
this study.  The collected policies were analysed against information security related legislation.  It is 
important to state that only half of the 16 companies whose policies were analysed have integrated 
information security legal provisions into their policies.  Two of the eight companies that have 
integrated legislation in their policies had only incorporated legislation requirements in their Records 
Retention Schedules; the rest of their information security policies do not make any reference to any 
law.  Paragraphs below provide results of the document analysis. 
 
4.2.1 Policies regarding hacking 
Hacking has much to do with access control.  This is addressed in our Information Security Policy, 
and Interception & Surveillance Policy.  The relevant legislations are the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act; Electronic Communications and Transactions Act; and the Interception Act.   
 
4.2.2 Policies regarding intellectual property, copyright, and trademarks 
Intellectual Property is gradually becoming an important asset amongst the South African companies.  
According to the information contained in the few collected policies, it includes assets such as, but not 
limited to – ‘websites content, website source code, software developed within a particular company, 
software developed by employees, product packaging, trademarks, domain names, marketing 
information, and the like’. Copyright is addressed by the Intellectual Property Policy. The objective of 
this policy is to formulate a framework for the establishment, protection, registration, maintenance, 
management and use of ICT Intellectual Property. This policy is applicable to all employees, third 
parties, external contractors, and ICT Intellectual Property related contracts entered into by employees 
acting on behalf of the organization. The relevant legislation is the Intellectual Property Law 
Amendment Act of 1997, Copyright Act of 1978, Merchandise Marks Act of 1941.   The problem is 
that some of the aforementioned laws are very old and were introduced before the Internet was used 
for commercial purposes. Other relevant policies for the intellectual property, copyright and 
trademarks are the Information Security Policy and the Data Privacy Policy. It is a matter of extreme 
concern to note that the majority of the organizations that participated in this study do not have 
policies that address the protection of intellectual property, copyright and trademarks. 
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4.2.3  Policies regarding patents rights 
None of the companies that participated in this study had a separate policy on patents.  Actually, only 
three organizations addressed the patents protection as part of the intellectual property policy.  The 
researcher concluded that this could be due to the fact that most companies that participated in this 
study perceive the South African patent law to be ineffective.  According to the Patents Act of 1978, 
computer programmes cannot be patented; however, companies are patenting these programmes 
anyway.  In other words, Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO), an organ 
of the state responsible for patents registration – does not respect the Act responsible for patents. 
 
4.3 Findings obtained through observation 
 
The researcher investigated the websites of the 22 organizations that participated in this study.  The 
purpose of the observation was to determine if the websites complied with the following information 
security legal requirements: availability of legal notice, terms and conditions available as hyperlinks, 
liability disclaimers available as hyperlinks, compliance with the provisions of Chapter 3, Part II and 
Chapter 7 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, positioning and implementing 
legal notice correctly, availability of legal notice that is printable or saveable as required by section 
11(3) of Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, and availability of policies that address 
websites legal compliance.  Table 1 below reflects the findings of the observation. 
 
Table 1: Number of organizations that are compliant with the legislation governing 
websites and e-commerce. 
ASPECT OBSERVED NUMBER 
Websites with legal notices at all 17 
Websites with terms and conditions available as hyperlinks 7 
Websites with liability disclaimers available as hyperlinks 11 
Websites with legal notices that address the provisions of Chapter 3, Part II 
and Chapter 7 of the ECT Act 
5 
Websites that position and implement legal notices correctly 2 
Website legal notices that are printable or  saveable as required by section 
11(3) of the ECT Act 
2 
Organizations that have policies that address websites legal compliance 5 
  
From Table 1 above, one deduces that most companies in South Africa are not complying with the 
legal requirements of the websites.  This may expose the consumers to cyber crime during electronic 
transactions.  It appears most IT and information security practitioners are not familiar with the 
requirements of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002 regarding consumer 
protection.  Although 17 out 21 websites that were observed have legal notices, their legal notices are 
very elementary in nature.  These legal notices, and/or ‘terms and conditions’ do not make provisions 
regarding some of the following legal requirements – ‘definitions and interpretation, allowed usage 
and license, intellectual property rights and domain name use, software and equipment, disclosures 
required by section 43 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, changes and 
amendments, privacy, hyperlinks to third parties, security, disclaimer and limitation of liability, 
removal and correction of content, interception of communications, entire agreement and severability, 
agreement in terms of Section 21 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, applicable 
and governing law, and legal costs’.  Irrefutably, table 1 conclusively show limited, partial 
compliance.  In some websites there is not attempt to comply with relevant policies at all. 
 
5. CONCEPT MODEL OF LEGAL COMPLIANCE FOR INFORMATION SECURITY 
AT THE CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT 
 
This section suggests a model whereby legal requirements are incorporated into the information 
security endeavours – policy formulation, implementation, and monitoring.  This model is an 
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intellectual property of the writers and can be seen as a synthesis of theory, practice and cognitive 
perspectives gained over the years of practical experience. The model was necessitated by the main 
finding of this study which reveals that both the government and corporate South Africa were not 
implementing some of the information security legal provisions.  This model may be very useful to 
policy formulators, directors of the boards, ICT executives, and information security practitioners. A 
graphic representation of the model reflected in Figure 1 
Make ICT strategic 
pronouncement. These 
would include information 
security within the corporate 
governance framework.
Identify relevant 
information security 
legislation, standard and 
related governance 
compliance duties.
Integrate legislation and 
compliance duties into ICT 
and Information Security
Allocate duties to business 
units and for individual 
position
Audit compliance and 
identity gaps attend to gaps 
and monitor compliance.
Each employee signs the 
consent form, new 
employee sign this as part of 
the employment contract
Approve the policies and 
delegation of duties. Gives 
go ahead for the 
implementation.
All employees are receiving 
education and training on 
Information security 
policies
 
Figure 1: A concept of legal compliance for Information security policies 
formulation, implementation and multitasking. 
 
  
According to the Draft King III Report, IT strategic planning, risk management and information 
security is the primary responsibilities of the Board of Directors.  One does not expect the Board to be 
involved in a detailed process regarding the formulation of the information security policies, but they 
should rather make broader pronouncements within the business strategic direction and sustainability, 
corporate governance, standards, and legislation framework.  The Draft King III advices that there 
should be an ICT Steering Committee at the enterprise’s executive level.  This ICT Steering 
Committee will include all executives in the organisations and chaired by the CEO.  It is the 
researchers’ contention that relevant information security and related compliance duties should be 
identified at this level.  Once this has been done, the next step will be the ICT Department. 
 
 The ICT Department is headed by the CIO.  According the Draft King III Report, the CIO must 
be business oriented and must be an interface between IT and business. S/he would obviously serve in 
the ICT Steering Committee and thus s/he take the identified information security legal provisions and 
related compliance duties and translate them into information security policies.  The drafted 
information security policies will then be taken by the CIO to the ICT Steering Committee for 
consideration and comment.  The Steering Committee will allocate duties business units and/or 
individual positions.  The policies will then be taken to the Board’s Sub-Committee for Risk 
Management for approval.   All employees will then be trained regarding the information security 
policies.  They will also be asked to sign the acceptance forms.  The Board’s Sub-Committee on Risk 
Management will audit compliance and identify gaps.  Thus, the overall intention of the model is to 
prioritise information security, elevate the profit of business security, and ultimately address corporate 
security lapses. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
There are more than ten laws that deal with information security in South Africa.  The title of this 
paper poses a very thought proving question – are these laws effective enough in addressing 
information security challenges in corporate environment?  The answer is no. Information security 
provisions that are contained in certain laws are not yet implemented.  There is also a deliberate 
disregard of the information security legal provisions by some companies and the government entities.  
It was reported in this paper that most IT and information security practitioners were not familiar with 
the information security legal requirements. It is perhaps in this premise that most South African 
companies do not comply with the requirements of the law regarding information security related 
matters.  
 
 In some instances the attitude of the South African government towards its own laws has been 
lukewarm.  The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002, agitate for the appointment 
of cyber inspectors who have powers to inspect, search and seize.  A magistrate or a judge may issue a 
warrant requested by the cyber inspector.  Although the legislator had good intentions, the government 
has not yet appointed the cyber inspectors.  This paper reported the confusion related to the legality of 
the of the software patents in this country.  This matter should be brought to the attention of the 
legislators. Some of the laws pertaining to information security are very old; they were in effect 
introduced before the Internet was used for commercial purposes.  These include the Merchandise 
Marks Act of 1941; Copyright Act of 1978; and the Patents Act of 1978.  Having said all these, one 
would conclude that although information security and the legislation thereof do not reflect a perfect 
marriage; their marriage, with its imperfections, remains necessary. 
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Abstract  
Information for individual organisations should always be secured. Organisations need to 
protect their information from attackers or competitors as these could lead to law suits or loss 
of business. With the more advanced network technology, information security risks and 
threats are believed to be on the increase and becoming even more sophisticated. This paper 
assesses how South African organisations integrate legal and policy aspects when they deal 
with information security issues. Qualitative research methods were employed to gather and 
analyse data for the study. Results show that participation by top management in the provision 
of information security policies is very minimal in organisations. Again, most information 
security practitioners are not familiar with the legal and policy aspects that they are supposed 
to integrate in the implementation of information security and thus most organisations in the 
country are not complying with the law. 
 
KEY WORDS 
Security risks, South African, organisations, information security polices, legal compliance 
 
Introduction 
In South Africa, as in many other countries, many organisations have developed websites for 
information and business related purposes (Beatty, Reat, Dick, & Miller, 2011; Bond, 2002). While 
some of the organisations have their websites merely display information about the organisation, 
others have gone further to offer interactivity with clients. However, research shows that there are 
challenges, brought by the Internet to the corporate environment, which are exacerbated by 
information security risks, threats and crime (Fumey-Nassah 2007; Sha, 2008, Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010). 
Organisations need to protect their information from attackers or competitors as these could lead to 
law suits or loss of business. In other words, information for the organisation should always be secure.  
Information Security refers to “measures adopted to prevent the unauthorized use, misuse, 
modification, or denial of use of knowledge, facts data or capabilities” (Maiwald 2004:4). Put 
differently, it is the preventative measures put in place to guard information and capabilities hence 
keeping these safe from threats and any exploitation (ibid). While it may be argued that there are 
several kinds of information security issues; and that different security problems may lead to different 
legal issues, and may need different management intervention and policies, it is not the aim of this 
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paper to focus on a specific information security issue. This paper tries to understand what South 
African organizations are doing regarding integration of information security legal requirements into 
their policy formulation and implementation 
South African organizations and their clients are not immune to cybercrime (Bruns & Huth, 2011; 
Dunlop, 2005).  The South African government therefore passed the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act, No. 25 of 2002.  The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (King II Report) 
(2002) also deals with information security issues.  Prior to the proclamation of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act, No. 25 of 2002 and the King II Report, South African e-
commerce merchants and customers relied on common law (Dunlop, 2005).  The legislation that was 
introduced has given e-commerce participants confidence in transacting over the Internet (Venter, 
2005; Tran, 2010). However, there are no studies undertaken yet to assess how South African 
organisations integrate legal and policy aspects when they deal with information security issues. This 
study, therefore, aims at investigating such aspects. Thus the study attempts to answer the question: 
To what extent are organisations in South Africa integrating information security legal 
requirements into their policy formulation and implementation? 
 
To answer the question, the study employed a qualitative research approach.  One-on-one interviews, 
websites analysis, and document analysis were techniques used to gather data.  Results of the study 
show that the participation of the Board of Directors in the provision of information security policies is 
very minimal. Again, most information security practitioners are not familiar with the legal and policy 
aspects that they are supposed to integrate in the implementation of information security and thus most 
organisations in the country are not complying with the law.  It is therefore recommended that 
governance aspects of ICTs should be taken seriously by the Board of Directors and other responsible 
structures and should be given priority due to their technical nature.  Nonetheless, there should be an 
interrogation to the alignment of the ICT strategy to the overall business strategy and the impact of 
ICT in the sustainability of the organization. 
 
Significance of the study 
This study may provide important insights into the future application of legal and policy aspects in the 
provision of information security in the South African corporate environment.  Companies, Boards of 
Directors, ICT executives, information security practitioners, e-commerce participants, and policy 
formulators may use the findings of this study as a resource and guide.  It is envisaged that the 
findings and recommendations of this study may be transferable and applicable to other contexts and 
countries.  The study will contribute both theoretically and practically in achieving compliance with 
legislation when implementing information security.The originality of the contribution of this study to 
the academic and industry knowledge-base has benefited from an additional contextualised corporate 
description that can enhance the understanding of the intricacies of making use of legislation to 
improve information security in South African organisations. 
 
Problems with Information Security 
Threats on Information Security, have increased dramatically in the past few years; especially with the 
more advanced network technology the threats are believed to be on the increase and becoming even 
more sophisticated (Mlangeni & Biermann, 2005; Johnston and Warkentin 2010). In line with this 
argument, is Kyobe (2005: 2) who argues that computational models are overly complex and therefore 
require an enormous amount of historical data, but, unfortunately, this is not always available in some 
organisations. He further argued that “while information confidentiality, integrity and availability have 
been emphasized in most models, the evolving nature of threats and technology makes use of these 
three critical aspects of information security, alone, inadequate” (ibid). Other researchers are also of 
the opinion that “a sufficiently big set of historic cases must be available for significant probability 
calculations” (Canal 2005:3). 
Maiwald (2004:11) notes that new technologies have simply evolved much faster than security 
measures put in place; hence it is difficult if not impossible to assure that something is secured. He 
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therefore suggests that, as the industry continues to search for the final answers, individuals and 
organizations have to define security as best as they can. This means organizations need to exercise 
due care and due diligence in the management of their information systems. According to Harris 
(2003) “Due care are steps that are taken to show that a company has taken responsibility for the 
activities that take place within the corporation and has taken the necessary steps to help protect the 
company, its resources, and employees. Due diligence refers to the continual activities that make sure 
the protection mechanisms are continually maintained and operational”. This means responsible 
parties should ensure that due care actions that can be verified or measured are put in place.  Due 
diligence requires ongoing actions whereby individuals or organizations actually have hands on things 
to guard and maintain preventative processes (Harris, 2003; Chai, Kim & Rao, 2010). 
 
Measures to deal with information security threats 
The protective measures against password cracking are similar to those used for traditional password 
cracking.  Skoudis (2004) and Doinea (2009) advised that weak passwords should be eradicated from 
the system.  Nowadays it should be made more difficult for the hacker to guess the password than it 
was years ago when there were no distributed passwords (Logan & Clarkson, 2005; Summer, 2009).  
The information security management should establish a policy that compels users to create passwords 
that are longer than a minimum length (Micco & Rossman, 2002; Bala, 2008).  The aforementioned 
statement proves that technical defence measures should be based on a policy framework rather than 
just employment of protective technologies.  According to Skoudis (2004; Savola, 2007), the 
information security staff should occasionally run a password-cracking tool against their users’ 
passwords to distinguish the weak ones before the hacker does.  Should the weak passwords be found, 
there should be an approved procedure to rectify this.  Users should be educated regarding the 
selection of better passwords. 
 
To deal with the distributed denial-of-service attacks, the information security personnel should ensure 
that critical network connections have enough bandwidth and redundancy to prevent easy attacks 
(Manion and Goodrum, 2000).  Skoudis (2004) and Katz (2006) reported that lower connection speeds 
can easily be overwhelmed by the attacker.  The distributed denial-of-service attacks cannot just be 
eliminated by having sufficient bandwidth; additional techniques for dealing with these attacks should 
be employed (Nolan & Levesque, 2005:33).  This includes the installation of intrusion detection 
systems to foresee a possible attack (Sukhai, 2004 and Kesh, 2007).  Skoudis (2004:136) described the 
intrusion detection systems as network burglar alarms – “listening to the network for traffic that 
matches common attack signatures stored in the [intrusion detection system’s] database. 
 
Skoudis (2004) and, Fenz and Ekelhart (2009) claimed that the best protective measure against 
distributed port scanning is to close down all redundant services in your network.  Most  relay attacks 
take place outside an organisation’s own network and thus there is little you can do to stop such 
attacks.  It is therefore necessary to ensure that systems are protected by applying security patches and 
closing down all unrelated services (Stoecklin-Serino, 2009).  The aforementioned assertions once 
more proves that technical measures are not the panacea for ICT security problems.  It is therefore 
necessary to work together with law enforcement officers in dealing with the relay attacks.  Equally, 
data that is transmitted across the network should be encrypted to prevent active sniffing attacks 
(Summers and Bosworth, 2004; Braz, Fernandez and VanHilst, 2008).  The best way of dealing with 
these kinds of attacks is to empower users to employ certain tools, both from a technical and an 
awareness perspective.  Again, this proves that technology measures cannot be useful in the absence of 
policy and legal protective defence mechanisms (Zhang, Deng, Li, Wu, Sun, & Deng, 2011; Deane, 
Ragsdale, Rakes, & Rees, 2009).  
 
Policies and awareness 
The ICT ethically related risks, threats and crimes are difficult to counter.  This should be attributed to 
the fact that usually the technical security controls are not effective as protection mechanisms 
(Schneider, 2000:32; Lamprecht, 2004).  Ethical problems such as social engineering, for example, are 
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attacks targeting the human element (Berti and Rogers, 2004:152; Chang, Wang & Shen, 2010).  It is 
on this basis that protective measures need to focus on administrative security defenses (Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010).  These measures are constituted by policies, users’ awareness and education. 
Schneider (2000:30) agitated that policies should be introduced and publicised to the whole enterprise 
as a measure to counter ethically related problems.  Policies are very useful in providing guidelines on 
how people should behave.  
  
The research approach 
This study employed a qualitative approach whereby one-on-one semi-structured interviews, websites 
analysis and document analysis were techniques used to collect data  The reason for using the 
qualitative approach is that respondents could constitute a rich and valuable source of information 
(Kalof, Dan & Dietz, 2008; Devers & Frankel, 2000). Again, qualitative data collection techniques 
such as interviews help in exploring the meanings of situations, and uncertainties which may not be 
accessible in quantitative techniques. 
 
Participants and sampling 
Forty-five South African organisations were both purposively and conveniently included in the study 
(Cresswell, 2007; Merriam, 1998).  The sampling was purposive in that participants were chosen 
based on the contribution that they could make to the study.  That is, those which seem to be data-rich 
cases for an in-depth study were selected as participants (Blaxte, Hughes & Tight, 2010; Bless & 
Higson-Smith, 1995). The sampling was convenient in that only those situate in South Africa were 
targeted to reduce travel and other communication expenses as the researchers were based in the 
country. Organisations involved in the study came from different industrial sectors such as banking, 
transport, online retail, hotel, broadcasting, and telecommunications. These included the energy, 
mining, insurance, banking, telecommunication and services industrial sectors.  In addition to 
information security practitioners and executives in the South African corporate environment, the 
study also involved cyber law and information security experts. 
 
Data collection techniques  
This study used generic techniques for qualitative data collection and analysis (Walliman, 2001; 
Blaxter et al. 2010). The study satisfied the principle of triangulation by employing multiple data-
gathering methods and sources (Maswera, Edwards, & Dawson, 2009; Walsham, 2006). Data-
gathering methods included semi-structured interviews, websites analysis, and documents analysis. 
The interview was a particularly suitable data collection method for the environment concerned, and 
made it possible to gather useful information concerning the types of research questions (Hanford, 
2009; Dey, 1993; Dargie, 1998).  Interviews provided the opportunity for direct contact with the 
participants in the study, and the ability to obtain facts directly from the research participants. 
Websites analysis was used as a data collection method to determine websites’ legal compliance.  This 
was achieved by analysing the websites of all organisations that participated in this study.  
 
Some data in this study was collected through document analysis (Rowlands, 2005). The study 
regarding the legal and policy aspects in the provision of information security cannot be investigated 
without doing document analysis.  The reason is that both legal and policy documents should be 
analysed.  The analysis revealed the causal link between them and how they impacted the provision of 
information security in the South African corporate environment.   
 
Data analysis 
Data gained from interviews was analysed using open coding (Cresswell, 2007). A frequent 
comparative method was applied to analyse data within and between interviews (Merriam, 1998; 
Henning, Van Rensburg & Smit, 2004). The process involved going through the interview data while 
marking important sections and adding code to it. While continuing with the process of analysing the 
data by breaking down into distinct ideas and/or events, any important information in the process was 
labeled. The names of the labels were decided by the researcher in the study based on his knowledge 
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of the topic as well as considering what was in the content (data). After coding the interview data, the 
researcher did analysis of the coded data to determine similarities and group them into categories 
according to their common properties  
 
In a nutshell, content analysis was applied to analyse the content of interview data. The process 
involved the instantaneous coding of raw data and the construction of categories (Kalof et al. 2008; 
Merriam, 1998). Data was analysed with the intention to distinguish common patterns and to put 
together categories; these was weighed against the literature and legislation (Leedy & Ormorod, 2005; 
Bell, 2006).  Data collected through document analysis was analysed by comparing it with the South 
African legal framework pertaining to information security. Content analysis was also used to analyse 
the legislation and policy documents from the South African companies which participated in this 
study.  
 
Trustworthiness  
The trustworthiness of this study was guaranteed by fulfilling the needs of triangulation by using 
various data-gathering methods and sources (Kalof et al. 2008). Moreover, trustworthiness was 
ensured by using both internal and external validities (Bell, 2006). Internal validity was applied by 
comparing the research findings with actuality of information security in the South African corporate 
environment (Merriam, 1998).  External validity was accomplished by providing adequately complete 
descriptions of the context of the study for the reader to compare with other situations (Merriam, 1998; 
Leedy & Ormorod, 2005).  
 
Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations were observed in this study although some readers may not view this work as 
sensitive research.   Research participants, both at organisational and individual levels, were asked to 
take part in this study.  The requests were conveyed though e-mail letters.  Virtually all research 
participants who accepted to be involved this study approved in writing. Nonetheless, interviewees 
were at liberty to pull out from the study at any time, with no compulsion to give any explanation.  We 
undertook all measures to ensure that organisations and individuals participating in the study were not 
caused any harm by doing so; hence we made a commitment to assign a pseudonym to all participants 
to safeguard their identity and to ensure that any information revealed, either personal or professional, 
would be treated as completely confidential. 
 
Findings and discussions 
Data analysis yielded three main themes, namely: the attitude of corporate South Africa towards 
information security legislation; the manner in which organisations in South Africa integrate legal 
aspects in their information security policies; and users’ knowledge regarding information security 
policies.   
 
The attitude of corporate South Africa towards information security legislation 
This study found the attitude towards the legal aspects of information security in the South African 
corporate environment to be negative.  The Board of Directors in most of the companies that 
participated in this study did not provide leadership in the formulation of information security policies.  
Most organisations in South do not incorporate the requirements of legislation in their information 
security policies.   
 
The Board of Directors is not involved in the formulation of information security policies 
This study found that the involvement of the Board of Directors in the establishment of the 
information security policies is very minimal or non-existent.  This is in conflict with the spirit of good 
corporate governance as espoused by the King III Report.  This was confirmed by a Senior Lecturer 
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who is an expert in information security law in a Law School of one of the prominent South African 
universities:  
“King III has more IT governance provisions.  IT governance and security are the 
responsibility of the Board of Directors.  According to the King III Report, IT security is an 
important element of the overall business efficiency and sustainability.”  
  
Analysis of the data collected shows that policies in the organisations are actually approved at the 
Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) level.  The CIO would convene an ICT Steering Committee which 
is constituted by representatives from various departments.  The problem is that most of these 
representatives are actually not really senior.  This shows that most organisations do not take 
information security seriously.  However in the King III Report, it is noted that information security 
policies should be approved by the Board and that the IT Steering Committee should be chaired by the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and “all Group Executives are expected to serve in the IT Steering 
Committee.”   Therefore, flouting this provision demonstrates deviance from compliance requirement. 
 
 Very few organisations in South Africa incorporate legislation requirements in their information 
security policies 
Legislation in South Africa has a lot of impact on policy formulation.  According to his observations, 
one information security legal expert narrated the following:  
The problem is that very few IT security experts and practitioners are conscious about this.  
Technology people are more familiar with the standards; unfortunately there is myriad of 
legislation and governance internationally and in South Africa. 
 
In South Africa, one of the crucial pieces of legislation is the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act of 2002.  This Act deals with the removal of legal barriers to electronic transactions 
and provides a security framework for both the merchants and buyers. A Johannesburg-based 
Managing Director of an IT legal firm concurred:  
One of the observations that I have made is that people buy batches of the policies and they 
do ISO compliance, for instance ‘2700’ and they will immediately implement those policies 
rather than drafting the policies based on legislation. 
 
 Most IT departments are aware that they should have information security policies but they do not 
have the awareness to actually make the policies relevant to them, “they’d rather purchase just broad 
generic policies and apply those.”  This means that corporate security executives are not diligent in the 
execution of their security mandate.  In addition, they are lax, lack commitment and are characterised 
by unprofessional demeanour.  This account of security professionals and their approach to their 
vocation permeated overwhelmingly during the data collection stage. 
 
Government slowness in implementing information security laws impacts the corporate 
environment’s attitude towards legislation 
Analysis also shows that the attitude of corporate South Africa towards the implementation of 
information security laws is partly affected by the manner in which government performs its 
responsibilities towards the implementation and improvement of the legislation.  Certain provisions in 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 have not yet been implemented despite the 
fact that the legislation was promulgated approximately nine years ago.  Nevertheless, South African 
banks have dedicated teams of information security professionals who ‘combat’ Internet related 
crimes.  After noticing clients’ concerns regarding Internet and Cellphone Banking crime, banks have 
responded to crime forcefully and with a lot of superiority; to prevent financial losses and reputational 
damage.  a Managing Executive of Digital Banking Channels said:  
We ensure that we have got monitoring systems, behaviour pattern analysis, and early 
warning systems For example, if a spoofing site is picked up worldwide on the Internet or a 
phishing email goes out, we typically shut the site down within 45 minutes to two hours.  It 
doesn’t matter where it sits in the world. 
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Banks are also available 24 hours a day to help their customers in case they suspect their Internet 
Banking accounts are being defrauded.  They ensure that transactions via Internet Banking are taking 
place in an encrypted environment.  It is not possible for criminals to intercept encrypted transactions.  
We also noted that banks were more compliant with the information security aspects of the legislation 
than all other industrial sectors that participated in this study.  A researcher attached to a security 
institute argued that the South African banks had no choice but to comply with the legal aspects of 
information security:  
They are however motivated by business considerations rather than solely being loyal to 
what the legislation prescribes.  Companies in other industrial sectors don’t have huge 
volumes of transactions on the Internet like the banking sector has.  Consequently, they have 
very little interest in establishing organs like SABRIC (South African banking Risk 
Information Centre) or establishing their own sophisticated teams to fight Internet related 
crimes.   
 
The Head of Enterprise Information Architecture, whose company is the hotel industry, concurred:  
We work with the government through the Business Against Crime initiative, but the 
government should take leadership when it comes to information security crimes, otherwise 
companies in South African will end up operating paramilitary entities and that is not good 
in a constitutional state; I mean we are not in the business of securing the country; we are 
hoteliers. You can argue that the government is actually breaking the law by delaying the 
implementation of certain aspects of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act.   
 
The registration of cellphone SIM cards as required by law was done after seven years of the 
promulgation of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
related Information Act, 2002’.  Criminals in the Internet sphere are getting very sophisticated and the 
government should ensure that the legislation is updated and implemented in line with the changing 
times.  Therefore, it may be argued that failure by the government to appear to be taking its laws 
seriously has negative ramifications on the attitude of corporate South Africa towards information 
security legislation.  
 
The manner in which South African organisations integrate legal aspects in their information 
security policies 
From the analysis, this theme reflects that the delegation of trademark responsibilities is not well 
defined; legal provisions that deal with unsolicited communication have serious loopholes. 
 
The delegation of the trademark responsibilities is not well defined 
Even in organisations wherein the protection of trademarks have been incorporated in policies; the 
responsibility of implementing them are not defined and this has the potential of rendering the policy 
redundant.   In a certain car hire company, the IT Department has initiated the establishment of the 
Intellectual Property Policy which, amongst other things, caters for the trademarks:  
Although we have this kind of policy, it is important to stress that we don’t regard things 
like websites and trademarks to be part of the IT Department’s domain; they actually 
belong to the Corporate Communications and Marketing Department.  The problem with 
our Corporate Communications and Marketing Department is that it is very lousy. 
 
The lack of clear delegation of authority has other serious ramifications.  It was found that even the 
top management of a certain hotel associated the web sites, Intranet and the related organisational 
trademarks that appear in these sites to be the responsibility of the IT Department.  We viewed this to 
be highly problematic because then these issues are misplaced.  This includes the budget thereof. 
 
Legal provision that deals with unsolicited communication has a serious loophole 
Unsolicited emails, famously known as spam emails, are addressed in Chapter 7 of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act No. 25 of 2002.  This Chapter of the aforesaid Act deals with 
consumer protection.  The spam emails are dealt with in Clause 45 which prohibits unsolicited 
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commercial communications to the consumers.  However, interviewees indicated that this prohibition 
is not effective.  Sellers of the goods, products and services are using a loophole in the Act to send 
chains of unsolicited messages to the consumers.  The Head of Internet Channel in one of the banks 
noted that: 
The Act says the sender should give the recipient a choice to stop the subscription.  
However, consumers are uninformed and thus they are swamped with spam emails.  In 
real essence, the first email that is sent is unsolicited, but it is legal because it gives the 
recipient an option to opt out.  Usually, recipients don’t opt out and thus the subsequent 
emails cannot be defined as unsolicited because the consumer is deemed to have opted 
to receive the adverts since he did not opt out.  This is entirely within the law.  
 
The problem is that most banking clients in South Africa have received unsolicited emails which were 
attached with viruses and spyware. In addition, it was also noted that South African Copyright law is 
very old; the implementation of the Privacy Bill has been delayed; the patents law is ineffective; and 
the provisions regarding the prevention of malicious code are difficult to implement. 
 
The level of users’ knowledge of information security policies 
The word ‘user’ in this study refers to the information systems users such as employees, independent 
contractors, service providers, consultants, and all personnel affiliated with third parties who are based 
in the relevant company.  It is therefore imperative for employees to be familiar with the information 
security policies and, by implication, the legal requirements.  It would be a futile exercise for any 
organisation to have policies that are not known and complied with by the targeted information 
systems users.   
 
Analysis of the data shows that some users perceive information security policies as a nuisance 
because they curtail their freedom to certain things in the information systems.  Again users feel that 
effort to acquaint themselves with the policies is time consuming and interferes with the actual work.  
An Assistant Director who is based in a airliner said: 
 I think getting employees to be conversant with information security policies is always a 
problem because people always feel that security policies get in their way and it’s something 
that hinders them from their work.  It is generally difficult to get people to pay attention to 
policies and all that.   
 
Nevertheless, in some instances, users who are employees familiarise themselves better with policies 
than users who are customers.  This is very prevalent in the banking environment where many Internet 
Banking holders have been victims of fraud despite the fact that banks have put policies on their 
websites to assist the users:  
Users who are professionals in their right would be ignorant on basic information security 
requirements and they lose lots of money due to this.  When criminals plunder their accounts 
they plead ignorance and expect the bank to refund them.   
 
It has been noted that whilst users are knowledgeable with policy aspects such as passwords, 
acceptable usage of e-mail and Internet, they have rudimentary knowledge of information security 
issues such as phishing e-mails, pharming websites, and spoofing scams.  However, it has also been 
observed that although policies could have been properly established and approved, the adherence to 
them is not effective because the only form of awareness is to post policies on the Intranet. A General 
Manager: Networks in a hotel defended her department regarding the superficial awareness of 
information security policies:  
It is not our responsibility to train employees; we’re IT people.  We coordinated the drafting 
of the policies, forwarded them to a law firm in Cape Town which specialise in IT law, and 
then got them approved.  You are barking up the wrong tree; the culprits in this matter are the 
HR (Human Resources) guys.  HR should do this as part of training, induction, or orientation 
programmes.  The sooner they spend less time training people about dressing and eating 
etiquette the better.   
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Even in organisations where the Human Resources Department wants to conduct the awareness 
programmes, their efforts are usually met by stiff opposition from the ‘core-business’ departments 
which perceive an information security awareness campaign as a waste of time.  The problem is that 
they cannot link information security and market competitiveness.  This is being disingenuous because 
a company cannot flourish and make lots of money because poor security would lead to huge financial 
losses and reputational damage.   
 
In some instances, it was found  that users are suffering from compliance fatigue. If you mention the 
word “compliance” to a group of banking, mining, or insurance employees, you may literally see some 
of them cringing because they are expected to comply with a myriad of laws, regulations, procedures 
and policies.  Although security is highly prioritised in the above-mentioned sectors, information 
security awareness policies have to compete with other compliance requirements.  Problems emanate 
when the relationship between the employer and employee deteriorates; the user becomes a security 
risk; that is why in a corporate environment, most information security crimes are committed 
internally, sometimes with external cooperation. A bitter IT employee may deliberately destroy 
information systems. When the matter is taken to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA) the estranged employee usually pleads ignorance and the company is blamed for 
insufficient awareness programmes. Ordinary users may sell information to the company competitors.  
A Senior Channel Manager: Cellphone & Electronic Channels in one of the big four banks 
proclaimed:  
You also have users who are honest and genuine employees; their main weakness is gullibility 
and lack of proper training in terms of security.  When such employees are confronted with a 
‘social engineer’ they become gullible and fall into the trap; this is very sad.  Whilst 
compliance fatigue is a genuine issue, information security policies awareness should remain 
on our radar screen. 
 
Information security practitioners have to be creative to gain the attention of the targeted audience.  
However, one should hasten to indicate that information security policies awareness should not be 
done in the expense of other compliance requirements.   
 
Conclusions  
This study has noted that the participation of the Board of Directors in the provision of information 
security policies was very minimal; most information security practitioners were not familiar with the 
legal and policy aspects that they were supposed to integrate in the implementation of information 
security and thus most organisations were not complying with the law. It has been discovered that 
there is a general trend in organisations to put low probability to ICT risks and data disaster 
occurrence.  Nevertheless, the reality is that ICT infrastructure is a high risk in itself, and thus a 
domino effect applies here, as the failure of infrastructure will, without doubt, also lead to the loss of 
data, information and business intelligence.  Organisations cannot continue to perceive the 
establishment of information security policies, ICT Risk Management Framework and the 
implementation thereof as a costly overhead which needs to be downgraded.  It is therefore critical 
that organisations integrate legal aspects into information security policies.  
 
The recommendation here is that the governance aspects of ICTs should be taken seriously by the 
Board of Directors and other governance structures and should not continue to be given less priority 
due to its technical nature.  The alignment of the ICT strategy to the overall business strategy and the 
impact of ICT in the sustainability of the organisation should be interrogated.  The ICT service is 
vulnerable to failure like any other business function and should also comply with good corporate 
governance provisions that are contained in the King III Report (2009).  According to the legislation, 
the management of ICT must comply with responsible governance practices where the Board of 
Directors should exercise its role of being the custodian of corporate governance.  In other words, the 
process of establishing information security policies should be kicked-off by the Board of Directors, 
up to the auditing and review points. 
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It is also been noted that the slow implementation of information security laws by the South African 
government had a negative impact on the corporate environment’s attitude towards legislation. Certain 
provisions in the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 25 of 2002 and the Regulation 
of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Act No. 70 of 2002 have 
not yet been implemented notwithstanding the fact that these two pieces of legislation were 
promulgated just about ten years ago.  It is therefore argued that failure by the government to appear to 
be taking its laws seriously has negative ramifications on the attitude of corporate South Africa 
towards information security legislation.  
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Towards the Development of a Concept Model of Legal Compliance for 
Information Security in the South African Corporate Environment 
 
Abstract 
Evidence shows that currently there is no concept model to guide corporate South Africa in the 
implementation of information security within the broader framework of the law.  The need for 
such a model was identified by the main finding of the broader qualitative study of which this 
paper is part. Forty-five organisations from around the country participated in the study. 
Analysis of the data showed that there is little participation by the organisations in the 
provision of the information security policies; most information security practitioners are not 
familiar with the legal and policy aspects that they are supposed to integrate in the 
implementation of information security and thus, most organisations were not complying with 
the law. Nonetheless, this paper will, by proposing a concept model, synthesise legal 
requirements and information security operational necessities into a single model.  The study 
adopted a hypothetical company in order to demonstrate how the proposed model can be 
implemented in a corporate environment.  Such a study makes a contribution to the body of 
information security theory and knowledge by a model on how legal requirements are 
incorporated into the information security endeavours – policy formulation, implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation.  
 
Key words: concept model; information security; policy; implementation; corporate 
environment; legal requirements, policy requirements 
 
1. Introduction 
While many South African organisations have adopted e-commerce in their transactions, they may not 
be immune to risks, threats and crime due to inadequacy in integration and implementation of 
information security issues (Wu & Ye, 2014).  Research shows that companies that succeed in e-
commerce are those that implement information security policies (Rastogi & Solms, 2012). However, 
the internet revolution is developing so rapidly that it remains a challenge to most organisations to 
remain abreast of developments (Morrison, 2013).   
 
In many organisations, there is a general trend to put low probability to ICT risks and data disaster 
occurrence (Dagada & Eloff, 2013). The reality is that ICT infrastructure is a high risk in itself, and 
thus a domino effect applies here, as the failure of infrastructure will, without doubt, also lead to the 
loss of data, information and business intelligence (Latimer, 2013).  Organisations cannot continue to 
perceive the establishment of information security policies, an ICT Risk Management Framework and 
the implementation thereof, as a costly overhead which needs to be downgraded (Ahmad, Zuraini, 
Rahim & Zairah, 2012).  According to Trcek and Likar (2014), information security policy is meant to 
inform all individuals within an organisation regarding their actions in relation to ICT information 
security issues.  Nonetheless, in some settings, policies are drafted because of regulatory requirements 
(Huber, 2012; Dagada & Mukwevho, 2013).  Drafting information security policies just for the sake of 
satisfying regulatory obligations is not good enough (Bin-Muhaya & Ali-Minhas, 2012). 
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Literature in South Africa depicted the operational necessity and legislation requirements of the 
integration of legal aspects to information security policies in various companies (Westby, 2013; 
Dagada & Eloff, 2013). The evidence shows that currently there is no concept model to guide 
corporate South Africa to implement information security within the broader framework of the law 
(Lodi, Anniello, Di Luna & Baldoni, 2014).  This paper will, therefore, by presenting a proposed 
concept model, synthesise legal requirements and information security operational necessities into a 
single model.  This study makes a contribution to the body of information security theory and 
knowledge.  In this model, legal requirements are incorporated into the information security 
endeavours – policy formulation, implementation, risk management framework, monitoring, and 
evaluation. This model should be seen as a synthesis of theory, practice and cognitive perspectives 
gained over the years of research and practical experience of the author. It should however, be stressed 
that the model developed in this paper is the researcher’s conceptualisation of a model which could 
guide organisations in the country to implement information security in their businesses. 
 
1.1 Research design issues and context 
Briefly, the aim of the study is to assess how South African companies integrate legal and policy 
aspects when dealing with information security issues. In the study, a qualitative research approach 
embracing semi-structured interviews as well as document and web analysis were used for data 
gathering. Forty-five organisations from different industrial sectors in South Africa participated in the 
study. Analysis of the data showed that there is little participation of organisations in the provision of 
the information security policies. It further shows that many information security practitioners are not 
familiar with the legal and policy aspects that they are supposed to integrate in the implementation of 
information security. This means many organisations are not complying with the law. Meta-analysis of 
the study revealed that both the government and corporate South Africa were not implementing some 
of the information security legal requirements. However, it is hoped that this model proves to be useful 
to policy formulators, directors of the boards, ICT executives, and information security practitioners in 
incorporating/addressing legal requirements in their policy formulation. 
 
The proposed Concept Model combines theory, the author’s extensive experience (as an academic and 
ICT Manager) and cognitive perspectives gained over many years. It should be noted that this study 
was a product of interplay between the researcher’s ontological position and the empirical findings of 
the study.   The author’s perspective has influenced the research methodology employed in the study, 
and, by implication, the findings of the study and the Concept Model. The model was necessitated by 
the main finding of the broader study of which this paper is part.  
 
In order to demonstrate how the proposed model can be implemented in a corporate environment, the 
study adopted a hypothetical company named Aifheli Pty Ltd in which the model would be 
implemented.   Aspects related to the model are real whilst the descriptions of the phantom company 
are simply fictitious, but of significance for illustration purposes. As part of illustrating how the 
concept model can be implemented, I have dealt with macro and micro aspects of the organisational 
implementation of the Concept Model of Legal Compliance for the Information Security in the 
Corporate Environment (CMLCISCE).  The macro organisational initiatives are the foundation for the 
actual implementation of the concept model.  These include the establishment and implementation of 
the ICT Enterprise Architecture; and the implementation.  At micro level, the paper demonstrates 
components of the concept model and roles played by the Board of Dierctors, Group ICT Steering 
Committee, Group ICT Management Committee, Board of Dierctors’ Audit Committee, and all 
employees involved in the formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of information 
security policies. 
 
The proposed concept model will present a structured organization that is generic in its disposition, is 
product independent and will cater for both sides of information security practice - governance and 
operations. 
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1.2 Aifheli Group of Companies 
In order to demonstrate how the proposed model can be implemented in a corporate environment, we 
have decided to construct a hypothetical company (Aifheli Pty Ltd) in which the model would be 
implemented.  Consequently, aspects related to the model are genuine whilst the descriptions of the 
phantom company are simply fictitious, but of significance for illustration purposes. The Group has 
four entities (companies) as follows – Aifheli Mines, Aifheli SHERQ (Quality, Safety, Health, and 
Environment) Solutions, Aifheli HRD (Human Resources Development) Services, and Aifheli 
Autocatalytic Converter Solutions.  Figure 1 (see appendix) illustrates the structure of Aifheli Pty Ltd. 
 
2 The Proposed Model of Legal Compliance 
The CMLCISCE will be implemented on macro and micro level.  A major difference between macro 
and micro model implementations is that the macro level deals with overall ICT governance issues, 
whilst at the micro level, the focus is specifically on the integration of legal aspects in information 
security policies and the implementation thereof.   
 
2.1 Macro-organisational model implementation  
The proposed model cannot be implemented in a vacuum and thus certain ICT macro-organisational 
initiatives have to happen before the actual implementation.  The aforesaid macro-organisational 
issues include the following – establishment and implementation of the ICT Enterprise Architecture; 
and implementation of the ICT governance structures. 
 
2.1.1 Establishment and implementation of the ICT Enterprise Architecture 
A major concern emerging from the international environment, and South Africa in particular, is that 
ICT has, in more ways than one, become disconnected from the business and is thus losing touch with 
the core activities (Jisarek, 2012; Dagada & Eloff, 2013). Whilst a number of reasons are attributable 
to this state of affairs, the major causal factor is that when major institutions evolve and restructure, 
they tend to temporarily lose focus.  This may result in support functions like ICT assuming a 
corporate life of their own without necessarily being aligned to the core business of the organisation 
(ibid). The disconnection between ICT and the business can be resolved by establishing an Enterprise 
Architecture as part of implementing the proposed Concept Model of Legal Compliance for 
Information Security within the Group. Aifheli should establish an Enterprise Architecture. 
 
The Enterprise Architecture will provide an organisational model for the deployment of ICT within the 
company.  This Enterprise Architecture, which should be aligned to the company strategy, articulates 
the required ICT infrastructure and its role in business processes.  ICT, in this instance, should not just 
be seen as a support function, but should play a major role in the core business of the organisation 
(Cumbie & Sankar, 2012; Dagada & Eloff, 2013).  The suggested Enterprise Architecture should, 
firstly, be positioned and aligned to the four fundamental characteristics of the Aifheli core business 
(business reality) – Mining, SHERQ, HRD, and autocatalytic converter manufacturing. Secondly, it 
should cater for operational effectiveness by defining the role of ICT in the Group shared services 
such as – human resources, marketing, finance, procurement, treasury, legal affairs and auditing; and 
thirdly, align to the governing aspects that are contained in the organisational vision, mission, and 
strategy (Stantchev, Petruch & Tamm, 2013).   
 
The Enterprise Architecture should recognise the crucial role of the ICT user in the various entities 
within the Group in the implementation and the overall management of the ICT infrastructure and 
applications.  The provision of ICT should nevertheless, be aligned to national and international best 
practices (ibid).   
 
2.1.2 Establishment and implementation of the ICT governance structures 
As part of implementing the proposed Concept Model of Legal Compliance for Information Security 
in the corporate environment, it is suggested that the Aifheli Group should, at the macro-level, have a 
five tier ICT governance structure. 
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i. Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors is the highest level of the governance in any company.  The Board also has 
fiduciary responsibilities.  Between the shareholder’s Annual General Meetings (AGMs) of any 
organisation (Non-Profit Companies, Profit Companies, and Private Companies) the Board of 
Directors is the uppermost governance structure.  This statement is in line with the provisions of the 
Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008 and the King Report on Governance for South Africa (2009) 
(commonly known and hereafter as: King III Report, 2009).  According to the Companies Act, No. 71 
of 2008, the duties of directors caters for both fiduciary responsibility and duty of reasonable care.  
The implication of this is that the business and activities of an organisation should be conducted under 
the management or direction of the Board within the powers and authority provided by the aforesaid 
Act, common law, and other relevant pieces of legislation.  In line with the top-down approach, the 
Board of Directors will make certain broad ICT pronouncements or policy directives that should be 
established and implemented at an operational level.  In other words, the Board of Directors will 
depart from the concept of the ‘bigger picture’, the comprehensive position, and most of the time it 
will serve as the point of departure where ICT policy initiatives are formulated and governed.  In terms 
of the bottom-up approach, the Group ICT Steering Committee will, in line with the legislation and/or 
company policies, take certain matters to the Board of Directors for information or decision-making 
purposes. According to this study, the Board should have five sub-committees as follows – audit, 
nomination and compensation, corporate governance, investment, and sustainable development.  
 
The Audit Committee, to be responsible for identifying and mitigating the risks, which includes ICT 
related risks.  The Committee should approve information security policies and monitor 
compliance; and on behalf of the Board of Directors, determine if the legal aspects have been 
integrated into information security policies.   
 
The Nomination and Compensation Committee is responsible for advising the Board of Directors 
regarding people who can serve as either non-executive or executive directors.   Due to the 
pervasiveness of the ICT role within the organisation and the bluring of the boundary between 
the typical ‘business and the ‘business of ICT within the organisation’, it is advisable for the 
Nomination and Compensation Committee to ensure that amongst the Non-Executive Directors, 
there is someone with a broad knowledge of ICT related risks.   
 
The Corporate Governance Committee should be responsible for the overall oversight of corporate 
governance by ensuring that the company’s operations are aligned to best corporate governance 
practice, overseeing the company’s governance pronouncements, assessing the independence of 
the Non-Executive Directors, and establishing the ethical guidelines for directors and measures 
to deal with conflict of interest.   
 
The Investment Committee should advise the company regarding its main strategic thrust.  This 
committee will make recommendations on dealing with organic or/and acquisition growth, 
disposals, and strategic partnerships.     
 
Sustainable Development Committee: should ensure that the company approaches sustainability in an 
integrated manner by bringing together economic, environmental and social aspects into the 
inextricably woven fabric of the Group.  This committee should also ensure that its ICT 
operations do not lead to environmental decay. 
 
ii. Group ICT Steering Committee 
This committee should be constituted by all the Executive Directors of the organisation.  In the context 
of the Aifheli Group, members of the Group ICT Steering Committee will be the Group CEO, Group 
Chief Operations Officer, Group Finance, Group CIO, and the CEOs of the Group’s four entities.  The 
Group ICT Steering Committee should be chaired by the Group CEO and an independent Advisor 
should be appointed to advise the committee.  The purpose of this committee is to: –  
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 ensure that the ICT systems and infrastructure are in place to support the Board in the 
execution of its responsibilities in terms of good corporate governance, accountability, and 
business performance;  
 ensure that the ICT strategy and all major ICT initiatives are aligned to the company’s 
business goals and success metrics;  
 deal with ICT related matters as per the Board of Directors’ directives;  
 identify ICT priorities against the broad goals of the Group and with the advice from the 
CEO’s of the four entities within Aifheli;   
 pay attention to the ICT related risks and governance issues;  
 consider the reports from the Group CIO regarding the performance of the ICT function and 
budgets;  
 determine the impact of ICT systems and infrastructure on business processes and 
performance; assume the highest-level governance role over projects and consider reports of 
all projects and ICT initiatives in the Group;  
 identify major strategic directions and matters with regard to the company’s needs in terms of 
ICT;  
 determine, based on proposals presented by the Group CIO, the ICT policy framework and 
formulate and review the Group ICT programme in relation to all rolling capital projects 
underpinning the shared services and the core business of the company.  
The Steering Committee should meet bi-monthly.   
 
iii. Group ICT Operations Committee  (OpsCom) 
OpsCom members should be made up of CEOs and two General Managers from each of the four 
entities of the Aifheli Group, the Group CIO, and the Group Chief Operations Officer. OpsCom 
should be chaired by the Group Chief Operations Officer and should meet once per month.  The main 
purpose of OpsCom is to determine the ICT needs of the Group entities, identify gridlocks in business 
processes and ensure the effective coordination of the ICT rollout across the entire Group. OpsCom 
should also establish action plans to enhance the role of ICT in improving operations and pay attention 
to ICT risks.  Appropriate attention should be placed on the deployment of ICT systems and 
infrastructure and the determination of proper controls to be maintained by each entity over the 
decentralised ICT systems (Cumps, et al 2003).  As part of exercising this responsibility, OpsCom 
should make sure that all the information security related issues are satisfactorily attended to and 
resolved. OpsCom should, where necessary, establish working groups and ad hoc subcommittees to 
deal with specific ICT operational matters.  OpsCom should make recommendations to the Group ICT 
Steering Committee with regard to the ICT investments and operational matters with high impact on 
business performance.   
 
iv. ICT Entity Committees 
Each of the entities should have its own ICT committee chaired by the CEO. The Chair should serve 
on OpsCom.  The entity committee should be the main platform in which the voices of users are heard 
regarding ICT issues within the Group.  The committee should submit ICT reports to the OpsCom 
reflecting each entity’s needs and concerns.  Other responsibilities of the committee should be to:  
 serve as a platform for the departments within the entity to share information about 
operational issues and how ICT can be an enabler;  
 align the entity ICT activities to optimise ICT and determine the alignment with the Group 
Enterprise Architecture;  
 assess the quality of ICT services on a quarterly basis and recommend service levels to the 
OpsCom;  
 provide input to the OpsCom with regard to the crafting and implementation of the ICT plans 
and policies;  
 monitor the ICT related risks within the entity;  
 serve as a safety vehicle to ensure there is a watch over ICT related operations and that 
interventions can be made before crises arise; and  
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 coordinate the entity’s activities regarding ICT and forward issues of interest and concern to 
the OpsCom.   
The ICT Entity Committee will, where necessary, bring matters of concern and interest to the attention 
of the Group ICT Management Committee.   
 
v. Group ICT Management Committee 
The Group ICT Management Committee should be chaired by the Group CIO.  A possible 
organisational structure of Aifheli’s Group ICT Management should be constituted by the Group CIO 
and senior members of his office (Finance Manager, Programmes Manager, Project Manager, and an 
Independent Advisor), and Heads of Strategy and Governance, User Support, Infrastructure and 
Systems Solutions, and Enterprise Information Architecture.  The purpose of the Group ICT 
Management Committee is to:- 
o align the ICT strategy with the overall Group strategy; implement enterprise-wide best 
practices and monitor trends globally, nationally, and within the Group;  
o ensure that ICT initiatives are linked with business priorities;  
o assume overall responsibility for the selection, procurement, deployment, support, and 
maintenance of infrastructure and systems;  
o make sure that all ICT initiatives have clear business objectives and success metrics; conduct 
regular monitoring of the ICT skills of employees on behalf of the entities and the Group;  
o make recommendations to the Group ICT Steering Committee regarding the alignment of ICT 
investments and strategic initiatives and operational needs of the entities and shared services;  
o make recommendations to the Group ICT Steering Committee to approve the implementation 
of large scale ICT programmes and projects;  
o establish and deploy a consolidated ICT Service Delivery Model;  
o establish and maintain an ICT Disaster Recovery and  Business Continuation Plan and 
Procedure;  
o establish and implement draft ICT policies portfolio;  
o establish and implement draft ICT standards portfolio;  
o establish and implement draft ICT Procedures Portfolio;  
o establish and implement draft ICT Risk Management Framework; and  
o operationalise and implement decisions taken through approved recommendations and 
directives from other governance structures.  
The next sub-section deals with the micro-organisational model implementation. 
 
2.2  Micro-organisational model implementation 
According to the King III Report (2009), enterprise strategic planning, risk management and 
information security are the primary responsibilities of the Board of Directors. One does not expect the 
Board of Directors to be involved in a detailed process regarding the formulation of the information 
security policies, but they should rather make broader pronouncements within the business strategic 
direction and sustainability, corporate governance, standards, and legislation framework.  Other parties 
(components of the model) that play a role in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation are the Board of Directors, Group ICT Steering Committee, Group ICT Management 
Committee, Board of Directors’ Audit Committee, and Whole Organisation.  Figure 2 (see appendix 
1) illustrates the placement of each governance structure in the process of integrating legal aspects in 
information security policies and their implementation, and the interface between the governance 
structures. The numbers in the figure shows the steps or sequence of getting the process completed 
successfully. In the following paragraph, the single digit in brackets shows the step in the process as 
depicted in Figure 2. Arrows indicated ABCD in the figure show that, in some instances, while 
following the steps within components of the model, collaboration and/or consultation may be direct 
between the highest levels/steps and the bottom. For instance, arrow A shows that though the Board’s 
sub-Committee on risk management which is on step 5, can consult directly with the Board of 
Directors who are on step1. 
 
249 
 
The King III Report (2009) and Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008  require that a public company like 
the Aifheli Group should have a Board of Directors as the highest governance structure in the 
company. The Board of Directors (1) may have committees that serve as working groups focusing on 
specific governance areas. It is suggested that relevant information security and related compliance 
duties should be identified at this level. Once this has been done the next governance structure will be 
the Group ICT Management Committee. The Group CIO, as the chairperson of this committee, should 
serve on both the Group ICT Steering Committee (2) and the Board of Directors as one of the 
Executive Directors.  This would enable the Group CIO to take the identified information security 
legal provisions, requirements and related compliance duties and translate them into information 
security policies. The drafted information security policies will then be taken by the Group ICT 
Management Committee (3) to the Group ICT Steering Committee (4) for consideration and comment. 
The Group ICT Steering Committee will allocate duties to the business units and/or individual 
positions. The policies will then be taken to the Board’s sub-Committee on risk management (5) for 
their approval. All employees (6) will then be trained regarding the information security policies. They 
will also be asked to sign an Employee Acceptance Form, and the Employee Interception Consent (7). 
The Audit Committee (8) will assess compliance and identify gaps. Thus the overall intention of the 
model is the integration of legal aspects in the information security policies’ formulation, 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, to elevate the benefits of business security, and ultimately 
address corporate security lapses. 
 
3.  Discussion of the components of the model 
 
3.1 Board of Directors gives directives regarding ICT policies 
ICT plays an important role in the functioning of a company and that is why its failure can threaten the 
sustainability of the organisation (Demirkan & Delen, 2013) and therefore the Board of Directors 
should articulate broad ICT policy directives.  The Board of Directors does not have to get involved in 
the technical details of such pronouncements.   
 
In its endeavour to conform with legislation, the Board of Directors should be familiar with ICT risks 
as outlined by the literature, King III Report (2009), and Buys attorneys (2006): liability, risk or harm 
resulting from employees’ abuse of electronic communication; risk resulting from a website and/or E-
Commerce; risk resulting from theft of ICT equipment; risk resulting from software risk; and risk 
presented by the failure of the Board of Directors and/or company executives to deal with information 
security breaches.  The King III Report (2009) and the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008, explicitly allot 
risk management as part of the Board of Directors responsibilities.  Company management is 
accountable to the Board of Directors for crafting, implementing and monitoring ICT policies in 
general, and specifically, information security policies. Due to the pervasiveness and the critical role 
of ICT in the running of the company, part of the responsibilities of the Board of Directors is to 
educate and acquaint themselves with the ICT risks and how they can be mitigated through the 
integration of legal aspects in information security policies.   
 
It is the responsibility of the Board of Directors and its various committees to ensure that the Group 
complies with the legislation of the Republic.  It should, nevertheless, be noted that there are several 
pieces of legislation that have a direct impact on the manner in which information security policies 
should be crafted and implemented; please also see Table 1.  The Board of Directors may require the 
Group CEO to ensure that the following areas of information security are addressed in terms of policy 
implementation – hacking, intellectual property, copyright, protection of trademarks, privacy, and 
patents protection.  The reason for the Board of Directors to give this responsibility to the Group CEO 
is, in real essence, the Board has only one employee – the Group CEO. That is why, if a huge 
information security incident happens, the Board of Directors will require the Group CEO to account 
instead of the Group CIO.  At the same time, the Group CEO depends on other executives to carry out 
his/her responsibilities and thus there is a Group ICT Steering Committee. 
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3.2 Group ICT Steering Committee identifies security areas and instructs the ICT Management 
Committee to establish an ICT Governance Portfolio 
Almost all members of the Group ICT Steering Committee serve on the Board of Directors as 
executive directors and thus the provisions of the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and King III Report 
(2009) relating to directors responsibilities and liabilities are applicable to them.  The new liabilities 
heaped on directors by the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008, have equated the responsibilities of South 
Africa’s executives with that of their counterparts in the USA, who had to contend with the 
governance and reporting responsibilities contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.   
 
In real essence, this is actually the Group Executive, it is just that, in this instance, the agenda of the 
meetings only focuses on ICT related matters.  Once the Board of Directors pronounces certain policy 
directives, it is the responsibility of the Group ICT Steering Committee to delegate the actualisation of 
these directives to individuals and/or structures.  In this instance, the Group Steering Committee will 
delegate the responsibility of crafting information security policies to the Group CIO and the Group 
ICT Management Committee.   
 
The Group ICT Steering Committee should require the Group ICT Management Committee to address 
information security areas (hacking, intellectual property, copyright, protection of trademarks, privacy, 
and patents protection) by establishing the ICT Governance Portfolio which is in line with the 
legislation of the Republic and the best-of-breed nations and international standards.   
 
3.3  Group ICT Management Committee establishes an ICT Governance Portfolio 
This committee has to unpack and put in place details regarding the mandate from the Group ICT 
Steering Committee by delving into the establishment of the ICT Governance Portfolio.  The 
committee should be sensitive to the fact that ICT Governance is a critical component for an effective 
ICT strategy and function.  It is on this basis that ICT Governance should be documented and 
communicated to the Group to enable full implementation and compliance.  A critical element of ICT 
governance is the accountability in terms of information security.  On the other hand, the Group ICT 
Management Committee should ensure that ICT functions are within a framework of policies and legal 
aspects. The lack of policies which integrate legal aspects disadvantages a structured growth of the 
ICT function within a Group and threatens its sustainability.  This should be attributed to the fact that 
the organisation would not be operating in a normalised operating environment.  With the exception of 
polices which integrate policy aspects, ICT Governance should be constituted by the establishment of 
operating standards, identifying the operational risks, and comprehending the whole notion of quality 
management and alignment with the critical success factors for ICT initiatives (vision, people, process, 
and technology). However, this study focuses only on Information Security Policies Portfolio and the 
Risk Management Framework. 
 
3.3.1  Establishment of an ICT policies portfolio 
The Group ICT Management Committee should acknowledge that many pieces of legislation compel 
all organisations in South Africa, regardless of the method and form of their incorporation or 
founding, to comply with the provisions of the legislation in terms of the implementation of 
information security.  This requirement is applicable to all companies as defined by the Companies 
Act, No. 71 of 2008, that is – for profit companies (state owned company, a private company, a 
personal liability company, and a public company) and not for profit companies.   
 
Then again, the King III Report (2009) argues that information security is a critical component of the 
overall business and sustainability and thus companies should address information security by 
addressing confidentiality, integrity, and availability.   
 
The Group ICT Management Committee should take cognisance of the fact that, making-up a 
predominant part of corporate ICT governance, ICT policies which integrate legal aspects in terms of 
information security, will guide the Group position on matters which not only pertain to ICT 
operations.  This is because ICT permeates the company at all levels and enables the flow of the 
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business processes. Due to ICT’s pervasive nature, employees’ work tends to revolve around ICT and 
in most instances information security and its relevant pieces of legislation are neglected and thus lead 
to corporate non-compliance. To avoid this, the Group ICT Management Committee must establish an 
ICT Policies Portfolio by aligning information aspects with the relevant policies and legislation.  Table 
1 illustrates the aforementioned recommendation. 
 
Table 1: Synopsis of ICT Policies Portfolio 
AREA OF 
INFORMATION 
SECURITY 
RELEVANT POLICY RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
1) Hacking   Information Security Policy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Access to Information Security 
Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance 
Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 
2 of 2000 
 Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act No. 25 of 2005 
 Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Matters Act No. 70 
2002 
 Common law 
2) Intellectual 
Property and 
Copyright 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
 Information Security Policy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Plagiarism Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act 
No. 38 of 19997 
 Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
 Films and Publications Act No. 65 of 1996 
 National Archives and Records Service of 
South Africa Act No. 43 of 1996 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 
2 of 2000 
3) Protection of 
trademarks 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act  
No. 38 of 1997 
 Copyright Act of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
4) Privacy  Data Privacy Policy 
 ICT Acceptable Use Policy 
 Electronic Communications 
Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance 
Policy 
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
No. 108 of 1996 
 Protection of Personal Information Bill No. 
9 of 2009 
5) Patents 
protection 
 No company had a 
distinguishing policy on patent 
rights 
 Patents Act No. 57 of 1978 
 Note: Only three organisations addressed 
patent protection as part of their Intellectual 
Property Policy 
 Common law 
 Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly 
Financed Research and Development Act 
No. 52 of 2008. 
 
The proposed ICT Policies Portfolio in Table 1 adequately addresses the findings of the research on 
which this study is based.  They also address ICT risks that were listed by Buys Attorneys (2006) as 
follows: liability, risk or harm resulting from employees abuse of electronic communication; risk 
resulting from a website and/or E-Commerce; risk resulting from theft of the ICT equipment; risk 
resulting from software risk; and risk presented by the failure of the Board of Directors and/or 
company executives to deal with information security breaches.  Table 2 demonstrates how risks 
identified by Buys Attorneys (2006) are addressed in the ICT Policies Portfolio. 
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Table 2: Accommodation of ICT risks in the ICT Policies Portfolio 
AREA OF 
INFORMATION 
SECURITY 
RELEVANT POLICY RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
1) Hacking (Buys 
Attorneys: 
employees risk, E-
Commerce risk, risk, 
& theft) 
 Information SPolicy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Access to Information Security 
Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance 
Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 Information Security Standards 
Management Policy 
 Procedure Development and 
Management Policy 
 Quality Management Policy 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 
of 2000 
 Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act No. 25 of 2005 
 Regulation of Interception of Communications 
and Provision of Communication-related Act 
No. 70 2002 
 Common law 
2) Intellectual 
Property and 
Copyright (Buys 
Attorneys: 
employees risk, E-
Commerce risk, risk, 
& theft) 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
 Information Security Policy 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 Plagiarism Policy 
 Records Management Policy 
 Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act No. 
38 of 1997 
 Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
 Films and Publications Act No. 65 of 1996 
 National Archives and Records Service of South 
Africa Act No. 43 of 1996 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 
of 2000 
 Common law 
3) Protection of 
trademarks (Buys 
Attorneys: 
employees risk, E-
Commerce risk, risk, 
& theft) 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act  No. 
38 of 19997 
 Copyright Act of 1978 
 Merchandise Act No. 17 of 1941 
 Common law 
4) Privacy (Buys 
Attorneys: 
employees risk, E-
Commerce risk, risk, 
& theft) 
 Data Privacy Policy 
 ICT Acceptable Use Policy 
 Electronic Communications Policy 
 Interception and Surveillance 
Policy 
 E-Commerce Policy 
 Information Security Standards 
Management Policy 
 Procedures Development and 
Management Policy 
 Quality Management Policy 
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 
108 of 1996 
 Protection of Personal Information Bill No. 9 of 
2009 
 Common law 
5) Patents protection 
(Buys Attorneys: 
employees risk, E-
Commerce risk, risk, 
& theft) 
 No company had a distinguishing 
policy on patents rights 
 Patents Act No. 57 of 1978 
 Notes: Only three organisations addressed patent 
protection as part of the Intellectual Property 
Policy 
 Common law 
 Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly 
Financed Research and Development Act No. 52 
of 2008. 
 
Buys Attorneys (2006) also mentioned the risk associated with the failure of the Board of Directors 
and/or the company’s management; this has not strictly been addressed in either Tables 1 or 2.  
However, measures to deal with the negligence of both non-executive and executive directors are 
sufficiently catered for in the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and the provisions of this Act should not 
necessarily be part of any information security policies.  Other than integrating legal aspects to the 
information security policies, ICT standards should also be integrated into some policies.   
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3.3.2 Establishment of an ICT Risk Management Framework 
Since ICT is pervasive throughout Group entities and is an enabler of the business processes and 
connected to suppliers and customers, the Group ICT Management Committee should establish 
measures to mitigate information security threats.  These measures should be done in line with the 
established ICT Portfolio.  In essence, the best mechanism to counteract ICT threats is to actually 
implement the approved policies.  At face value, the point I am making sounds obvious, but 
practically, it is not so apparent.  During the fieldwork of this study, I came across some companies 
that had well-crafted policies which were never implemented and thus there was a huge disjuncture 
between the policy and the actual implementation of information security.  The proposed ICT Risk 
Management Framework should comprise the standards, procedures, and quality management. 
 
Standards bring stability in the ICT environment and give assurance to the company that their 
information security implementation has been implemented within the framework of best practice.  
Due to the fixed nature of the standards, it is advisable that they should be customised for the 
particular operational environment.  However, customisation should not lead to a major departure 
from the core framework of the standard.  Standards should form part of the ICT Risk Framework and 
consequently ICT Governance, and thus they should be managed centrally as a portfolio. Apart from 
integrating aspects of standards into various information security policies, the Group ICT Management 
Committee should develop an Information Security Standards Management Policy and it should deal 
with the following aspects: information security areas to be standardised, typical detour from 
standards, motivation and process for customisation, deployment of the standards portfolio, review of 
standards, Group ICT Management Committee remit and answerability, and non- acquiescence 
management.  The following standards should form part of the ICT Risk Management Framework – 
ISO 9000/20000 (which relates to quality assurance in project implementation) and ISO38500 (which 
deals with the corporate governance of ICT).   
 
The Standard Operating Procedures should be part of the ICT Risk Management Framework.  In the 
absence of operational procedures, it would become difficult to monitor information security 
performance and compliance with the relevant legislation aspects and standards. I therefore propose 
the establishment of the Procedure Development and Management Policy.   
 
In addition, the Group ICT Management Committee should make sure that quality management is an 
integral part of information security implementation.  The fact that information security deployment 
conforms to legislation, best-of-breed standards, procedures and quality management, gives certain 
assurances to the Group Executive and the Board of Directors.  A Quality Management Policy should 
be established and become an integral part of the ICT Management Framework.  Once the ICT Polices 
Portfolio and ICT Risk Management Framework have been established, the Group CIO should, on 
behalf of the Group ICT Management Committee, submit them to the Group ICT Steering Committee. 
It is advisable for the Group ICT Management Committee to seek the advice of the Group ICT 
Operations Committee and the ICT Entity Committee before they are passed to the Group ICT 
Steering Committee.   
 
3.4  Group ICT Steering Committee endorsement of policies portfolio and risk management 
framework 
If the Group ICT Steering Committee, for whatever reason, does not endorse the Policies Portfolio and 
Risk Management Framework, they should be taken back to the Group ICT Management Committee 
for refinement.  However, once the ICT Policies Portfolio and ICT Risk Management Framework have 
been endorsed by the Group ICT Steering Committee, the Group CEO should, on behalf of the Group 
ICT Steering Committee, submit them to the Audit Committee for approval.  
 
3.5  Board of Directors’ Audit Committee approves policies and risk management framework 
The Audit Committee should ensure that the ICT Polices Portfolio and ICT Risk Management 
Framework that have been endorsed by the Group ICT Steering Committee do not leave loopholes that 
could compromise the performance and sustainability of the organisation.  The Audit Committee 
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should satisfy itself that measures to deal with ICT security risks are integrated into the overall 
company strategy and that various information security policies are aligned with this strategy.  
Furthermore, information security policies should have integrated relevant legislation provisions.  The 
Audit Committee should also ensure that ICT related risks and security threats are identified and 
mitigated.  The Audit Committee should get the services and advice of an independent ICT Law Firm 
or auditing company in executing the assessment of information security policies.   
 
The Audit Committee should check whether information security policies have been formulated to 
deal with risks and potential threats in a way that is commensurate with the organisation’s vision, 
business priorities, and goals.  In line with the recommendations of the King III Report (2009), the 
Audit Committee should determine how information security policies address three areas – 
confidentiality (protecting sensitive information from unauthorised disclosure), integrity (safeguarding 
the accuracy of data, information and software), and availability (ensuring that information and vital 
services are available when needed). During this period of evaluating the policies, the Audit 
Committee should liaise with the overall Board of Directors for information purposes and the Group 
ICT Steering Committee to seek clarity and give feedback.  
 
3.6  Group Human Resources conducts employee training 
If the Audit Committee is satisfied with the submitted policies, the Group CEO will be informed and 
the policies will then be implemented in the whole organisation.  The Group ICT Operations 
Committee and ICT Entity Committee should be involved when it comes to the technical aspects of 
the policies’ implementation. The Group CEO will, on behalf of the Group Steering Committee, give a 
directive to Group Human Resources to conduct training to all staff members in all the Group entities.   
 
When formulating a corporate Information Security Training Programme, Group Human Resources 
should take into consideration that ICT systems are dependent on employees.  This is in line with 
Cecere and Rochelandet (2013) who argue that information security is more about people’s behaviour 
than anything else.  In other words, in a corporate environment, information security is about 
thwarting employees’ intentional and unintentional actions and the harmful implications thereof.  In 
spite of the propaganda from ICT suppliers about the necessity of information security technology, 
many essential security actions cannot be automated and thus they rely on the correct usage by the 
employees.  This means that companies are reliant on employees to attain a secure ICT environment.  
Due to the fact that humans are regarded by several authors (Clarke, Hall & Rapanotti, 2013; 
Stephanou & Dagada, 2009) as the “weakest link” in the security chain, there is a need for Group 
Human Resources to make sure that staff members are properly trained regarding the correct 
implementation of, and compliance with, information security policies.   
 
As part of establishing or procuring a corporate Information Security Training Programme, Group 
Human Resources should take into account that a real threat in terms of ICT systems is that of 
insiders, employees, and consultants.  This is so because these people are permitted to have 
advantaged access to the ICT systems, and are familiar with internal processes of the Group and 
possess some technical knowhow.  Together these factors present a considerable risk to the company.  
It is on this premise that information security awareness and training must be conducted to enable 
employees to comprehend what they must do to enforce security policies and the rationale thereof.  
This view is supported by authors such as Chou and Cheng (2012).  
 
3.7  All employees accept security policies by signing Consent Forms 
Once the awareness and training programmes have been implemented, each staff member should sign 
the Consent Form and Employee Interception Consent which would enforce employees’ adherence to 
the principles of good corporate governance; conformance to safety and security of the organisations’ 
network; and ensure a secure and healthy working environment.  The Consent Form will enable the 
company to monitor employees’ activities related to the use of Group ICT systems when needs be.  
The company should take into consideration the fact that, in South Africa, employees have the 
constitutional right to privacy and thus the Consent Form is a correct mechanism to balance 
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information security objectives and the compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa No. 108 of 1996.   
 
The Consent Form enables the employees to agree to the necessary undertakings.  The Consent Forms 
should be signed by employees who are already within the organisation when information security 
policies are approved by the Board of Directors or when they are amended.  Provisions contained in 
the Consent Form should be part of the employment agreement for new employees.  Group Human 
Resources, with the guidance of Group Legal Corporate Affairs, should determine steps that have to 
be taken against employees who refuse to sign the Consent Forms.  Such steps should be taken within 
the framework of acceptable human resources practices and labour related laws of the Republic of 
South Africa.  Once employees have signed the Consent Forms and the policies have been 
implemented, the next step in the legal compliance chain will be the audit conducted by Board of 
Directors’ Audit Committee.   
 
3.8  The Audit Committee audits adherence to the security policies 
Once policies have been implemented, the Group ICT Committee should constantly monitor 
information security legal compliance.  However, the actual audit of compliance should be done by the 
Audit Committee on behalf of the Board of the Directors because, whilst monitoring is a management 
issue, auditing is a governance matter.  It is advisable for the Audit Committee to get external 
independent assistance when carrying out the audit.  The Audit should look at both the compliance by 
the employees, and ICT infrastructure and systems.   
 
Regarding human resources’ compliance with the information security policies, it may be advisable to 
take guidance from Midha and Bhattacherjee (2012) who reasoned that employees’ policies 
compliance can be determined by observing their behaviours and attitudes by: conducting password 
cracking; doing interviews with employees at pause areas in order to obtain anecdotal evidence; 
tracking the number and nature of incidents reported before and after information security policies 
were implemented; conducting clean desk audits; determining who has reviewed the policies; and 
distributing surveys or questionnaires in order to get input from employees.  This may include 
following up to determine what employees remember and what worked.   
 
ICT infrastructure and systems are devised as intrinsic units, but are actually prone to disappoint due 
to their digital nature, vulnerability to attacks, and their dependency on resources outside the ICT 
sphere of influence.  It is on this premise that the Audit Committee should also audit the ICT 
infrastructure and systems to ascertain whether they satisfy the requirements of the information 
security policies and the established Risk Management Framework.   
 
As a starting point, the Audit Committee should assess to what extent the ICT security infrastructure is 
linked to the enterprise-wide risk management efforts, at the same time considering that ICT risks 
cannot always be defined based on the parameters articulated on a corporate level.  Backups are very 
important in terms of mitigating ICT risks and information security threats and thus the audit team 
should test their performance and whether there is some backup off-site and alignment with the 
business expectations for data recovery capabilities.  As part of the audit, an assessment of the 
Information Technology General Controls (ITGCs) of the Group should be conducted; Table 3 below 
serves as an example. 
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Table 3: Scope of the ITGCs in the Management Campus 
Objective Overview of procedures 
COSO Components: Those mechanisms that management has implemented, and uses, to manage the day to day activities of 
the ICT environment 
1. Adequate policies & procedures 
exist governing the day to day 
operations of the ICT domain. 
Inspection of policies and understanding of procedures governing: 
-security administration; 
-incident monitoring; 
-change management; 
-backups; 
-batch/job processing; etc. 
2. A defined structure exists under 
which ICT operates. 
-confirmation of organisational structure with a focus on understanding 
reporting structures, responsibilities and on ensuring key functions are 
segregated; 
-understanding and validation of key management meetings (including core 
audit) with a focus on understanding items discussed, and on the nature and 
format of documentation produced. 
 
3. An ICT strategy exists governing 
the short term and long terms goals, 
and those steps needed to achieve 
the goals. 
Inspection of ICT strategy with a focus on understanding: 
-short term goals; 
-long term goals; 
-alignment with business; and 
-steps to be taken to achieve goals 
Program Change Control: The process whereby changes are made to data, application functionality & reports 
4. Only authorised individuals have 
access to migrate changes into 
production, and these persons are 
segregated from those responsible 
for development activities. 
-comparison of list of developers with those responsible for, and with access 
to, migrate changes into production; 
-validation of listing to ensure all access is authorised, and to ensure that 
adequate segregation of duties exists between those responsible, and those 
responsible for migrating changes. 
Access to Programs & data: the process around ensuring application & data access is restricted to authorised individuals 
6. User provisioning processes ensure 
that only authorised users have 
access to the applications and 
databases. 
Validation of user provisioning processes with a focus on ensuring: 
-all new users are approved; 
-accounts for terminated users are removed in a timely manner; 
-adequate segregation of duties exists between critical functions; and 
-regular reviews are performed on users with access to the shared 
applications and databases. 
7. Production servers are appropriately 
configured to reduce the risk of 
unauthorised access to the 
databases and shared applications. 
Review of security configuration for production servers.  Review will be 
performed using proprietary scripts and will include the validation of high 
risk security configuration.  This will include the review of: 
-audit logging configuration & associated monitoring procedures; 
-password parameters; 
-trusts & servers; and 
-accounts with administrative privileges. 
8. Administrative privileges are 
restricted to authorised personnel 
only and all activities performed 
with these accounts are authorised. 
-Validation of persons with administrative access to application, and 
associated technical platforms; 
-Review of audit logging/monitoring procedures for users with 
administrative access. 
 
Computer Operations: The process around ensuing adequate monitoring of the application environment is performed 
9. Adequate procedures have been 
implemented to ensure adequate 
recovery in the event of the disaster. 
-Review and validation of backup schedule and associated monitoring; 
-Inspection of ICT environmental controls, with a focus on understanding 
mechanisms implementation to control the server environment; 
-Inspection of Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP), and review of procedures 
performed by management to ensure that DRP functions effectively.  
10. Production issues are monitored 
and resolved in a real time manner. 
-Review and validation of job schedule and associated monitoring; 
-Validation of Help Desk monitoring/tracking procedures. 
 
There are several templates of the ITGCs in literature; however the one appearing in Table 2 has been 
modified to suit the proposed Concept Model of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the 
Corporate Environment.  The purpose of the ITGCs is to firstly, appraise key controls with the ICT 
general computerised control environment that support reliable and continuous processing of 
computerised information systems, and secondly, report to the Board of Directors the areas of 
perceived weakness or areas for improvement in procedure or control.  The Board of Directors will 
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delegate audited matters that need attention to the Group ICT Steering Committee for rectification and 
implementation.   
 
4.  Conclusion  
The significant point drawn from this study is that the governance aspect of ICTs should be taken 
seriously by the Board of Directors and other governance structures and should not continue to be 
given lower priority due to its technical nature.  The alignment of the ICT strategy with the overall 
business strategy and the impact of ICT in the sustainability of the organisation should be interrogated.  
Notwithstanding, the ICT service is vulnerable to failure like any other business function and should 
also comply with good corporate governance provisions that are contained in the King III Report 
(2009).  According to the legislation, the management of ICT must comply with responsible 
governance practices.  The Board of Directors should exercise its role of being the custodian of 
corporate governance.  The lack of, or inadequate, ICT security measures constitute poor corporate 
governance and thus this paper emphasises that the Board of Directors should pay attention to this.  
The paper also emphasised the role of the independent Audit Committee, which should amongst 
others, audit the organisation’s ICT infrastructure and systems.  Such audits will ensure that ICT 
related policies are well crafted and implemented to mitigate information security risks. According to 
the proposed model, the process of establishing information security policies should be initiated by the 
Board of Directors, up to the auditing and review points. 
 
Inasmuch as this paper has been constructed around a hypothetical organisation in which the proposed 
Concept Model (of Legal Compliance for Information Security in the Corporate Environment) can be 
implemented, it is the researcher’s belief that this model can be implemented in other real companies 
despite their governance and management structures. The rationale for presenting the model 
conceptually was the consequence of the appreciation that the Model will not be implementable 
without its conceptual nature being sculptured.  The researcher contributed to information security 
knowledge and theory by crafting the Concept Model and demonstrating how it can be implemented.  
The Concept Model came into being by integrating two traditionally foreign concepts – information 
security and legislation into a single Concept Model. Before the two concepts were integrated in this 
paper, the literature review and the findings of the bigger research project on which this study is based, 
provided detailed referencing to enable the reader to appraise himself of the theoretical and real-life 
grounding of legal aspects and information security.   
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagrammatical representation of the structures of Aifheli Group of Companies 
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Figure 2: Diagrammatical representation of Concept Model of Legal Compliance for Information 
Security at Corporate Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
